Three years on, the spectre of Galwan is looming large over India’s China policy. Amidst China’s unwillingness to back down and Indian forces’ intensifying willingness to hold their ground, we are likely to see more skirmishes similar to the one witnessed in Arunachal Pradesh’s Tawang sector in December last year, taking place. And in this light, an assessment of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) capacity-building close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the past three years indicates that China is not planning to concede its strategic entrenchment beyond India’s claim lines. Rather, it is attempting to create a new status quo with increased firepower available for ready use in anticipation of such potential skirmishes.&nbsp;

Capabilities of the actor India is confronting

In order to build a world-class fighting force by 2050, Chinese President Xi Jinping initiated reforms of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 2015, and a cornerstone of said reforms has been the switch from Military Regions (MRs) to Theatre Commands (TCs). Of the five theatre commands created, the Western TC is the one assigned to take care of mountainous/high-altitude offensive and defensive campaigns, and other mobilisation endeavours on the India-China border front.&nbsp;

<a href="https://www.wionews.com/india-news/galwan-valley-standoff-casting-a-shadow-on-india-china-ties-says-s-jaishankar-508972">ALSO READ|&nbsp;Galwan valley standoff casting a shadow on India-China ties, says S Jaishankar</a> 
 
The focus of each theatre command is to become adept at conducting Multi-Domain Integrated Joint Operations (MDIJO). This indicates that the ground, air, naval, and rocket forces assigned to the command have to seamlessly combine their individual strengths across all frontiers of warfare (including electronic, cyberspace and outer space), to realise the goal of victory on the battlefield. And even though no naval brigades have been assigned to the Western TC (given its land-oriented posture), between 2019 and 2022, there has been a steady increase in its deployment of infantry divisions and brigades, border defense brigades, and missile units on China’s borders with India, Nepal and Bhutan.

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In addition, the Western TC is equipped with resources from two sub-theatre-level Military Commands (MCs), namely Xinjiang and Xizang (Tibet). The two MCs were elevated to a sub-theatre level rank in 2016, and came under the direct control of the Western TC’s Ground Forces. This is as opposed to the other provincial-level MCs, which are under the mandate of the National Defence Mobilisation Department of the Chinese Central Military Commission. This signifies that the mission, function, and capabilities of the Xinjiang and Tibet MCs have been expanded, especially since each of them respectively borders one major area of dispute between India and China – Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh.

Specialised divisions and equipment are assigned to these MDs to enhance their operational capability in the difficult terrain around the LAC. For example, as per the 2022 ‘Military Balance’, since late 2020, the Xinjiang MC is being equipped with NORINCO Type-08 Infantry Fighting Vehicles, Type-15 light tanks, and Type-99 main battle tanks, which have emerged specifically in Southern Ladakh. As a show of force and tactic near the border, the Tibet MC has engaged in testing of air-defense missile launcher vehicles at altitudes of over 4000 meters in sub-zero temperatures.

To enable transport of important equipment to the frontlines, like cold-resistant gear (such as thermos flasks, cotton-padded coats and anti-fragment goggles), and subsequently even light tanks and helicopters, China has developed a heavy-transport aircraft called the Y-20, and assigned it to the Western TC. In November 2021, the Y-20 demonstrated its capability to fly winter gear to border troops stationed along the LAC within seven hours. It is likely that as the aircraft engages in more such transactions, its time-of-flight and load-carrying capacity will both expand.&nbsp;

A new capacity the Western TC has been building in the past three years is the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) like quadcopter drones for functions such as delivering food and water to deployed PLA personnel in plateau regions, performing intelligence and surveillance, acquiring targets, and engaging in swarm tactics to disengage enemy lines. Analysts even suggest that China may be ahead of American capabilities to deploy swarm drones. Now, India is preparing to counter this new threat, by planning to induct ‘Zorawar’ light tanks with counter-drone capabilities meant for high-altitude deployment. In 2022, India has also launched the second edition of the Meher Baba Swarm Drones Competition with an aim to find counter-drone solutions for deployment at the border.&nbsp;

Even though it is unlikely that an eventuality of a nuclear nature emerges on the India-China border, available information on nuclear forces between the two sides indicates that since 2020, while China operates a little over 100 missiles capable of targetting all or elements of Indian mainland, the Indian side maintains only 10 (Agni-III) launchers capable of hitting all of Chinese mainland, and 8 (Agni-II) launchers capable of only reaching Tibet.&nbsp;

These conventional capabilities exclude other technological strides China has made to actualise a joint operational doctrine at the border. For example, it is investing heavily in space-based and Artificial Intelligence (AI) surveillance capabilities to make Command, Control and Communications (C3) more effective, while also deploying electronic interference units to create an ‘electromagnetic fog’ that can deceive enemy systems or misguide enemy drones.&nbsp;

Has India drawn its lessons?

The Galwan Valley conflict was a landmark demonstration of the fighting power of Indian forces at the LAC. India’s resolve has been visible in its deployment of 50,000 additional troops along the LAC at the height of tensions in 2020-21, and its plan to deploy two additional mountain strike corps (the 1st and 17th). However, in many areas, it also demonstrated the shortcomings of Indian comprehensive power vis-a-vis China. For example, &nbsp;the 1st strike corps was initially meant to be deployed to India’s western border with Pakistan, and are now being ‘realigned’ to the LAC. It shows a real financial constraint facing the Indian armed forces, and a lack of balance between the two actively hostile fronts.&nbsp;

Similarly, border infrastructure and connectivity are a major hurdle for India, because on the one hand, while Chinese troops have motorable roads even beyond Indian claim lines, India’s troops fall short and reach only up to some distance of their claim lines. For ease of transport and air-lift, China has now even inducted the Y-20, for which India does not possess a counterpart.

Overall, there is a mismatch in force capacity between the two sides. The Indian Army’s current LAC deployment across the Northern, Eastern and Central commands is about 225,000, while the Chinese Western TC and its two MCs account for 230,000 troops.&nbsp;

In the past three years, India has repeatedly emphasised that its primary national security priority is the border with China. But a comparative analysis of the capacities on either side indicates that India has a lot to catch up on, to be able to match Chinese comprehensive power along the LAC. In such a scenario, the focus on research and development in drones, upcoming induction of indigenous Zorawar tanks, expanding endeavours to develop border infrastructure by the Border Roads Organisation (BRO), and multiplying troop deployment, are positive milestones on the long road from Galwan.

 
(Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.)

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Three years on, the spectre of Galwan is looming large over India’s China policy. Amidst China’s unwillingness to back down and Indian forces’ intensifying willingness to hold their ground, we are likely to see more skirmishes similar to the one witnessed in Arunachal Pradesh’s Tawang sector in December last year, taking place.

Three years on, the spectre of Galwan is looming large over India’s China policy. Amidst China’s unwillingness to back down and Indian forces’ intensifying willingness to hold their ground, we are likely to see more skirmishes similar to the one witnessed in Arunachal Pradesh’s Tawang sector in December last year, taking place. And in this light, an assessment of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) capacity-building close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the past three years indicates that China is not planning to concede its strategic entrenchment beyond India’s claim lines. Rather, it is attempting to create a new status quo with increased firepower available for ready use in anticipation of such potential skirmishes. Capabilities of the actor India is confronting In order to build a world-class fighting force by 2050, Chinese President Xi Jinping initiated reforms of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 2015, and a cornerstone of said reforms has been the switch from Military Regions (MRs) to Theatre Commands (TCs). Of the five theatre commands created, the Western TC is the one assigned to take care of mountainous/high-altitude offensive and defensive campaigns, and other mobilisation endeavours on the India-China border front. ALSO READ| Galwan valley standoff casting a shadow on India-China ties, says S Jaishankar The focus of each theatre command is to become adept at conducting Multi-Domain Integrated Joint Operations (MDIJO). This indicates that the ground, air, naval, and rocket forces assigned to the command have to seamlessly combine their individual strengths across all frontiers of warfare (including electronic, cyberspace and outer space), to realise the goal of victory on the battlefield. And even though no naval brigades have been assigned to the Western TC (given its land-oriented posture), between 2019 and 2022, there has been a steady increase in its deployment of infantry divisions and brigades, border defense brigades, and missile units on China’s borders with India, Nepal and Bhutan. × In addition, the Western TC is equipped with resources from two sub-theatre-level Military Commands (MCs), namely Xinjiang and Xizang (Tibet). The two MCs were elevated to a sub-theatre level rank in 2016, and came under the direct control of the Western TC’s Ground Forces. This is as opposed to the other provincial-level MCs, which are under the mandate of the National Defence Mobilisation Department of the Chinese Central Military Commission. This signifies that the mission, function, and capabilities of the Xinjiang and Tibet MCs have been expanded, especially since each of them respectively borders one major area of dispute between India and China – Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. Specialised divisions and equipment are assigned to these MDs to enhance their operational capability in the difficult terrain around the LAC. For example, as per the 2022 ‘Military Balance’, since late 2020, the Xinjiang MC is being equipped with NORINCO Type-08 Infantry Fighting Vehicles, Type-15 light tanks, and Type-99 main battle tanks, which have emerged specifically in Southern Ladakh. As a show of force and tactic near the border, the Tibet MC has engaged in testing of air-defense missile launcher vehicles at altitudes of over 4000 meters in sub-zero temperatures. To enable transport of important equipment to the frontlines, like cold-resistant gear (such as thermos flasks, cotton-padded coats and anti-fragment goggles), and subsequently even light tanks and helicopters, China has developed a heavy-transport aircraft called the Y-20, and assigned it to the Western TC. In November 2021, the Y-20 demonstrated its capability to fly winter gear to border troops stationed along the LAC within seven hours. It is likely that as the aircraft engages in more such transactions, its time-of-flight and load-carrying capacity will both expand. A new capacity the Western TC has been building in the past three years is the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) like quadcopter drones for functions such as delivering food and water to deployed PLA personnel in plateau regions, performing intelligence and surveillance, acquiring targets, and engaging in swarm tactics to disengage enemy lines. Analysts even suggest that China may be ahead of American capabilities to deploy swarm drones. Now, India is preparing to counter this new threat, by planning to induct ‘Zorawar’ light tanks with counter-drone capabilities meant for high-altitude deployment. In 2022, India has also launched the second edition of the Meher Baba Swarm Drones Competition with an aim to find counter-drone solutions for deployment at the border. Even though it is unlikely that an eventuality of a nuclear nature emerges on the India-China border, available information on nuclear forces between the two sides indicates that since 2020, while China operates a little over 100 missiles capable of targetting all or elements of Indian mainland, the Indian side maintains only 10 (Agni-III) launchers capable of hitting all of Chinese mainland, and 8 (Agni-II) launchers capable of only reaching Tibet. These conventional capabilities exclude other technological strides China has made to actualise a joint operational doctrine at the border. For example, it is investing heavily in space-based and Artificial Intelligence (AI) surveillance capabilities to make Command, Control and Communications (C3) more effective, while also deploying electronic interference units to create an ‘electromagnetic fog’ that can deceive enemy systems or misguide enemy drones. Has India drawn its lessons? The Galwan Valley conflict was a landmark demonstration of the fighting power of Indian forces at the LAC. India’s resolve has been visible in its deployment of 50,000 additional troops along the LAC at the height of tensions in 2020-21, and its plan to deploy two additional mountain strike corps (the 1st and 17th). However, in many areas, it also demonstrated the shortcomings of Indian comprehensive power vis-a-vis China. For example, the 1st strike corps was initially meant to be deployed to India’s western border with Pakistan, and are now being ‘realigned’ to the LAC. It shows a real financial constraint facing the Indian armed forces, and a lack of balance between the two actively hostile fronts. Similarly, border infrastructure and connectivity are a major hurdle for India, because on the one hand, while Chinese troops have motorable roads even beyond Indian claim lines, India’s troops fall short and reach only up to some distance of their claim lines. For ease of transport and air-lift, China has now even inducted the Y-20, for which India does not possess a counterpart. Overall, there is a mismatch in force capacity between the two sides. The Indian Army’s current LAC deployment across the Northern, Eastern and Central commands is about 225,000, while the Chinese Western TC and its two MCs account for 230,000 troops. In the past three years, India has repeatedly emphasised that its primary national security priority is the border with China. But a comparative analysis of the capacities on either side indicates that India has a lot to catch up on, to be able to match Chinese comprehensive power along the LAC. In such a scenario, the focus on research and development in drones, upcoming induction of indigenous Zorawar tanks, expanding endeavours to develop border infrastructure by the Border Roads Organisation (BRO), and multiplying troop deployment, are positive milestones on the long road from Galwan. (Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.) WATCH WION LIVE HERE

Remembering Galwan and the China Challenge: Capabilities of the PLA Western Theatre Command

On July 13 and 14, Wang Yi, the newly re-appointed Chinese Foreign Minister visited Jakarta to attend the 56th ASEAN Regional Forum and the 13th East Asia Summit Foreign Ministers' Meetings. During these meetings, Wang held several bilateral exchanges, including with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. He also participated in an ‘ASEAN+3’ meeting, with representatives from the ten countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as Japan and South Korea. His engagements aimed at assuaging regional anxieties surrounding China’s belligerent rise and its intensifying rivalry with the US. However, his meeting with Blinken said otherwise.

In his speech at the ARF Foreign Ministers’ meeting, Wang presented a three-point proposal for regional security, and in his subsequent meeting with the ASEAN+3 countries, he discussed three ways for the partnership to progress. Both of these comprised his central message to regional countries, which was that China is the right developmental partner for regional countries to embrace, and any contentions pertaining to economic or military security must be addressed without inviting interference from an external actor.

For example, in his introductory speech, Wang stated that the region must promote ‘common’, ‘cooperative’, and ‘universal’ security, which was a reiteration of the primary principles of Xi Jinping’s flagship Global Security Initiative (GSI), and sought to undermine the American security predominance in favour of a China-led model. He also emphasised ‘pragmatic cooperation’ to build mutual trust. To that end, Wang suggested that regional countries find “less sensitive” areas of cooperation, which potentially include counter-piracy, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), and climate change, and may fare better in their prospect of building mutual trust. He also emphasised “adherence to inclusiveness;” an emphasis that serves to provide an alternative approach to the US's 'Free and Open' Indo-Pacific concept.

Also Read | <a href="https://www.wionews.com/opinions-blogs/chinas-nuclear-cabbage-619972">China employs 'nuclear cabbage' strategy for dominance in South China Sea</a>

The economic overtone was even more evident in his address to the ASEAN+3 meeting, where he proposed that the member countries should “uphold opening-up and cooperation,” accelerate the regional integration, allow for Hong Kong’s accession to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and acknowledge China’s leading role in the construction of “stable, smooth and comparative advantage-based regional production and supply chains.” He also reminded member countries of China’s contributions to the ASEAN Emergency Rice Security Mechanism and Electric Vehicle Ecosystem, while also claiming that China is their best bet in their quest towards poverty alleviation and rural empowerment. The essence of his arguments is two-fold: one is that China is open for business and is seeking increased interlinkedness. The second is that because China has already experimented successfully with policies on food security, EV supply chain management and poverty alleviation, it is now projecting itself as the most appropriate business partner for ASEAN countries to approach – which is also how China understands ‘pragmatic cooperation’.

However, Wang’s message was received with caution and suspicion by ASEAN member countries. The lack of significant progress in deliberations over competing claims in the South China Sea overshadowed any hope for substantive confidence-building. The ARF Foreign Ministers’ meeting witnessed the second reading of the draft of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, which has been pending for 20 years, and the issuance of a guideline document on speeding up the negotiations on the CoC. However, the final Chairman’s Statement of the 13th EAS Foreign Ministers’ meeting sounded the warning that any further discussion on the CoC must be undertaken in the spirit of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Seas, to “reduce tensions and the risk of accidents, misunderstandings, and miscalculation.” Moreover, just a few days before these meetings, the Philippines marked seven years of the award of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling against China in 2016, which invited an infuriated response from China. So clearly while there might be greater talk of cooperation, security anxieties and competition remain the dominant motif in the region.

Moreover, the proceedings of the Wang-Blinken meeting on the sidelines of the ARF Foreign Ministers’ meeting also did not yield a lot of confidence, even though it was a positive sign that the two sides were conducting high-level dialogue. During the meeting, Wang highlighted that to mend their relations, the two sides need to resolutely stop “gray rhinos”, properly handle “black swans” and thoroughly remove “tigers blocking the way”.&nbsp;Essentially, his message to the US was that short and long-term high-impact incidents, such as Taiwan-related contingencies or the controversy surrounding the Chinese ‘spy balloon’, need to be managed more “rationally” in order to bring some semblance of stability in the relationship. This also serves as China’s acknowledgment that the relationship is indeed at its lowest point at the current juncture.

Regional countries, especially ASEAN member states, see the bettering of US-China relations as absolutely essential to peace and stability in the region. This sentiment is echoed in Indonesian Foreign Minister Marsudi Retno’s statement at Jakarta, in which she said, “The Indo-Pacific is not a battleground. This region must remain stable.” ASEAN countries also seek diversity in partnerships, and expect China to act in a manner that is necessary to build the mutual trust it vehemently propagates. To that end, the conclusion of the CoC and its implementation in good faith is a necessary factor. And as Singaporean Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan argued at the meeting, even though political will has been expressed to take the CoC forward, it is a “complicated process,” and it has already been two decades since the DoC was signed as an “interim, stopgap” measure.

Overall, regional countries are looking to maximise economic gains, while great powers like China and the US are looking at regional issues from a largely strategic perspective. It is this dissonance in approach that has created both, a geopolitical dilemma and an opportunity for negotiation for regional countries.

(Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.)

You can now write for wionews.com and be a part of the community. Share your stories and opinions with us <a href="https://www.wionews.com/content-contribution-registration-form">here</a>.

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On July 13 and 14, Wang Yi, the newly re-appointed Chinese Foreign Minister visited Jakarta to attend the 56th ASEAN Regional Forum and the 13th East Asia Summit Foreign Ministers' Meetings.

On July 13 and 14, Wang Yi, the newly re-appointed Chinese Foreign Minister visited Jakarta to attend the 56th ASEAN Regional Forum and the 13th East Asia Summit Foreign Ministers' Meetings. During these meetings, Wang held several bilateral exchanges, including with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. He also participated in an ‘ASEAN+3’ meeting, with representatives from the ten countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as Japan and South Korea. His engagements aimed at assuaging regional anxieties surrounding China’s belligerent rise and its intensifying rivalry with the US. However, his meeting with Blinken said otherwise. In his speech at the ARF Foreign Ministers’ meeting, Wang presented a three-point proposal for regional security, and in his subsequent meeting with the ASEAN+3 countries, he discussed three ways for the partnership to progress. Both of these comprised his central message to regional countries, which was that China is the right developmental partner for regional countries to embrace, and any contentions pertaining to economic or military security must be addressed without inviting interference from an external actor. For example, in his introductory speech, Wang stated that the region must promote ‘common’, ‘cooperative’, and ‘universal’ security, which was a reiteration of the primary principles of Xi Jinping’s flagship Global Security Initiative (GSI), and sought to undermine the American security predominance in favour of a China-led model. He also emphasised ‘pragmatic cooperation’ to build mutual trust. To that end, Wang suggested that regional countries find “less sensitive” areas of cooperation, which potentially include counter-piracy, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), and climate change, and may fare better in their prospect of building mutual trust. He also emphasised “adherence to inclusiveness;” an emphasis that serves to provide an alternative approach to the US's 'Free and Open' Indo-Pacific concept. Also Read | China employs 'nuclear cabbage' strategy for dominance in South China Sea The economic overtone was even more evident in his address to the ASEAN+3 meeting, where he proposed that the member countries should “uphold opening-up and cooperation,” accelerate the regional integration, allow for Hong Kong’s accession to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and acknowledge China’s leading role in the construction of “stable, smooth and comparative advantage-based regional production and supply chains.” He also reminded member countries of China’s contributions to the ASEAN Emergency Rice Security Mechanism and Electric Vehicle Ecosystem, while also claiming that China is their best bet in their quest towards poverty alleviation and rural empowerment. The essence of his arguments is two-fold: one is that China is open for business and is seeking increased interlinkedness. The second is that because China has already experimented successfully with policies on food security, EV supply chain management and poverty alleviation, it is now projecting itself as the most appropriate business partner for ASEAN countries to approach – which is also how China understands ‘pragmatic cooperation’. However, Wang’s message was received with caution and suspicion by ASEAN member countries. The lack of significant progress in deliberations over competing claims in the South China Sea overshadowed any hope for substantive confidence-building. The ARF Foreign Ministers’ meeting witnessed the second reading of the draft of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, which has been pending for 20 years, and the issuance of a guideline document on speeding up the negotiations on the CoC. However, the final Chairman’s Statement of the 13th EAS Foreign Ministers’ meeting sounded the warning that any further discussion on the CoC must be undertaken in the spirit of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Seas, to “reduce tensions and the risk of accidents, misunderstandings, and miscalculation.” Moreover, just a few days before these meetings, the Philippines marked seven years of the award of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling against China in 2016, which invited an infuriated response from China. So clearly while there might be greater talk of cooperation, security anxieties and competition remain the dominant motif in the region. Moreover, the proceedings of the Wang-Blinken meeting on the sidelines of the ARF Foreign Ministers’ meeting also did not yield a lot of confidence, even though it was a positive sign that the two sides were conducting high-level dialogue. During the meeting, Wang highlighted that to mend their relations, the two sides need to resolutely stop “gray rhinos”, properly handle “black swans” and thoroughly remove “tigers blocking the way”. Essentially, his message to the US was that short and long-term high-impact incidents, such as Taiwan-related contingencies or the controversy surrounding the Chinese ‘spy balloon’, need to be managed more “rationally” in order to bring some semblance of stability in the relationship. This also serves as China’s acknowledgment that the relationship is indeed at its lowest point at the current juncture. Regional countries, especially ASEAN member states, see the bettering of US-China relations as absolutely essential to peace and stability in the region. This sentiment is echoed in Indonesian Foreign Minister Marsudi Retno’s statement at Jakarta, in which she said, “The Indo-Pacific is not a battleground. This region must remain stable.” ASEAN countries also seek diversity in partnerships, and expect China to act in a manner that is necessary to build the mutual trust it vehemently propagates. To that end, the conclusion of the CoC and its implementation in good faith is a necessary factor. And as Singaporean Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan argued at the meeting, even though political will has been expressed to take the CoC forward, it is a “complicated process,” and it has already been two decades since the DoC was signed as an “interim, stopgap” measure. Overall, regional countries are looking to maximise economic gains, while great powers like China and the US are looking at regional issues from a largely strategic perspective. It is this dissonance in approach that has created both, a geopolitical dilemma and an opportunity for negotiation for regional countries. (Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.) You can now write for wionews.com and be a part of the community. Share your stories and opinions with us here. WATCH WION LIVE HERE ×

The ASEAN's tryst with US-China contestation

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