Historically, the relationship between India and Pakistan has been mired in conflicts, war, and lack of trust. Pakistan has continued to loom large on India’s horizon despite the growing gap between the two countries. Ambassador (retd) Sharat Sabharwal’s book "India’s Pakistan Conundrum: Managing a Complex Relationship" examines the nature of the Pakistani state, its internal dynamics, and its impact on India. The text looks at key issues of the India-Pakistan relationship, appraises a range of India’s policy options to address the Pakistan conundrum, and proposes a way forward for India’s Pakistan policy. Drawing on the author’s experience of two diplomatic stints in Pakistan, including as the High Commissioner of India, the book offers a unique insider’s perspective on this critical relationship.

Below are the selected excerpts from the book:

The Pakistan army sees nuclear arsenal as an umbrella under which they can use their terror card with impunity without inviting an Indian reprisal. One often heard it being said in Pakistan that there could be no war under a nuclear overhang. During my lectures to Pakistan army officers at their National Defence University, I told them that their statement would sound more meaningful if it were modified to state that there could be no war- overt or covert- under a nuclear overhang.

Pakistan is known to have acquired its nuclear weapon capability on the basis of the design of a bomb provided by China and a test reportedly conducted for Pakistan by China at its Lop Nur test site, much before it went overtly nuclear in 1998. Its nuclear blackmail also, therefore, started much before 1998. In an interview given to the veteran Indian journalist, Kuldip Nayar in January 1987, in the course of Operation Brasstacks, the Pakistani nuclear scientist, Dr. A.Q. Khan said, “They told us Pakistan could never produce the bomb, and they doubted my capabilities, but they know we have done it.” After Nayar went public with the story, Khan described the comments attributed to him as false and concocted, but the cat was already out of the bag. It is unlikely that someone in his sensitive position could have met an Indian journalist without authorisation from the higher quarters and made the above comment. It is, therefore, more than likely that he did it with due authorisation to hold out a nuclear threat to India. The subsequent denial seems to have been aimed at keeping Pakistan’s American patrons mollified.

In the middle of the night between May 27 and 28, 1998, the Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan, Satish Chandra, was called in to the Pakistan Foreign Ministry by Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad and I accompanied him. The meeting took place past 1 am. Shamshad, who was accompanied by senior Foreign Ministry officials, said that they had credible information that India was going to attack their nuclear facilities. When asked how, Shamshad responded that the attack was perhaps to be mounted by F16 aircraft stationed at the Chennai airfield and added that he had been instructed by his government to inform the Government of India through the High Commissioner that in the event of such an attack, there would be "massive retaliation with devastating consequences." The High Commissioner expressed his surprise at what Shamshad had said. He

pointed out that India did not possess F 16 aircraft. Shamshad said that the aircraft he had referred to could be Israeli. The High Commissioner also enquired whether the Foreign Secretary had talked of a possible attack against the nuclear installations and facilities included in the list given by Pakistan to India at the beginning of every year under the bilateral agreement on the prohibition of attack against the nuclear installations of each other. Shamshad mumbled that he had referred to those and “other” facilities. The meeting wrapped up in a few minutes with the High Commissioner assuring Shamshad that his demarche would be conveyed to the Government of India. The High Commissioner and I went to the High Commission to report the rather alarmist and unusual demarche of our hosts to New Delhi. In view of its nature, we decided to convey it on phone before sending a cable. But we found that for the capital of the country, which according to the Pakistanis was about to mount an attack of major import against their country, New Delhi seemed extraordinarily relaxed and it took us some time to reach the Indian Foreign Secretary, who had been alerted to the Pakistani demarche a few minutes earlier by the Indian Mission to the UN in New York. Unknown to us, the Pakistanis had also taken up the matter with all the P5 countries in their capitals and through their Missions to the UN in New York.

High Commissioner Chandra and I discussed Shamshad Ahmad’s demarche before sending our assessment to Delhi. It was our considered view that the Pakistanis were on the verge of carrying out their nuclear tests ( which happened on May 28) and were nervous about India attacking their testing site in the Chagai hills of Balochistan, which did not figure in the lists given to India at the beginning of every year under the agreement on the prohibition of attack against the nuclear installations of each other. That explained Shamshad's use of the word "other" while answering High Commissioner’s query about the facilities that he had in mind.

The policy of massive retaliation was announced by the then US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, in 1954 when he said that the US would protect its allies through the deterrent of massive retaliatory power. His reference was to reliance on the American nuclear arsenal against a Soviet aggression. Since then, the term “massive retaliation” has come to denote disproportionate retaliation with nuclear weapons to an attack by an adversary. Therefore, in using the expression “massive retaliation with devastating consequences”, Shamshad had spoken of a nuclear response, thereby confirming the Indian position that Pakistan already possessed nuclear weapons capability acquired with the Chinese help. The impending tests were meant, inter alia, to bring this capability into the open. The Pakistanis surely did not believe that India would take any such action lying down and would not retaliate with whatever nuclear capability it had at that stage. All in all, it seems to have been a case of overreaction and nuclear bluster in response to a non-existent threat.

Years later, a retired Pakistan Foreign Office official, who was present at our meeting with Shamshad Ahmad, told me that they had reports of the presence of Israeli aircraft at the Chennai airfield with the aim to attack their nuclear testing site in Balochistan. At the same time, there was a US naval presence off the coast of Karachi. Their defence experts believed that if the reports of an attack being planned from India were correct, the US ships would move away before it was mounted and the ships did move away on May 27. These developments convinced them of the need of an urgent demarche. From what my interlocutor told me, they seemed to believe that the Americans were complicit in the plan to attack the Chagai hills testing site.

*****

Reproduced from India's Pakistan Conundrum: Managing a Complex Relationship by Sharat Sabharwal with permission of INFORMA UK Limited through PLSclear. No part of this extract may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

(Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.)

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Historically, the relationship between India and Pakistan has been mired in conflicts, war, and lack of trust. Pakistan has continued to loom large on India’s horizon despite the growing gap between the two countries.

Historically, the relationship between India and Pakistan has been mired in conflicts, war, and lack of trust. Pakistan has continued to loom large on India’s horizon despite the growing gap between the two countries. Ambassador (retd) Sharat Sabharwal’s book "India’s Pakistan Conundrum: Managing a Complex Relationship" examines the nature of the Pakistani state, its internal dynamics, and its impact on India. The text looks at key issues of the India-Pakistan relationship, appraises a range of India’s policy options to address the Pakistan conundrum, and proposes a way forward for India’s Pakistan policy. Drawing on the author’s experience of two diplomatic stints in Pakistan, including as the High Commissioner of India, the book offers a unique insider’s perspective on this critical relationship. Below are the selected excerpts from the book: The Pakistan army sees nuclear arsenal as an umbrella under which they can use their terror card with impunity without inviting an Indian reprisal. One often heard it being said in Pakistan that there could be no war under a nuclear overhang. During my lectures to Pakistan army officers at their National Defence University, I told them that their statement would sound more meaningful if it were modified to state that there could be no war- overt or covert- under a nuclear overhang. Pakistan is known to have acquired its nuclear weapon capability on the basis of the design of a bomb provided by China and a test reportedly conducted for Pakistan by China at its Lop Nur test site, much before it went overtly nuclear in 1998. Its nuclear blackmail also, therefore, started much before 1998. In an interview given to the veteran Indian journalist, Kuldip Nayar in January 1987, in the course of Operation Brasstacks, the Pakistani nuclear scientist, Dr. A.Q. Khan said, “They told us Pakistan could never produce the bomb, and they doubted my capabilities, but they know we have done it.” After Nayar went public with the story, Khan described the comments attributed to him as false and concocted, but the cat was already out of the bag. It is unlikely that someone in his sensitive position could have met an Indian journalist without authorisation from the higher quarters and made the above comment. It is, therefore, more than likely that he did it with due authorisation to hold out a nuclear threat to India. The subsequent denial seems to have been aimed at keeping Pakistan’s American patrons mollified. In the middle of the night between May 27 and 28, 1998, the Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan, Satish Chandra, was called in to the Pakistan Foreign Ministry by Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad and I accompanied him. The meeting took place past 1 am. Shamshad, who was accompanied by senior Foreign Ministry officials, said that they had credible information that India was going to attack their nuclear facilities. When asked how, Shamshad responded that the attack was perhaps to be mounted by F16 aircraft stationed at the Chennai airfield and added that he had been instructed by his government to inform the Government of India through the High Commissioner that in the event of such an attack, there would be "massive retaliation with devastating consequences." The High Commissioner expressed his surprise at what Shamshad had said. He pointed out that India did not possess F 16 aircraft. Shamshad said that the aircraft he had referred to could be Israeli. The High Commissioner also enquired whether the Foreign Secretary had talked of a possible attack against the nuclear installations and facilities included in the list given by Pakistan to India at the beginning of every year under the bilateral agreement on the prohibition of attack against the nuclear installations of each other. Shamshad mumbled that he had referred to those and “other” facilities. The meeting wrapped up in a few minutes with the High Commissioner assuring Shamshad that his demarche would be conveyed to the Government of India. The High Commissioner and I went to the High Commission to report the rather alarmist and unusual demarche of our hosts to New Delhi. In view of its nature, we decided to convey it on phone before sending a cable. But we found that for the capital of the country, which according to the Pakistanis was about to mount an attack of major import against their country, New Delhi seemed extraordinarily relaxed and it took us some time to reach the Indian Foreign Secretary, who had been alerted to the Pakistani demarche a few minutes earlier by the Indian Mission to the UN in New York. Unknown to us, the Pakistanis had also taken up the matter with all the P5 countries in their capitals and through their Missions to the UN in New York. High Commissioner Chandra and I discussed Shamshad Ahmad’s demarche before sending our assessment to Delhi. It was our considered view that the Pakistanis were on the verge of carrying out their nuclear tests ( which happened on May 28) and were nervous about India attacking their testing site in the Chagai hills of Balochistan, which did not figure in the lists given to India at the beginning of every year under the agreement on the prohibition of attack against the nuclear installations of each other. That explained Shamshad's use of the word "other" while answering High Commissioner’s query about the facilities that he had in mind. The policy of massive retaliation was announced by the then US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, in 1954 when he said that the US would protect its allies through the deterrent of massive retaliatory power. His reference was to reliance on the American nuclear arsenal against a Soviet aggression. Since then, the term “massive retaliation” has come to denote disproportionate retaliation with nuclear weapons to an attack by an adversary. Therefore, in using the expression “massive retaliation with devastating consequences”, Shamshad had spoken of a nuclear response, thereby confirming the Indian position that Pakistan already possessed nuclear weapons capability acquired with the Chinese help. The impending tests were meant, inter alia, to bring this capability into the open. The Pakistanis surely did not believe that India would take any such action lying down and would not retaliate with whatever nuclear capability it had at that stage. All in all, it seems to have been a case of overreaction and nuclear bluster in response to a non-existent threat. Years later, a retired Pakistan Foreign Office official, who was present at our meeting with Shamshad Ahmad, told me that they had reports of the presence of Israeli aircraft at the Chennai airfield with the aim to attack their nuclear testing site in Balochistan. At the same time, there was a US naval presence off the coast of Karachi. Their defence experts believed that if the reports of an attack being planned from India were correct, the US ships would move away before it was mounted and the ships did move away on May 27. These developments convinced them of the need of an urgent demarche. From what my interlocutor told me, they seemed to believe that the Americans were complicit in the plan to attack the Chagai hills testing site. ***** Reproduced from India's Pakistan Conundrum: Managing a Complex Relationship by Sharat Sabharwal with permission of INFORMA UK Limited through PLSclear. No part of this extract may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. (Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.)

Pakistan’s nuclear brinkmanship

Two judgments by the Pakistan judiciary – one questioning the extension of tenure of the incumbent army chief and the other awarding death sentence to former chief <a href="https://www.wionews.com/opinions/from-us-perspective-pervez-musharraf-gets-a-well-earned-sentence-268959">Pervez Musharraf</a> for high treason- have attracted considerable attention because of being utterly out of character for the army dominated Pakistani polity. Do they signal the advent of a new dawn in Pakistan?&nbsp;

PM Imran Khan’s decision to grant the second tenure of three years to army chief Qamar Javed Bajwa was not unprecedented. Aside from the self- granted extensions of their tenures by army chiefs turned military dictators, the PPP government had given the second tenure of three years to the then army chief, Ashfaq Parvez Kayani in 2010. However, three days before Bajwa was to embark upon his new tenure, a Supreme Court bench headed by Chief Justice Asif Saeed Khosa took up a petition challenging his continuation in office and suspended the government notification issued for the purpose. 
 
During the tense three-day hearing, the judges questioned the government decision both on account of the utterly inept procedural handling of the matter and the absence of any legal or constitutional basis for it. At the end, in order not to precipitate a crisis, they ruled that Bajwa could continue in his post for a further period of six months and his continuation thereafter would depend upon adoption of suitable legislation by the Parliament concerning the appointment and terms and conditions of service of the Chief of Army Staff. &nbsp;

Subsequently, a special court, constituted by the Supreme Court and comprising a judge each of the Lahore, Peshawar and Sindh High Courts, has given a 2-1 verdict, awarding death sentence for high treason to the former military dictator Parvez Musharraf for his action in declaring an emergency and suspending the constitution in early November 2007, when he was President and Chief of Army Staff. The court relied on Article 6 of the Pakistan Constitution that stipulates that any person who abrogates or subverts or suspends or holds in abeyance the Constitution by force or unconstitutional means shall be guilty of high treason.&nbsp;

The treason case was filed by the Nawaz Sharif government in November 2013 and the Supreme Court agreed to set up a special court to try Musharraf. Within a few months, the then army chief Raheel Sharif indicated that he was against the trial and said that the army “Would preserve its own dignity and institutional pride.” With the army backing him, Musharraf dodged the trial and was able to secure an order from the Supreme Court in March 2016 to go abroad for medical treatment and has not returned to Pakistan since then, even though the special court gave him six opportunities to make his statement. 
 
Finally, when the court decided to hear the case on a daily basis in October 2019, Imran Khan’s government sacked the entire prosecution team! With no further inputs coming from the prosecution or Pervez Musharraf’s defence lawyers, the special court concluded its proceedings on November 19 and said that it would give its verdict on November 28. Caught by surprise, Musharraf’s defence team challenged the special court’s decision to announce its verdict in the Lahore High Court.&nbsp;

Strangely, the government also approached the Islamabad High Court to restrain the special court from going ahead with its verdict. The High Court granted the request and directed the special court to listen to all the parties and complete all legal formalities before pronouncing its judgement. It also directed the government to appoint a prosecutor by December 5. The special court stated that it was not bound by the decision of the Islamabad High Court. 
 
When it convened on December 17, both Pervez Musharraf’s lawyer and the prosecution tried to stall the proceedings, the former by saying that Musharraf must be given an opportunity to make a statement before the court and the latter making an attempt to widen the scope of the trial by bringing in charges against some alleged collaborators of Musharraf, including former Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz. The special court rejected these pleas, ruling that Pervez Musharraf had foregone repeated opportunities to make his statement and the Supreme Court had decided that the case be proceeded with against Musharraf only. It then pronounced its split verdict to sentence Musharraf to death. &nbsp;

The Pakistani judiciary has, with a few exceptions, acted as a handmaiden of the army and helped them in subverting democratic processes. A recent example is its collaboration with the selective accountability process against Nawaz Sharif to rule him out of the 2018 election. Facilitation of his departure for medical treatment abroad by the judiciary seems to be the result of a nod from the army, keen to see him leave the country, in return for an end to his and his daughter’s strident campaign against them. 
 
The last time the judiciary mounted a challenge to the army was under the maverick Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, who reopened the case of financing of the Nawaz Sharif led Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad by the ISI during the 1990 election to defeat Benazir Bhutto, hauled up a few retired generals on corruption charges and took up cases of forced disappearances in Baluchistan and the tribal areas. However, in the face of the resistance of Pakistan army, the court did not make much headway. 
 
Why Chief Justice Khosa, who is to retire later this month, took up the case of Bajwa’s extension has been a matter of speculation. Some observers ascribe it to his annoyance at Imran Khan’s criticism of the judiciary in letting Nawaz Sharif go abroad without the stringent conditions imposed by his government and the consequent desire to get even with the Prime Minister by showing the functioning of his government in a poor light in the matter of army chief’s extension. Others believe that the court might have been encouraged by senior army officers, whose promotion prospects would be marred by the continuation of Bajwa in his post. As for the special court, one of its members, Chief Justice Waqar Ahmed Seth of the Peshawar High Court has had a record of bold decisions, setting aside trials by military courts.&nbsp;

What do the above judgments mean for Pakistan’s democracy? &nbsp;

The continuation of Bajwa as army chief beyond the six months period approved by the Supreme Court would be more a function of his control over his senior army commanders than of the political dynamics within the Parliament. Should he be able to ensure cohesion within the army’s senior ranks, politicians in the government and opposition could be expected to bend over backwards to provide the legislation required for his continuation. The army and Imran Khan government have already rallied against the death sentence awarded to Musharraf. The army spokesperson has issued a statement that the special court judgment has been received by the rank and file of Pakistan armed forces “With a lot of pain and anguish”. 
 
He adds that Pervez Musharraf, who served Pakistan&nbsp;for over 40 years and fought wars for its defence “can surely not be a traitor” and complains that due legal process seems to have been ignored “including constitution of special court, denial of fundamental right of self-defence, undertaking individual-specific proceedings and concluding the case in haste.” He expresses the expectation of armed forces that justice would be dispensed in line with Pakistan’s constitution. This plea for justice in keeping with the constitution for a man who blew to pieces all constitutional tenets sounds bizarre, to say the least! The army would go to any length to thwart the judgment. Though Musharraf’s successors have not resorted to the extreme steps against constitutional governance that he did, the army leadership has continued to act well beyond its remit in violation of constitutional norms, including interference in elections. Any judicial harm coming to Musharraf could, therefore, leave his successors vulnerable to similar judicial action. 
 
Musharraf’s lawyer has said that he would file an appeal in the Supreme Court. The government has expressed its intent to support Musharraf during the appeal process. With the possibility of reversal of the special court judgment by the Supreme Court and power of the President to grant pardon, should the apex court uphold the judgment and no likelihood of Musharraf returning to the country, the death sentence remains largely symbolic and it is deterrent effect uncertain.&nbsp;

Pakistan is nowhere close to redressal of its civil-military imbalance. However, even if, as expected, the army leadership manages to overcome the hurdles thrown up by the above judgments, its inability to prevent the judges concerned from pronouncing them is a reminder of a sizeable body of opinion in Pakistan that does not see eye to eye with the army’s ways of functioning. This opinion, which the army has managed to keep under subjugation through heavy-handedness, must gain in strength if Pakistan is ever to become a normal state. &nbsp; 
 
 
(Views expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) 
&nbsp;

Two judgments by the Pakistan judiciary – one questioning the extension of tenure of the incumbent army chief and the other awarding death sentence to former chief Pervez Musharraf for high treason- have attracted considerable attention because of being utterly out of character for the army dominated Pakistani polity.

Two judgments by the Pakistan judiciary – one questioning the extension of tenure of the incumbent army chief and the other awarding death sentence to former chief Pervez Musharraf for high treason- have attracted considerable attention because of being utterly out of character for the army dominated Pakistani polity. Do they signal the advent of a new dawn in Pakistan? PM Imran Khan’s decision to grant the second tenure of three years to army chief Qamar Javed Bajwa was not unprecedented. Aside from the self- granted extensions of their tenures by army chiefs turned military dictators, the PPP government had given the second tenure of three years to the then army chief, Ashfaq Parvez Kayani in 2010. However, three days before Bajwa was to embark upon his new tenure, a Supreme Court bench headed by Chief Justice Asif Saeed Khosa took up a petition challenging his continuation in office and suspended the government notification issued for the purpose. During the tense three-day hearing, the judges questioned the government decision both on account of the utterly inept procedural handling of the matter and the absence of any legal or constitutional basis for it. At the end, in order not to precipitate a crisis, they ruled that Bajwa could continue in his post for a further period of six months and his continuation thereafter would depend upon adoption of suitable legislation by the Parliament concerning the appointment and terms and conditions of service of the Chief of Army Staff. Subsequently, a special court, constituted by the Supreme Court and comprising a judge each of the Lahore, Peshawar and Sindh High Courts, has given a 2-1 verdict, awarding death sentence for high treason to the former military dictator Parvez Musharraf for his action in declaring an emergency and suspending the constitution in early November 2007, when he was President and Chief of Army Staff. The court relied on Article 6 of the Pakistan Constitution that stipulates that any person who abrogates or subverts or suspends or holds in abeyance the Constitution by force or unconstitutional means shall be guilty of high treason. The treason case was filed by the Nawaz Sharif government in November 2013 and the Supreme Court agreed to set up a special court to try Musharraf. Within a few months, the then army chief Raheel Sharif indicated that he was against the trial and said that the army “Would preserve its own dignity and institutional pride.” With the army backing him, Musharraf dodged the trial and was able to secure an order from the Supreme Court in March 2016 to go abroad for medical treatment and has not returned to Pakistan since then, even though the special court gave him six opportunities to make his statement. Finally, when the court decided to hear the case on a daily basis in October 2019, Imran Khan’s government sacked the entire prosecution team! With no further inputs coming from the prosecution or Pervez Musharraf’s defence lawyers, the special court concluded its proceedings on November 19 and said that it would give its verdict on November 28. Caught by surprise, Musharraf’s defence team challenged the special court’s decision to announce its verdict in the Lahore High Court. Strangely, the government also approached the Islamabad High Court to restrain the special court from going ahead with its verdict. The High Court granted the request and directed the special court to listen to all the parties and complete all legal formalities before pronouncing its judgement. It also directed the government to appoint a prosecutor by December 5. The special court stated that it was not bound by the decision of the Islamabad High Court. When it convened on December 17, both Pervez Musharraf’s lawyer and the prosecution tried to stall the proceedings, the former by saying that Musharraf must be given an opportunity to make a statement before the court and the latter making an attempt to widen the scope of the trial by bringing in charges against some alleged collaborators of Musharraf, including former Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz. The special court rejected these pleas, ruling that Pervez Musharraf had foregone repeated opportunities to make his statement and the Supreme Court had decided that the case be proceeded with against Musharraf only. It then pronounced its split verdict to sentence Musharraf to death. The Pakistani judiciary has, with a few exceptions, acted as a handmaiden of the army and helped them in subverting democratic processes. A recent example is its collaboration with the selective accountability process against Nawaz Sharif to rule him out of the 2018 election. Facilitation of his departure for medical treatment abroad by the judiciary seems to be the result of a nod from the army, keen to see him leave the country, in return for an end to his and his daughter’s strident campaign against them. The last time the judiciary mounted a challenge to the army was under the maverick Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, who reopened the case of financing of the Nawaz Sharif led Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad by the ISI during the 1990 election to defeat Benazir Bhutto, hauled up a few retired generals on corruption charges and took up cases of forced disappearances in Baluchistan and the tribal areas. However, in the face of the resistance of Pakistan army, the court did not make much headway. Why Chief Justice Khosa, who is to retire later this month, took up the case of Bajwa’s extension has been a matter of speculation. Some observers ascribe it to his annoyance at Imran Khan’s criticism of the judiciary in letting Nawaz Sharif go abroad without the stringent conditions imposed by his government and the consequent desire to get even with the Prime Minister by showing the functioning of his government in a poor light in the matter of army chief’s extension. Others believe that the court might have been encouraged by senior army officers, whose promotion prospects would be marred by the continuation of Bajwa in his post. As for the special court, one of its members, Chief Justice Waqar Ahmed Seth of the Peshawar High Court has had a record of bold decisions, setting aside trials by military courts. What do the above judgments mean for Pakistan’s democracy? The continuation of Bajwa as army chief beyond the six months period approved by the Supreme Court would be more a function of his control over his senior army commanders than of the political dynamics within the Parliament. Should he be able to ensure cohesion within the army’s senior ranks, politicians in the government and opposition could be expected to bend over backwards to provide the legislation required for his continuation. The army and Imran Khan government have already rallied against the death sentence awarded to Musharraf. The army spokesperson has issued a statement that the special court judgment has been received by the rank and file of Pakistan armed forces “With a lot of pain and anguish”. He adds that Pervez Musharraf, who served Pakistan for over 40 years and fought wars for its defence “can surely not be a traitor” and complains that due legal process seems to have been ignored “including constitution of special court, denial of fundamental right of self-defence, undertaking individual-specific proceedings and concluding the case in haste.” He expresses the expectation of armed forces that justice would be dispensed in line with Pakistan’s constitution. This plea for justice in keeping with the constitution for a man who blew to pieces all constitutional tenets sounds bizarre, to say the least! The army would go to any length to thwart the judgment. Though Musharraf’s successors have not resorted to the extreme steps against constitutional governance that he did, the army leadership has continued to act well beyond its remit in violation of constitutional norms, including interference in elections. Any judicial harm coming to Musharraf could, therefore, leave his successors vulnerable to similar judicial action. Musharraf’s lawyer has said that he would file an appeal in the Supreme Court. The government has expressed its intent to support Musharraf during the appeal process. With the possibility of reversal of the special court judgment by the Supreme Court and power of the President to grant pardon, should the apex court uphold the judgment and no likelihood of Musharraf returning to the country, the death sentence remains largely symbolic and it is deterrent effect uncertain. Pakistan is nowhere close to redressal of its civil-military imbalance. However, even if, as expected, the army leadership manages to overcome the hurdles thrown up by the above judgments, its inability to prevent the judges concerned from pronouncing them is a reminder of a sizeable body of opinion in Pakistan that does not see eye to eye with the army’s ways of functioning. This opinion, which the army has managed to keep under subjugation through heavy-handedness, must gain in strength if Pakistan is ever to become a normal state. (Views expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Pervez Musharraf case: A new dawn in Pakistan?

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