When the world was analysed in the categories of bipolar interaction, the presence of regional or sub-regional subsystems was subordinate to the logic of a global division into two worlds.&nbsp;

This exclusivity is today challenged by logistic visions reflecting contemporary geopolitics that is likely to recreate the context within which regions and ‘regional’ organisations are perceived.&nbsp;

While this re-imaging presents various possibilities, the overlapping of states, no longer contained within clear bipolar divisions in multilateral ‘regional’ organisations, is a case in point. &nbsp;

Traditionally, three central elements have been identified by analysts as constituting the core elements of regionalism. First, a common historical experience and a sense of shared problems among a geographically distinct group of states/societies, which constituted a region.&nbsp;

Second, close linkages of a distinct kind between those states/societies; in other words recognition of a boundary to the region within which interactions would be more intense than those with the outside world or regionalisation.&nbsp;

Finally, the emergence of an organisation giving shape to the region in a legal and institutional sense and providing rules of the game within the region, the element of conscious policy which is central to regionalism.&nbsp;

Therefore, while dealing with regionalism three elements were considered to be important. The first related to the spatial dimension of regionalism, i.e., how large is the area covered and its definition. &nbsp;

A second related to its scope; in other words the tasks or areas of interaction covered by the region or by the regional organisation. A third feature was the level and extent of the organisation.&nbsp;

These three were considered to be useful since they indicated the variety and unevenness of regionalism and also brought into focus the fact that regional organisations recognise boundaries both in terms of spatial dimension as well as in terms of scope and in recent years both have been challenged.&nbsp;

As such an understanding of complex regional alignments may be the key to comprehending the success or failure of economic diplomacy supported by large scale infrastructural projects and economic corridors that seem to be the hallmark of global politics today.&nbsp;

‘Regional’ organisations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) today include as its ‘dialogue partners’ states as geographically separated as Azerbaijan, Armenia, Cambodia and Nepal.&nbsp;

Similarly, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) that began as a free trade agreement between the ten member states of the ASEAN and the six states with which the ASEAN has existing free trade agreement, will in all probability be expanded with the inclusion of states like Peru and Chile.&nbsp;

It also brings into question the spatial aspect of the ‘regional’ economic partnership that would include Latin America within the new Asia Pacific trade order.

In fact institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which includes 17 non-contiguous Asian and European states, including China and India, may become a new ‘region’ in terms of significance.&nbsp;

This Chinese initiative supports Beijing’s logistic vision of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with the aim to bring South Asian economies closer to China, Central Asia and West Asia.&nbsp;

However, while the replacement of ‘regional’ organisations by logistical spaces reduces the viability of ‘regions’ as geographically designed entities, economic corridors move towards ‘regional’ integration on the assumption that development is a wider collective process.

Nevertheless, both underline that global dynamics related to the management of infrastructure across borders will contribute to the creation of semi-autonomous governing bodies and to a redefinition of social and labour laws and relations across a number of states.&nbsp;

Corridors entail a direct role for the authorities ruling in the spaces they cross, including city/village councils, regions and states and international organisations concerned with trade, development and cross-border activities, while at the same time producing new governing dynamics and management agencies, whose role is growing as a consequence of the relevance assumed by transport connectivity and logistical infrastructure for global exchanges.

In real terms, that would result not just from strategies developed by the Chinese government-led companies, but also because these would confront diverse relations between public governance and private policies about economic corridors in different states requiring the development of new forms of diplomacy and geopolitical projections and a subsequent redefinition of relations between representative institutions and the governance practice of global logistics organisations.&nbsp;

It would also create the possibility of a situation where governance itself moves from traditional sites to the competing sites of economic corridors that coexist on a global scale.&nbsp;

(This article was originally published on The DNA. Read the <a href="https://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-seamless-connectivity-and-the-changing-world-order-2735161">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

When the world was analysed in the categories of bipolar interaction, the presence of regional or sub-regional subsystems was subordinate to the logic of a global division into two worlds.

When the world was analysed in the categories of bipolar interaction, the presence of regional or sub-regional subsystems was subordinate to the logic of a global division into two worlds. This exclusivity is today challenged by logistic visions reflecting contemporary geopolitics that is likely to recreate the context within which regions and ‘regional’ organisations are perceived. While this re-imaging presents various possibilities, the overlapping of states, no longer contained within clear bipolar divisions in multilateral ‘regional’ organisations, is a case in point. Traditionally, three central elements have been identified by analysts as constituting the core elements of regionalism. First, a common historical experience and a sense of shared problems among a geographically distinct group of states/societies, which constituted a region. Second, close linkages of a distinct kind between those states/societies; in other words recognition of a boundary to the region within which interactions would be more intense than those with the outside world or regionalisation. Finally, the emergence of an organisation giving shape to the region in a legal and institutional sense and providing rules of the game within the region, the element of conscious policy which is central to regionalism. Therefore, while dealing with regionalism three elements were considered to be important. The first related to the spatial dimension of regionalism, i.e., how large is the area covered and its definition. A second related to its scope; in other words the tasks or areas of interaction covered by the region or by the regional organisation. A third feature was the level and extent of the organisation. These three were considered to be useful since they indicated the variety and unevenness of regionalism and also brought into focus the fact that regional organisations recognise boundaries both in terms of spatial dimension as well as in terms of scope and in recent years both have been challenged. As such an understanding of complex regional alignments may be the key to comprehending the success or failure of economic diplomacy supported by large scale infrastructural projects and economic corridors that seem to be the hallmark of global politics today. ‘Regional’ organisations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) today include as its ‘dialogue partners’ states as geographically separated as Azerbaijan, Armenia, Cambodia and Nepal. Similarly, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) that began as a free trade agreement between the ten member states of the ASEAN and the six states with which the ASEAN has existing free trade agreement, will in all probability be expanded with the inclusion of states like Peru and Chile. It also brings into question the spatial aspect of the ‘regional’ economic partnership that would include Latin America within the new Asia Pacific trade order. In fact institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which includes 17 non-contiguous Asian and European states, including China and India, may become a new ‘region’ in terms of significance. This Chinese initiative supports Beijing’s logistic vision of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with the aim to bring South Asian economies closer to China, Central Asia and West Asia. However, while the replacement of ‘regional’ organisations by logistical spaces reduces the viability of ‘regions’ as geographically designed entities, economic corridors move towards ‘regional’ integration on the assumption that development is a wider collective process. Nevertheless, both underline that global dynamics related to the management of infrastructure across borders will contribute to the creation of semi-autonomous governing bodies and to a redefinition of social and labour laws and relations across a number of states. Corridors entail a direct role for the authorities ruling in the spaces they cross, including city/village councils, regions and states and international organisations concerned with trade, development and cross-border activities, while at the same time producing new governing dynamics and management agencies, whose role is growing as a consequence of the relevance assumed by transport connectivity and logistical infrastructure for global exchanges. In real terms, that would result not just from strategies developed by the Chinese government-led companies, but also because these would confront diverse relations between public governance and private policies about economic corridors in different states requiring the development of new forms of diplomacy and geopolitical projections and a subsequent redefinition of relations between representative institutions and the governance practice of global logistics organisations. It would also create the possibility of a situation where governance itself moves from traditional sites to the competing sites of economic corridors that coexist on a global scale. (This article was originally published on The DNA. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Seamless connectivity and the changing world order

Anpanman is a Japanese cartoon character whose head is made of red bean bread. The superhero, who shares parts of his bean bread face (in Japanese ‘pan’ is bread and ‘anko’ is red bean paste) with people in need is ‘Anpanman’, the world’s weakest superhero.&nbsp;

Lacking all the superpowers associated with American superhero characters like Superman or Spiderman, he hovers nearby ready to help.&nbsp;

The significance of the arrival of Anpanman, as the alternative Asian superhero, which resulted from the publicity received from the song ‘Anpanman’ sung by the iconic Korean Pop (K Pop) group BTS (Bangtan Sonyeondan) goes beyond the globalisation of a Japanese comic book character.&nbsp;

It heralds what Parag Khanna in his recent book, The Future is Asian calls ‘the Asianisation of the world’. In music for instance, BTS, an Asian pop group, represents one of the most significant departures in global pop culture of the 21st century. As a venture, BTS began with exploring neighbouring Asian markets in Taiwan, Japan and China and finally captured American audiences with the album Love Yourself in 2018.&nbsp;

‘Why Asia Matters’, has been the topic of discussion for some years now, not just because of the projection of the 21st century as the Asian Century, but also because of China’s emerging role in the global arena, the resilience of Asian economies in the face of a global downturn, its growing and young population, its advent as both the largest producer and consumer of goods and a plethora of other factors that would follow these developments.&nbsp;

It is today also space where new strategic geographies, that challenge traditional geopolitical divisions, are being imagined and where alternative economic institutions that predict a transition of the centre of global economics eastward are being framed.&nbsp;

This transition is emerging in the background of a deep sense of dissatisfaction with globalisation, fear of immigrants and emergence of populist politics, exemplified by a growing divide between cosmopolitan and non-cosmopolitan populations, deepening cultural differences between rural and urban populations and widening opinion among those favouring an open society that is welcoming to immigrants and other supporting closed borders.&nbsp;

The ‘new world order’ is in flux and Asia seems to be at its centre.

In recent years fundamental assumptions underlying the global world order have been politically, economically, socially and culturally challenged.&nbsp;

Typically stable territorial formations (nation-states, ideological blocks, global markets) have devolved into chaos while typically unstable extraterritorial flows (communication networks, trade arrangements, cultural codes or capital reserves) are evolving into consistent cohesions prompting the argument that globally there are shifts that are moving towards de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation at the same time.&nbsp;

The ‘new normal’, in economic terms, on the other hand, is a position that is likely to disrupt openness to trade on the part of the world that was its most vocal proponent and its support from states like China, which is stepping into the role of ‘globalisation’s biggest supporter’. &nbsp;

This was reflected in President Trump’s pullout from the 12-nation mega trade deal (the Trans-Pacific Partnership TPP) and increasing numbers of states opting to join the China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).&nbsp;

Begun as a free trade agreement between the ten member states of the ASEAN and the six states with which the ASEAN has existing free trade agreement, RCEP will in all probability be expanded with the inclusion of states like Peru and Chile bringing into question the spatial aspect of the ‘regional’ economic partnership.&nbsp;

As trade flows compete with military power for influence, geopolitics becomes an extension of geo-economics and infrastructural developments and institutions assume increasing significance logistical connects will move towards creating new frontiers of governance and new peripheries on the outskirts of logistical connects.&nbsp;

It is assumed that this will eventually create a space where the distinction between the economic and the institutional, the public and the private, the national and the supranational, and the local and the global will blur or even vanish. It would also probably herald the arrival of an Asianised future reflected hopefully in the lines ‘Waiting for you, Anpanman!’ 
&nbsp;

(This article was originally published on The DNA. Read the<a href="https://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-new-world-order-is-in-flux-and-asia-seems-to-be-at-its-centre-2727082"> original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Anpanman is a Japanese cartoon character whose head is made of red bean bread. The superhero, who shares parts of his bean bread face (in Japanese ‘pan’ is bread and ‘anko’ is red bean paste) with people in need is ‘Anpanman’, the world’s weakest superhero.

Anpanman is a Japanese cartoon character whose head is made of red bean bread. The superhero, who shares parts of his bean bread face (in Japanese ‘pan’ is bread and ‘anko’ is red bean paste) with people in need is ‘Anpanman’, the world’s weakest superhero. Lacking all the superpowers associated with American superhero characters like Superman or Spiderman, he hovers nearby ready to help. The significance of the arrival of Anpanman, as the alternative Asian superhero, which resulted from the publicity received from the song ‘Anpanman’ sung by the iconic Korean Pop (K Pop) group BTS (Bangtan Sonyeondan) goes beyond the globalisation of a Japanese comic book character. It heralds what Parag Khanna in his recent book, The Future is Asian calls ‘the Asianisation of the world’. In music for instance, BTS, an Asian pop group, represents one of the most significant departures in global pop culture of the 21st century. As a venture, BTS began with exploring neighbouring Asian markets in Taiwan, Japan and China and finally captured American audiences with the album Love Yourself in 2018. ‘Why Asia Matters’, has been the topic of discussion for some years now, not just because of the projection of the 21st century as the Asian Century, but also because of China’s emerging role in the global arena, the resilience of Asian economies in the face of a global downturn, its growing and young population, its advent as both the largest producer and consumer of goods and a plethora of other factors that would follow these developments. It is today also space where new strategic geographies, that challenge traditional geopolitical divisions, are being imagined and where alternative economic institutions that predict a transition of the centre of global economics eastward are being framed. This transition is emerging in the background of a deep sense of dissatisfaction with globalisation, fear of immigrants and emergence of populist politics, exemplified by a growing divide between cosmopolitan and non-cosmopolitan populations, deepening cultural differences between rural and urban populations and widening opinion among those favouring an open society that is welcoming to immigrants and other supporting closed borders. The ‘new world order’ is in flux and Asia seems to be at its centre. In recent years fundamental assumptions underlying the global world order have been politically, economically, socially and culturally challenged. Typically stable territorial formations (nation-states, ideological blocks, global markets) have devolved into chaos while typically unstable extraterritorial flows (communication networks, trade arrangements, cultural codes or capital reserves) are evolving into consistent cohesions prompting the argument that globally there are shifts that are moving towards de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation at the same time. The ‘new normal’, in economic terms, on the other hand, is a position that is likely to disrupt openness to trade on the part of the world that was its most vocal proponent and its support from states like China, which is stepping into the role of ‘globalisation’s biggest supporter’. This was reflected in President Trump’s pullout from the 12-nation mega trade deal (the Trans-Pacific Partnership TPP) and increasing numbers of states opting to join the China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Begun as a free trade agreement between the ten member states of the ASEAN and the six states with which the ASEAN has existing free trade agreement, RCEP will in all probability be expanded with the inclusion of states like Peru and Chile bringing into question the spatial aspect of the ‘regional’ economic partnership. As trade flows compete with military power for influence, geopolitics becomes an extension of geo-economics and infrastructural developments and institutions assume increasing significance logistical connects will move towards creating new frontiers of governance and new peripheries on the outskirts of logistical connects. It is assumed that this will eventually create a space where the distinction between the economic and the institutional, the public and the private, the national and the supranational, and the local and the global will blur or even vanish. It would also probably herald the arrival of an Asianised future reflected hopefully in the lines ‘Waiting for you, Anpanman!’ (This article was originally published on The DNA. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

‘New world order’ is in flux and Asia seems to be at its centre

The Euphrates emerges where the Karasu and Murat rivers merge in northeastern Turkey and flows to join the Tigris near Basra in Iraq.&nbsp;

Historically, Mesopotamia the region lying between the Euphrates and Tigris, was the heartland of the Babylonian and Assyrian empires. It is today the territory of modern-day Turkey, Syria and Iraq and the centre of a conflict that has engulfed the Middle East.&nbsp;

Where it crosses Syria, a state torn in the conflict between President Assad and a plethora of anti-regime groups, the Euphrates today marks the rough dividing line between forces backed by Iran and the United States.&nbsp;

The area to the river’s east is controlled by the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) backed by the United States, while pro-regime forces backed by Iran control the western banks.&nbsp;

This unstated yet clearly demarcated balance was disturbed when President Donald Trump tweeted on December 19 about the immediate and unconditional US retreat from the area east of the Euphrates river.&nbsp;

This was not significant in terms of the numbers of troops that will be withdrawn, but of the deterrence that the US provided through air power and its commitment as the global superpower.&nbsp;

Should this deterrence be removed, the SDF whose backbone is the Kurdish Peoples’ Protection Units (YPG), would feel the pressure from multiple actors in the region, including Russia, Turkey and Iran as well as the Syrian regime that is increasingly gaining ground.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (in an opinion piece on January 7 in the New York Times) reacted to the planned withdrawal by positing Turkey as the regional alternative who could ‘get the job done’.&nbsp;

Proposing a comprehensive strategy to eliminate the root causes of extremism, President Erdogan has called for a stabilisation force featuring fighters from all parts of Syria (except those with links to terrorist organisations), adequate representation of all communities in popularly elected councils and most importantly, a willingness to shoulder the responsibility of transition to stable governance.&nbsp;

Implicit in the offer is the stipulation for the liquidation of the YPG, which is the chief US ally in Syria, but which Ankara identifies as a terrorist affiliate of the banned Turkish group, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and the establishment of Turkish control in the east of Euphrates, a region covering about 27 per cent of Syrian territory.&nbsp;

This is not the first time Turkey has suggested a ‘zone of influence’ as a surrogate buffer zone. Similar offers of a ‘buffer zone’, signalling its initial intentions of a serious involvement, had been made by Turkey earlier as a measure to protect refugees fleeing the conflict in Syria. What is significant this time is President Trump’s tweet giving Turkey the green signal for actually setting up a 20-mile-wide buffer zone within Syria.

The proposed buffer zone under Turkish control has been rejected by the Syrian Kurds, who have called for the deployment of UN forces along the line separating Kurdish fighters from Turkish troops.&nbsp;

Identifying Turkey as one of the parties to the ongoing dispute, senior political leader Aldar Khalil has argued that as one of the players involved, Turkey cannot guarantee stability.&nbsp;

Complicated ethnic overlaps mean that the Kurdish population in the region now live across Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq with varying levels of autonomy.&nbsp;

While Turkey has accepted northern Iraq’s autonomous status over time, the dilemma is about the future of the Syrian Kurdish areas, adjoining southeastern Turkey, and the precedence that the autonomous status of the Kurds would create for the Kurdish population in Syria and Turkey.&nbsp;

Turkey has battled domestic Kurdish insurgency for decades and has only recently begun negotiations for conciliation. It, therefore, fears the domestic consequences of the creation of a contiguous area under Kurdish control in northern Syria.&nbsp;

When the Syrian crisis started in March 2011, Syria’s Kurds adopted an ambivalent position. However, in July 2012 they took control of several cities in the north where Kurds are in a majority.&nbsp;

The Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), which governs this region bordering Turkey, is affiliated to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and has clearly expressed its interest to form an autonomous zone in Syria comparable to Iraqi Kurdistan, a move Ankara opposes.&nbsp;

Turkey’s Syrian policy, in which President Erdogan had sought President Assad’s overthrow, therefore became counterproductive when it contributed to bringing Syrian Kurds into the fray.

The grandiose Turkish rhetoric faces challenges on a number of fronts. The Turkish plan outlined in the New York Times piece would test Turkish military, administrative and financial capabilities unless supported by US military commitments.&nbsp;

In that case, it would face opposition from Russia, which supports the return of the Kurdish-held regions to the Assad regime and the Astana process of which it is a part.&nbsp;

It would also affect its position in western Syria where it has made inroads into Idlib with Russian support. Syrian Kurds are reportedly in favour of allowing the Assad regime jurisdiction over their areas, rather than surrender control to the Turkish. And most significantly, the January 16 attack on a US military convoy in the northern city of Manbij has raised questions about the practicality of the withdrawal of American ground presence in Syria.&nbsp;

This was the sixth major attack by the Islamic State in less than a month and has raised questions about rhetoric centered around the ‘defeat of the Islamic State’ and reconstruction in a post-Islamic State era. Experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan show that any such premature assumptions should be avoided.&nbsp; 
&nbsp;

(This article was originally published on The DNA. Read the <a href="https://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-middle-east-s-melting-pot-2710965">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

The Euphrates emerges where the Karasu and Murat rivers merge in northeastern Turkey and flows to join the Tigris near Basra in Iraq. Historically, Mesopotamia the region lying between the Euphrates and Tigris, was the heartland of the Babylonian and Assyrian empires.

The Euphrates emerges where the Karasu and Murat rivers merge in northeastern Turkey and flows to join the Tigris near Basra in Iraq. Historically, Mesopotamia the region lying between the Euphrates and Tigris, was the heartland of the Babylonian and Assyrian empires. It is today the territory of modern-day Turkey, Syria and Iraq and the centre of a conflict that has engulfed the Middle East. Where it crosses Syria, a state torn in the conflict between President Assad and a plethora of anti-regime groups, the Euphrates today marks the rough dividing line between forces backed by Iran and the United States. The area to the river’s east is controlled by the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) backed by the United States, while pro-regime forces backed by Iran control the western banks. This unstated yet clearly demarcated balance was disturbed when President Donald Trump tweeted on December 19 about the immediate and unconditional US retreat from the area east of the Euphrates river. This was not significant in terms of the numbers of troops that will be withdrawn, but of the deterrence that the US provided through air power and its commitment as the global superpower. Should this deterrence be removed, the SDF whose backbone is the Kurdish Peoples’ Protection Units (YPG), would feel the pressure from multiple actors in the region, including Russia, Turkey and Iran as well as the Syrian regime that is increasingly gaining ground. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (in an opinion piece on January 7 in the New York Times) reacted to the planned withdrawal by positing Turkey as the regional alternative who could ‘get the job done’. Proposing a comprehensive strategy to eliminate the root causes of extremism, President Erdogan has called for a stabilisation force featuring fighters from all parts of Syria (except those with links to terrorist organisations), adequate representation of all communities in popularly elected councils and most importantly, a willingness to shoulder the responsibility of transition to stable governance. Implicit in the offer is the stipulation for the liquidation of the YPG, which is the chief US ally in Syria, but which Ankara identifies as a terrorist affiliate of the banned Turkish group, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and the establishment of Turkish control in the east of Euphrates, a region covering about 27 per cent of Syrian territory. This is not the first time Turkey has suggested a ‘zone of influence’ as a surrogate buffer zone. Similar offers of a ‘buffer zone’, signalling its initial intentions of a serious involvement, had been made by Turkey earlier as a measure to protect refugees fleeing the conflict in Syria. What is significant this time is President Trump’s tweet giving Turkey the green signal for actually setting up a 20-mile-wide buffer zone within Syria. The proposed buffer zone under Turkish control has been rejected by the Syrian Kurds, who have called for the deployment of UN forces along the line separating Kurdish fighters from Turkish troops. Identifying Turkey as one of the parties to the ongoing dispute, senior political leader Aldar Khalil has argued that as one of the players involved, Turkey cannot guarantee stability. Complicated ethnic overlaps mean that the Kurdish population in the region now live across Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq with varying levels of autonomy. While Turkey has accepted northern Iraq’s autonomous status over time, the dilemma is about the future of the Syrian Kurdish areas, adjoining southeastern Turkey, and the precedence that the autonomous status of the Kurds would create for the Kurdish population in Syria and Turkey. Turkey has battled domestic Kurdish insurgency for decades and has only recently begun negotiations for conciliation. It, therefore, fears the domestic consequences of the creation of a contiguous area under Kurdish control in northern Syria. When the Syrian crisis started in March 2011, Syria’s Kurds adopted an ambivalent position. However, in July 2012 they took control of several cities in the north where Kurds are in a majority. The Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), which governs this region bordering Turkey, is affiliated to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and has clearly expressed its interest to form an autonomous zone in Syria comparable to Iraqi Kurdistan, a move Ankara opposes. Turkey’s Syrian policy, in which President Erdogan had sought President Assad’s overthrow, therefore became counterproductive when it contributed to bringing Syrian Kurds into the fray. The grandiose Turkish rhetoric faces challenges on a number of fronts. The Turkish plan outlined in the New York Times piece would test Turkish military, administrative and financial capabilities unless supported by US military commitments. In that case, it would face opposition from Russia, which supports the return of the Kurdish-held regions to the Assad regime and the Astana process of which it is a part. It would also affect its position in western Syria where it has made inroads into Idlib with Russian support. Syrian Kurds are reportedly in favour of allowing the Assad regime jurisdiction over their areas, rather than surrender control to the Turkish. And most significantly, the January 16 attack on a US military convoy in the northern city of Manbij has raised questions about the practicality of the withdrawal of American ground presence in Syria. This was the sixth major attack by the Islamic State in less than a month and has raised questions about rhetoric centered around the ‘defeat of the Islamic State’ and reconstruction in a post-Islamic State era. Experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan show that any such premature assumptions should be avoided. (This article was originally published on The DNA. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Middle East’s melting pot

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Anita Sengupta

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