<p>2017 saw some of the most dramatic and ominous unravelings of the delicate human condition, and the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar and Bangladesh sits right at the top. The scale of the violence and physical displacement that unfolded after the 25 August militant attack in Myanmar&rsquo;s Northern Rakhine State remains unlike anything else in recent memory.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>Perhaps most remarkable is the geopolitical whirlpool that the crisis has created in the region, drawing in peering state and non-state actors in a complex, and often clashing, interplay of agendas, interests, and anxieties. In a way, the crisis has opened up Myanmar, currently undergoing democratic transition under the much-scrutinised leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi, to the subsuming throes of big power politics and regional contestation for strategic leverage. India, owing to its proximity to ground zero and concomitant regional dynamics, too remains in this sphere of geopolitical churning.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>But, the question is whether India has been able to respond in a manner that is not just effective in restoring stability in the short-term or providing comprehensive assistance to the direct stakeholders of the crisis, but also that consolidates its own standing as a reliable power in this volatile region.</p>

<p><strong>The Indian Response</strong></p>

<p>India has obviously had to articulate a position on the crisis, thanks to strategic realities, domestic sentiments, and regional geopolitical compulsions. But, this has been a far-from-consistent position, with the establishment in New Delhi fumbling to make sense of the rapidly evolving (or devolving) situation on the ground and get the geopolitical arithmetic right. The constant struggle for the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been to showcase and build upon a framework of neutrality by assisting both Myanmar and Bangladesh.&nbsp;</p>

<p>Modi, during his early-September visit to Myanmar, used the term &lsquo;extremist violence&rsquo; to describe the instability and centred the bulk of his remarks on terrorism and the deepening partnership between India and Myanmar. The absence of any reference to allegations of human rights abuses and use of excessive force against Rohingya civilians by Burmese security forces not only drew sharp criticism from commentators, but also stoked the hearth in Dhaka, which blames Myanmar for triggering the refugee situation. Less than a week after the tour, the Modi government had to do damage control by issuing a call for &lsquo;restraint and maturity&rsquo; from Burmese authorities.&nbsp;</p>

<p>A week hence, the Indian Air Force airlifted material aid, intended for the refugees, to Chittagong as part of &lsquo;Operation Insaniyat&rsquo;. Following this, New Delhi sent another 900 tonnes of relief aid via the naval route. Further, India&rsquo;s Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar recently signed an MoU with the Suu Kyi government on &ldquo;long-term socio-economic development of [Rakhine] state,&rdquo; including construction of pre-fabricated houses for returning refugees.</p>

<p>One could argue that India, quickly realising the difficult geopolitics of the situation, ultimately forwarded a balanced and mature diplomatic prognosis in the face of sensational - often precipitate - global rhetoric. After all, the Modi government chose to water the roots (read: infuse relief assistance at the source points) rather than prune the leaves&nbsp; (read: engage in abstract verbosity against the Suu Kyi government).&nbsp;</p>

<p>But, in reality, what good has come out of this diplomatic calibration?</p>

<p><strong>Balanced Diplomacy or Timidity?&nbsp;</strong></p>

<p>In effect, all of the above are nominal measures that neither resolve the refugee crisis, nor add any significant value to India&rsquo;s footprint in South and Southeast Asia. New Delhi must note that it is an extended stakeholder in the crisis, simply because Rohingyas are also crossing over to India, albeit in much lesser numbers to Bangladesh. While keeping the borders open to refugees in distress is a fair and precedent-based policy position, actively engaging in crisis-management is a far more concrete and sustainable design - even from a &lsquo;national security&rsquo; point of view. There is little doubt that existing Islamist extremist networks in the region would exploit the crisis to recruit and mobilise, and India then is a natural target.&nbsp;</p>

<p>But, the Modi government has done little to act from the front. Beyond abstaining from critical UN resolutions and sending limited aid that barely even scratches at the surface of the mammoth humanitarian demand, India has remained largely passive. Such a lukewarm and rather shaky response to an enormous regional crisis is counterintuitive to India&rsquo;s bulging aspirations of establishing itself as South Asia&rsquo;s prime security guarantor and in general, a responsible global power. Simply put, if regional assertion is an intention, then India cannot afford to sit by as a backbencher.&nbsp;</p>

<p>Even at home, the BJP-led government could not drive home a rational agenda on this issue. The noise over the intended deportation of the 40,000 odd Rohingya refugees in India drowned most voices of empathy in the initial phase of the crisis. Yet, the government ultimately ended up not actually carrying out the deportation, thus stoking the impatience of its rabble-rousing domestic electorate. What more, influential party voices kept the conversation confined to the apparent &lsquo;national security threat&rsquo; that Rohingyas posed to India while censoring the significant human rights aspect of the whole crisis.</p>

<p>For India, the most stark outcome of weak action has come in the form of corresponding strong-willed action from its most ambitious regional nemesis, China.&nbsp;</p>

<p><strong>Geopolitical Consequences of Inaction</strong></p>

<p>The Chinese have displayed impressive diplomatic tact on the Rohingya issue. Departing from its longstanding policy of leveraging itself in the neighbourhood through proxy subversion or absolute neutrality in third-party disputes, Beijing stepped into the shoes of a core mediator this time. In November, China proposed a three-stage plan to Bangladesh and Myanmar to resolve the refugee crisis and in the longer term, the &lsquo;Rohingya issue&rsquo;. Less than a week later, Bangladesh and Myanmar announced the signing of a bilateral repatriation deal.&nbsp;</p>

<p>From the perspective of a regional hegemon, this was result-oriented diplomacy at its finest, despite the fact that the deal is as obscure as it can get. The caveat here is that China&rsquo;s &lsquo;Rohingya plan&rsquo; may not be in the best interests of the Rohingyas. But, it certainly is in its own interests.&nbsp;</p>

<p>However, it might not be all too late for New Delhi to move to the frontline and lead a comprehensive regional effort to find sustainable solutions to the crisis.&nbsp;</p>

<p>For an ambitious global power like India, this quest for hegemony starts with desire for greater legitimacy (and not just dominance) in the region, which in turn, is premised on good faith, engagement, understanding, and progressive diplomacy.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p><em>(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL).</em></p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>


China has strengthened its geo-strategic clout in the region, however, it might not be all too late for New Delhi to move to the frontline, finding a sustainable solution to the crisis.

2017 saw some of the most dramatic and ominous unravelings of the delicate human condition, and the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar and Bangladesh sits right at the top. The scale of the violence and physical displacement that unfolded after the 25 August militant attack in Myanmar’s Northern Rakhine State remains unlike anything else in recent memory. Perhaps most remarkable is the geopolitical whirlpool that the crisis has created in the region, drawing in peering state and non-state actors in a complex, and often clashing, interplay of agendas, interests, and anxieties. In a way, the crisis has opened up Myanmar, currently undergoing democratic transition under the much-scrutinised leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi, to the subsuming throes of big power politics and regional contestation for strategic leverage. India, owing to its proximity to ground zero and concomitant regional dynamics, too remains in this sphere of geopolitical churning. But, the question is whether India has been able to respond in a manner that is not just effective in restoring stability in the short-term or providing comprehensive assistance to the direct stakeholders of the crisis, but also that consolidates its own standing as a reliable power in this volatile region. The Indian Response India has obviously had to articulate a position on the crisis, thanks to strategic realities, domestic sentiments, and regional geopolitical compulsions. But, this has been a far-from-consistent position, with the establishment in New Delhi fumbling to make sense of the rapidly evolving (or devolving) situation on the ground and get the geopolitical arithmetic right. The constant struggle for the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been to showcase and build upon a framework of neutrality by assisting both Myanmar and Bangladesh. Modi, during his early-September visit to Myanmar, used the term ‘extremist violence’ to describe the instability and centred the bulk of his remarks on terrorism and the deepening partnership between India and Myanmar. The absence of any reference to allegations of human rights abuses and use of excessive force against Rohingya civilians by Burmese security forces not only drew sharp criticism from commentators, but also stoked the hearth in Dhaka, which blames Myanmar for triggering the refugee situation. Less than a week after the tour, the Modi government had to do damage control by issuing a call for ‘restraint and maturity’ from Burmese authorities. A week hence, the Indian Air Force airlifted material aid, intended for the refugees, to Chittagong as part of ‘Operation Insaniyat’. Following this, New Delhi sent another 900 tonnes of relief aid via the naval route. Further, India’s Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar recently signed an MoU with the Suu Kyi government on “long-term socio-economic development of [Rakhine] state,” including construction of pre-fabricated houses for returning refugees. One could argue that India, quickly realising the difficult geopolitics of the situation, ultimately forwarded a balanced and mature diplomatic prognosis in the face of sensational - often precipitate - global rhetoric. After all, the Modi government chose to water the roots (read: infuse relief assistance at the source points) rather than prune the leaves (read: engage in abstract verbosity against the Suu Kyi government). But, in reality, what good has come out of this diplomatic calibration? Balanced Diplomacy or Timidity? In effect, all of the above are nominal measures that neither resolve the refugee crisis, nor add any significant value to India’s footprint in South and Southeast Asia. New Delhi must note that it is an extended stakeholder in the crisis, simply because Rohingyas are also crossing over to India, albeit in much lesser numbers to Bangladesh. While keeping the borders open to refugees in distress is a fair and precedent-based policy position, actively engaging in crisis-management is a far more concrete and sustainable design - even from a ‘national security’ point of view. There is little doubt that existing Islamist extremist networks in the region would exploit the crisis to recruit and mobilise, and India then is a natural target. But, the Modi government has done little to act from the front. Beyond abstaining from critical UN resolutions and sending limited aid that barely even scratches at the surface of the mammoth humanitarian demand, India has remained largely passive. Such a lukewarm and rather shaky response to an enormous regional crisis is counterintuitive to India’s bulging aspirations of establishing itself as South Asia’s prime security guarantor and in general, a responsible global power. Simply put, if regional assertion is an intention, then India cannot afford to sit by as a backbencher. Even at home, the BJP-led government could not drive home a rational agenda on this issue. The noise over the intended deportation of the 40,000 odd Rohingya refugees in India drowned most voices of empathy in the initial phase of the crisis. Yet, the government ultimately ended up not actually carrying out the deportation, thus stoking the impatience of its rabble-rousing domestic electorate. What more, influential party voices kept the conversation confined to the apparent ‘national security threat’ that Rohingyas posed to India while censoring the significant human rights aspect of the whole crisis. For India, the most stark outcome of weak action has come in the form of corresponding strong-willed action from its most ambitious regional nemesis, China. Geopolitical Consequences of Inaction The Chinese have displayed impressive diplomatic tact on the Rohingya issue. Departing from its longstanding policy of leveraging itself in the neighbourhood through proxy subversion or absolute neutrality in third-party disputes, Beijing stepped into the shoes of a core mediator this time. In November, China proposed a three-stage plan to Bangladesh and Myanmar to resolve the refugee crisis and in the longer term, the ‘Rohingya issue’. Less than a week later, Bangladesh and Myanmar announced the signing of a bilateral repatriation deal. From the perspective of a regional hegemon, this was result-oriented diplomacy at its finest, despite the fact that the deal is as obscure as it can get. The caveat here is that China’s ‘Rohingya plan’ may not be in the best interests of the Rohingyas. But, it certainly is in its own interests. However, it might not be all too late for New Delhi to move to the frontline and lead a comprehensive regional effort to find sustainable solutions to the crisis. For an ambitious global power like India, this quest for hegemony starts with desire for greater legitimacy (and not just dominance) in the region, which in turn, is premised on good faith, engagement, understanding, and progressive diplomacy. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL).

Opinion: China leveraged Rohingya crisis. India was timid.

<p>&ldquo;This is not just a diplomatic briefing, but in some ways, a friendly appeal to all those who wish Myanmar well,&rdquo; said Myanmar&rsquo;s State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, in her characteristically sombre tone, at the end of her public address on 19 September.</p>

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<h5>Suu Kyi categorically avoided touching upon specific allegations and counter-allegations with regard to the ground situation in northern Rakhine.</h5>
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<p>The speech came at a time when the Nobel Peace laureate finds herself in a thick swamp over her passivity on the alleged use of disproportionate and extrajudicial force by state security forces against the stateless community of Rohingya Muslims.&nbsp;</p>

<p><strong>Damage Control</strong></p>

<p>The State Counsellor&rsquo;s speech, delivered in English for international consumption, came in lieu of her absence at the 72nd session of the UN General Assembly held on the same date. In words that were heavily weighed, she offered a fairly broad and ostensibly neutral narrative aimed at damage-control.&nbsp;</p>

<p>Much unlike how the Tatmadaw (military) would have addressed criticism from the outside, the Lady&rsquo;s tone was one of conciliation rather than abrasive dismissal. She was fully aware of the importance of the global community of active and passive stakeholders that she was addressing in consolidating Myanmar&rsquo;s image as a progressive democracy. This was a target audience that the Lady does not wish to lose anytime soon.</p>

<p>However, the speech has been met with damning criticism from certain quarters of the international community. &ldquo;Too little, too late&rdquo;, &ldquo;disappointing&rdquo;, &ldquo;shameful&rdquo;, &quot;little more than a mix of untruths and victim blaming&quot; are some of the phrases that were employed to describe it. As she herself conceded in an interview with ANI next day, Suu Kyi stuck to Naypyidaw&rsquo;s standard narrative on the Rakhine/Rohingya issue, the crux of which is that the situation is complex, warrants the time to resolve, and is being misrepresented in the international media.</p>

<p>Let&#39;s take a look at some of the key themes in her cautiously-framed narrative, and the veracity of the claims made under them.</p>

<p><strong>Rule of Law and Human Rights Violations</strong></p>

<p>Suu Kyi said that her government was committed to the rule of law and condemned all forms of human rights violations and unlawful violence. She said that the security forces were under instructions to adhere to a strict code of conduct and exercise maximum restraint insofar as their operations in northern Rakhine are concerned.</p>

<p>However, these statements carry little value without corresponding evidence from the ground which is impossible owing to the security lockdown imposed in the core conflict zone.</p>

<p>The closest to any &lsquo;evidence&rsquo; that we have at the moment are the countless eyewitness accounts of Rohingya refugees who have fled to Bangladesh, which paint an entirely different picture. This is further backed up by satellite images released recently showing entire villages razed to the ground. The government, so far, has not furnished any solid material counter-evidence to thwart this accusatory narrative.</p>

<p>Further, &lsquo;rule of law&rsquo; is always a non-starter when serious allegations of human rights abuses by state forces are concerned. In fact, on many occasions, the law is used as a shield of legitimacy to carry out a draconian action. Such a broad mandate often leads to excessive use of force and overkill when combatants are diffused within a bigger non-combatant civilian population, like in this case. The situation is somewhat similar to India&rsquo;s use of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in insurgent areas.</p>

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<h5>Temporary resettlement in camps and aid provision, catered only to the non-Muslim population, including ethnic Rakhine Buddhists, sub-ethnic groups (like Mru), and Hindus. In fact, 4000 of them have already returned to their homes by now - an indication of effective but discriminatory crisis resettlement.&nbsp;</h5>
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<p><strong>The Situation on the Ground</strong></p>

<p>Suu Kyi categorically avoided touching upon specific allegations and counter-allegations with regard to the ground situation in northern Rakhine. She, however, stated that 50 per cent of the Rohingya villages is intact. Even if we take this at face value without triangulating it with material evidence (which remains obscure for now), the obvious question that pops up is: what happened to the other 50 per cent? Who burnt them?&nbsp;</p>

<p>She also stated that the government had launched relief and resettlement programmes on 27 August, two days after the attack. However, almost all media reports tell us that these programmes, involving temporary resettlement in camps and aid provision, catered only to the non-Muslim population, including ethnic Rakhine Buddhists, sub-ethnic groups (like Mru), and Hindus. In fact, 4000 of them have already returned to their homes by now - an indication of effective but discriminatory crisis resettlement.&nbsp;</p>

<p><strong>Exodus of Rohingyas to Bangladesh</strong></p>

<p>Suu Kyi&rsquo;s comments on the continuing mass exodus of Rohingyas to Bangladesh were met with sharp criticism and apprehension by international observers. She said that &lsquo;most&rsquo; of the Muslims had not fled, and called upon the international community to visit northern Rakhine and speak to these Rohingyas who chose to stay back. She also stated that the government wants to find out why the exodus was happening and that it wants to talk to those who had fled.</p>

<p>These are, at best, tactical comments aimed at deflection. Fact remains that 4 lakh Rohingyas have already crossed the perilous border, at least according to UN agencies operating in the area. Considering that around 10 lakh Rohingyas live in northern Rakhine, the displaced indeed accounts for just a part of the entire Muslim population. But, 4 lakh is not a small figure in itself and neither is the proportion of displaced so paltry that it ought to be dismissed.</p>

<p>Her cautiously minced statement does not issue any clear invitation to talk to the displaced - something that it believes is reserved for the state authorities alone.</p>

<p>Observers have also accused her of sounding ignorant for wondering what the reasons for the exodus could be. While she might have been fed inaccurate information about the ground reality in northern Rakhine, this seems to be another strategically-framed narrative like the rest. In asking this question, Suu Kyi implicitly absolved the military of responsibility for the ongoing displacement and shifted the blame to elements beyond the control of her government. The idea that she wants to project is that if the refugee exodus was indeed because of the state&rsquo;s conduct, then she would certainly know the reason.</p>

<p>One of the most crucial elements under this theme that Suu Kyi talked about was her government&rsquo;s willingness to engage with the government of Bangladesh to resolve the refugee crisis. She stated that Myanmar is willing to begin the National Verification Process (NVP) - a policy to ascertain the citizenship of non-citizen Rakhine residents, Rohingyas included - and repatriate refugees in Bangladesh in adherence to the principles agreed upon by the two countries in 1993 under UN supervision.</p>

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<p>This is a welcome move that addresses the root of the problem i.e. citizenship rights for Rohingyas. However, while the NVP has been termed as a nominal policy to partially rehabilitate roving refugees in Rakhine (without giving them full citizenship status), the 1993 guidelines earlier came under scrutiny for violating international law by repatriating refugees in Bangladesh against their own wishes. The futility of the NVP is reaffirmed by the fact that only 4000 of the 10 lakh Rohingyas have been accepted as citizens so far, with rest being given &ldquo;green cards&rdquo; (temporary resident status).&nbsp;</p>

<p>For now, the exact provisions of both remain, at best, dubious. Further, Suu Kyi said that all those who are legitimately accepted as &lsquo;refugees&rsquo; (in Myanmar) would receive full state entitlements, including security and access to humanitarian aid. What would happen to the rest remains unclear as ever?</p>

<p><strong>An Exercise in Vain?</strong></p>

<p>Clearly, the State Counsellor&rsquo;s speech was fraught with grave inconsistencies, those that third-party observers are ready to pounce on and expose. Thus, this exercise in damage control certainly falls short of its prime objective of placating international observers concerned about the situation in northern Rakhine.&nbsp;</p>

<p>However, the overall tone of the narrative was not of denial, which is a refreshing break from past official narratives. It was, nonetheless, ridden with passive omissions. Truth is that the Lady does not enjoy full autonomy when it comes to handling the ground situation in the affected conflict zone. The Tatmadaw is the key decision-making authority in this regard; and, thanks to the civilian government&rsquo;s delicate relationship with the ever-powerful army, Suu Kyi remains tied to the ground for now.</p>


Aung Suu Kyi's attempt at damage control certainly falls short of its prime objective of placating international observers concerned about the Rohingya situation.

“This is not just a diplomatic briefing, but in some ways, a friendly appeal to all those who wish Myanmar well,” said Myanmar’s State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, in her characteristically sombre tone, at the end of her public address on 19 September. Suu Kyi categorically avoided touching upon specific allegations and counter-allegations with regard to the ground situation in northern Rakhine. × The speech came at a time when the Nobel Peace laureate finds herself in a thick swamp over her passivity on the alleged use of disproportionate and extrajudicial force by state security forces against the stateless community of Rohingya Muslims. Damage Control The State Counsellor’s speech, delivered in English for international consumption, came in lieu of her absence at the 72nd session of the UN General Assembly held on the same date. In words that were heavily weighed, she offered a fairly broad and ostensibly neutral narrative aimed at damage-control. Much unlike how the Tatmadaw (military) would have addressed criticism from the outside, the Lady’s tone was one of conciliation rather than abrasive dismissal. She was fully aware of the importance of the global community of active and passive stakeholders that she was addressing in consolidating Myanmar’s image as a progressive democracy. This was a target audience that the Lady does not wish to lose anytime soon. However, the speech has been met with damning criticism from certain quarters of the international community. “Too little, too late”, “disappointing”, “shameful”, "little more than a mix of untruths and victim blaming" are some of the phrases that were employed to describe it. As she herself conceded in an interview with ANI next day, Suu Kyi stuck to Naypyidaw’s standard narrative on the Rakhine/Rohingya issue, the crux of which is that the situation is complex, warrants the time to resolve, and is being misrepresented in the international media. Let's take a look at some of the key themes in her cautiously-framed narrative, and the veracity of the claims made under them. Rule of Law and Human Rights Violations Suu Kyi said that her government was committed to the rule of law and condemned all forms of human rights violations and unlawful violence. She said that the security forces were under instructions to adhere to a strict code of conduct and exercise maximum restraint insofar as their operations in northern Rakhine are concerned. However, these statements carry little value without corresponding evidence from the ground which is impossible owing to the security lockdown imposed in the core conflict zone. The closest to any ‘evidence’ that we have at the moment are the countless eyewitness accounts of Rohingya refugees who have fled to Bangladesh, which paint an entirely different picture. This is further backed up by satellite images released recently showing entire villages razed to the ground. The government, so far, has not furnished any solid material counter-evidence to thwart this accusatory narrative. Further, ‘rule of law’ is always a non-starter when serious allegations of human rights abuses by state forces are concerned. In fact, on many occasions, the law is used as a shield of legitimacy to carry out a draconian action. Such a broad mandate often leads to excessive use of force and overkill when combatants are diffused within a bigger non-combatant civilian population, like in this case. The situation is somewhat similar to India’s use of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in insurgent areas. Temporary resettlement in camps and aid provision, catered only to the non-Muslim population, including ethnic Rakhine Buddhists, sub-ethnic groups (like Mru), and Hindus. In fact, 4000 of them have already returned to their homes by now - an indication of effective but discriminatory crisis resettlement. × The Situation on the Ground Suu Kyi categorically avoided touching upon specific allegations and counter-allegations with regard to the ground situation in northern Rakhine. She, however, stated that 50 per cent of the Rohingya villages is intact. Even if we take this at face value without triangulating it with material evidence (which remains obscure for now), the obvious question that pops up is: what happened to the other 50 per cent? Who burnt them? She also stated that the government had launched relief and resettlement programmes on 27 August, two days after the attack. However, almost all media reports tell us that these programmes, involving temporary resettlement in camps and aid provision, catered only to the non-Muslim population, including ethnic Rakhine Buddhists, sub-ethnic groups (like Mru), and Hindus. In fact, 4000 of them have already returned to their homes by now - an indication of effective but discriminatory crisis resettlement. Exodus of Rohingyas to Bangladesh Suu Kyi’s comments on the continuing mass exodus of Rohingyas to Bangladesh were met with sharp criticism and apprehension by international observers. She said that ‘most’ of the Muslims had not fled, and called upon the international community to visit northern Rakhine and speak to these Rohingyas who chose to stay back. She also stated that the government wants to find out why the exodus was happening and that it wants to talk to those who had fled. These are, at best, tactical comments aimed at deflection. Fact remains that 4 lakh Rohingyas have already crossed the perilous border, at least according to UN agencies operating in the area. Considering that around 10 lakh Rohingyas live in northern Rakhine, the displaced indeed accounts for just a part of the entire Muslim population. But, 4 lakh is not a small figure in itself and neither is the proportion of displaced so paltry that it ought to be dismissed. Her cautiously minced statement does not issue any clear invitation to talk to the displaced - something that it believes is reserved for the state authorities alone. Observers have also accused her of sounding ignorant for wondering what the reasons for the exodus could be. While she might have been fed inaccurate information about the ground reality in northern Rakhine, this seems to be another strategically-framed narrative like the rest. In asking this question, Suu Kyi implicitly absolved the military of responsibility for the ongoing displacement and shifted the blame to elements beyond the control of her government. The idea that she wants to project is that if the refugee exodus was indeed because of the state’s conduct, then she would certainly know the reason. One of the most crucial elements under this theme that Suu Kyi talked about was her government’s willingness to engage with the government of Bangladesh to resolve the refugee crisis. She stated that Myanmar is willing to begin the National Verification Process (NVP) - a policy to ascertain the citizenship of non-citizen Rakhine residents, Rohingyas included - and repatriate refugees in Bangladesh in adherence to the principles agreed upon by the two countries in 1993 under UN supervision. The futility of the NVP is reaffirmed by the fact that only 4000 of the 10 lakh Rohingyas have been accepted as citizens so far, with rest being given “green cards” × This is a welcome move that addresses the root of the problem i.e. citizenship rights for Rohingyas. However, while the NVP has been termed as a nominal policy to partially rehabilitate roving refugees in Rakhine (without giving them full citizenship status), the 1993 guidelines earlier came under scrutiny for violating international law by repatriating refugees in Bangladesh against their own wishes. The futility of the NVP is reaffirmed by the fact that only 4000 of the 10 lakh Rohingyas have been accepted as citizens so far, with rest being given “green cards” (temporary resident status). For now, the exact provisions of both remain, at best, dubious. Further, Suu Kyi said that all those who are legitimately accepted as ‘refugees’ (in Myanmar) would receive full state entitlements, including security and access to humanitarian aid. What would happen to the rest remains unclear as ever? An Exercise in Vain? Clearly, the State Counsellor’s speech was fraught with grave inconsistencies, those that third-party observers are ready to pounce on and expose. Thus, this exercise in damage control certainly falls short of its prime objective of placating international observers concerned about the situation in northern Rakhine. However, the overall tone of the narrative was not of denial, which is a refreshing break from past official narratives. It was, nonetheless, ridden with passive omissions. Truth is that the Lady does not enjoy full autonomy when it comes to handling the ground situation in the affected conflict zone. The Tatmadaw is the key decision-making authority in this regard; and, thanks to the civilian government’s delicate relationship with the ever-powerful army, Suu Kyi remains tied to the ground for now.

Rohingyas: Grave inconsistencies if not denial marks Aung Suu Kyi's speech

<p>On 9 October 2016, an unusual wave of extremist violence swept through the restive Rakhine (Arakan) State of northwestern Myanmar; close to 300 obscure assailants, armed with swords, spears, and homemade weapons, attacked several border police outposts in and around the Maungdaw and Rathedaung Townships located in close proximity to the volatile Bangladesh border. The attack left nine police officers dead, and four others wounded.</p>

<p>The situation escalated quickly as the government deployed additional troops from the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Defence Services) to the affected area, which is dominated by the stateless and heavily persecuted Rohingya Muslim community. A massive counterinsurgency operation marked by pervasive area sweeps and house-to-house searches followed. Subsequently, the region was placed under complete lockdown, to the point of blocking routine humanitarian aid. Amidst multiple allegations of arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial killings, the government announced that 30 &#39;attackers&#39; had been neutralised by security forces in the follow-up raids.&nbsp;</p>

<p>Perhaps in an attempt to clear the air of suspicion in the days following the shocking attacks, on 14 October, the office of the president released a statement that linked the attacks to a hitherto unknown organisation called <a href="http://[http://on.wsj.com/2dlqI0B]">Aqa Mul Mujhadin</a> (AMM). This outfit, as claimed by the government, is led by an individual identified as &#39;Mr Havistoohar&#39;, a local Rohingya Muslim. Going by supposed accounts provided by two detainees, &#39;Havistoohar&#39; was involved in locally recruiting close to 400 Rohingya youth for an attack around the Maungdaw area. Intriguingly enough, the government also linked the AMM to a long-dormant extremist outfit known as the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO). Not much is known about the latter.</p>

<p>If the above claims made by the government are to be deemed credible, then the recent attacks usher in as the first significant manifestation of a previously absent phenomenon that is &#39;Rohingya extremism&#39;. The glaring question, however, remains:&nbsp;is this newly-emergent face of organised violence in Rakhine State merely a localised occurrence, or is it linked to a much wider transnational terror network? The preliminary set of details in conjunction with an ambiguous history of Islamist terror penetration in this region points to the latter assumption.</p>

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<p>According to Myanmarese intelligence, &#39;Havistoohar&#39; was trained by the Taliban in Pakistan, and returned to Rakhine to mobilise a <a href="http://[http://on.wsj.com/2dlqI0B]">violent insurgency</a> in <a href="http://on.wsj.com/2dlqI0B">Myanmar</a>. He is also said to have frequently crossed over to Bangladesh for the purpose of receiving funds from certain &lsquo;Middle Eastern organisations&rsquo;. Most critically, his local recruits were purportedly trained by a largely nondescript man called &lsquo;Kalis&rsquo;, a Pakistani national of Rohingya origin. What really is the AMM then, and who are these slackly identified individuals?&nbsp;</p>

<p>This confusing picture becomes slightly clearer if we look at some incisive statements made by Indian intelligence officials a week after the attacks, quoted by two local <a href="http://bit.ly/2e6m1cl">Bangladeshi</a>&nbsp;and <a href="http://[http://bit.ly/2eGZFTr]">Myanmarese</a> newspapers. According to these reports, Indian intelligence has identified &#39;Mr Havistoohar&#39; as &#39;Hafiz Tohar&#39;, a 45-year old Rohingya man from Kyauk Pyin Seik village in Maungdaw. They have further categorised the AMM as an offshoot of a fairly well-known but mostly passive transnational terror outfit called Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami-Arakaan (HuJI-A). Going by a long-held <a href="http://[http://bit.ly/2eC4hWU]">understanding</a>, HuJI-A was formed in 1988 by a Pakistani national of Rohingya origin by the name of Abdul Qadoos Burmi. One could rationally assume that he is the same individual aliased as &#39;Kalis&#39;.</p>

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<h5>According to Indian intelligence officials AMM is an offshoot of a fairly well-known but mostly passive transnational terror outfit called Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami-Arakaan (HuJI-A)</h5>
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<p>However, the international connection hardly ends here. Qadoos, who fled to Pakistan in the early 1980s, is known to be very close to Hafiz Sayeed, the notorious chief of Pakistani terror outfit Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT). In a photograph published by <i>Mizzima News </i>in <a href="http://[http://bit.ly/1giwEcQ]">2015</a>, he was seen sharing the stage with Sayeed during a conference organised by LeT to express solidarity with the Rohingyas. He is alleged to have trained Rohingya recruits in Pakistan, subsequently sending them over to the remote hills of south eastern Bangladesh for further localised training.</p>

<p>The Pakistan connection to the Rohingya community in Rakhine State can be placed in the context of a fairly long and indistinct history of transnational Jihadist involvement in the Bangladesh-Myanmar border region. According to past claims made by Indian and <a href="http://[http://bit.ly/2eGZFTr]">Western intelligence</a>, the LeT maintains a well-grounded terror ecosystem in this region, wherein two overground charity organisations - Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) and Fala-I-Insaniyat (FIF) - have regularly picked up local Rohingya youth from the squalid camps of Rakhine for recruitment and training in Bangladesh and Pakistan. However, we do not yet know if these recruits were primarily meant for export to other territorial domains or for deployment in Myanmar itself.</p>

<p>Despite this murky history, it is difficult to pin down the responsibility for the recent attacks on any one outfit (or group of outfits). One separate analysis, made by researchers at the School of International Studies, <a href="http://[http://bit.ly/2eAN0lg]">Nanyang Technological </a>University (Singapore), attributes responsibility to an entirely disparate and previously unheard of an extremist outfit called &#39;Harakah al-Yaqin&#39;&nbsp;(HAY). The assessment, which is based on close analysis of some post-attack YouTube videos and social media chatter, claims that HAY, which is mostly constituted of heavily-armed &#39;illegal immigrants&#39; from Bangladesh, might have carried out the attacks. It also states that some Islamic State-affiliated terror outfits deeper inside southeast Asia have engaged with these videos on social media. Notably, the government raids after the attacks have led the authorities to some similar videos of masked militants with military-grade weapons calling for Jihad against the government forces of Myanmar. The exact nature of this digital evidence, however, remains unclear.</p>

<p>Nonetheless, what stands out quite remarkably is the style and tactic employed in the attacks. Although the assailants relied on rudimentary weapons for the assault, they managed to seize 51 medium-to-heavy firearms and more than 10,000 rounds of ammunition from the police. This points to a specific tactic of using a low-level offensive to gather resources for a much larger attack. Most importantly, it reflects the low-grade nature of the offensive entity in marked contrast to well-resourced outfits like HuJI (or HuJI-A). This points to the involvement of a highly localised group, albeit with possible facilitation, funding, and motivation from larger trans-border entities.&nbsp;</p>

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<h5>Despite the revelations by the government of Myanmar after the attacks, the precise contours of &#39;Rohingya extremism&#39; remain largely inconspicuous.</h5>
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<p>Thus, despite the revelations by the government of Myanmar after the attacks, the precise contours of &#39;Rohingya extremism&#39; remain largely inconspicuous. The LeT/HuJI-A link comes under serious scrutiny if one recalls the massive crackdown launched by the Awami League government on domestic extremist groups in Bangladesh, which resulted in the severe degradation of the broader HuJI infrastructure in the region. How, then, was the outfit successful in sustaining its mobilisation efforts, if it did? Did HuJI-A continue to function independently under LeT&#39;s tutelage? Were the attacks the sole handiwork of AMM - possibly a derivative of the subcutaneously functional RSO? It is hard to say so at the moment.</p>

<p>In light of the above, one could rationally suppose that the Rohingya cause has certainly spilled beyond borders to reach the doorsteps of transnational Jihad. However, one must not forget that an oppressed and disenfranchised community - wherever they might be situated -&nbsp; is often the most fitting resource pool for vested parties willing to hijack an existential cause for political ends. Thus, amidst the deafening clamour of hasty allegations and conclusions being drawn after the heinous attacks, one must try and not forget the perpetual state of fear and subjugation that the Rohingya community continues to live under&nbsp;a country that refuses to recognise them as legitimate citizens.&nbsp;</p>


Vested extremist parties often hijack oppressed communities, such as the Rohingyas, to serve political ends

On 9 October 2016, an unusual wave of extremist violence swept through the restive Rakhine (Arakan) State of northwestern Myanmar; close to 300 obscure assailants, armed with swords, spears, and homemade weapons, attacked several border police outposts in and around the Maungdaw and Rathedaung Townships located in close proximity to the volatile Bangladesh border. The attack left nine police officers dead, and four others wounded. The situation escalated quickly as the government deployed additional troops from the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Defence Services) to the affected area, which is dominated by the stateless and heavily persecuted Rohingya Muslim community. A massive counterinsurgency operation marked by pervasive area sweeps and house-to-house searches followed. Subsequently, the region was placed under complete lockdown, to the point of blocking routine humanitarian aid. Amidst multiple allegations of arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial killings, the government announced that 30 'attackers' had been neutralised by security forces in the follow-up raids. Perhaps in an attempt to clear the air of suspicion in the days following the shocking attacks, on 14 October, the office of the president released a statement that linked the attacks to a hitherto unknown organisation called Aqa Mul Mujhadin (AMM). This outfit, as claimed by the government, is led by an individual identified as 'Mr Havistoohar', a local Rohingya Muslim. Going by supposed accounts provided by two detainees, 'Havistoohar' was involved in locally recruiting close to 400 Rohingya youth for an attack around the Maungdaw area. Intriguingly enough, the government also linked the AMM to a long-dormant extremist outfit known as the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO). Not much is known about the latter. If the above claims made by the government are to be deemed credible, then the recent attacks usher in as the first significant manifestation of a previously absent phenomenon that is 'Rohingya extremism'. The glaring question, however, remains: is this newly-emergent face of organised violence in Rakhine State merely a localised occurrence, or is it linked to a much wider transnational terror network? The preliminary set of details in conjunction with an ambiguous history of Islamist terror penetration in this region points to the latter assumption. Is this newly-emergent face of organised violence in Rakhine State merely a localised occurrence, or is it linked to a much wider transnational terror network? × According to Myanmarese intelligence, 'Havistoohar' was trained by the Taliban in Pakistan, and returned to Rakhine to mobilise a violent insurgency in Myanmar. He is also said to have frequently crossed over to Bangladesh for the purpose of receiving funds from certain ‘Middle Eastern organisations’. Most critically, his local recruits were purportedly trained by a largely nondescript man called ‘Kalis’, a Pakistani national of Rohingya origin. What really is the AMM then, and who are these slackly identified individuals? This confusing picture becomes slightly clearer if we look at some incisive statements made by Indian intelligence officials a week after the attacks, quoted by two local Bangladeshi and Myanmarese newspapers. According to these reports, Indian intelligence has identified 'Mr Havistoohar' as 'Hafiz Tohar', a 45-year old Rohingya man from Kyauk Pyin Seik village in Maungdaw. They have further categorised the AMM as an offshoot of a fairly well-known but mostly passive transnational terror outfit called Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami-Arakaan (HuJI-A). Going by a long-held understanding, HuJI-A was formed in 1988 by a Pakistani national of Rohingya origin by the name of Abdul Qadoos Burmi. One could rationally assume that he is the same individual aliased as 'Kalis'. According to Indian intelligence officials AMM is an offshoot of a fairly well-known but mostly passive transnational terror outfit called Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami-Arakaan (HuJI-A) × However, the international connection hardly ends here. Qadoos, who fled to Pakistan in the early 1980s, is known to be very close to Hafiz Sayeed, the notorious chief of Pakistani terror outfit Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT). In a photograph published by Mizzima News in 2015, he was seen sharing the stage with Sayeed during a conference organised by LeT to express solidarity with the Rohingyas. He is alleged to have trained Rohingya recruits in Pakistan, subsequently sending them over to the remote hills of south eastern Bangladesh for further localised training. The Pakistan connection to the Rohingya community in Rakhine State can be placed in the context of a fairly long and indistinct history of transnational Jihadist involvement in the Bangladesh-Myanmar border region. According to past claims made by Indian and Western intelligence, the LeT maintains a well-grounded terror ecosystem in this region, wherein two overground charity organisations - Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) and Fala-I-Insaniyat (FIF) - have regularly picked up local Rohingya youth from the squalid camps of Rakhine for recruitment and training in Bangladesh and Pakistan. However, we do not yet know if these recruits were primarily meant for export to other territorial domains or for deployment in Myanmar itself. Despite this murky history, it is difficult to pin down the responsibility for the recent attacks on any one outfit (or group of outfits). One separate analysis, made by researchers at the School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University (Singapore), attributes responsibility to an entirely disparate and previously unheard of an extremist outfit called 'Harakah al-Yaqin' (HAY). The assessment, which is based on close analysis of some post-attack YouTube videos and social media chatter, claims that HAY, which is mostly constituted of heavily-armed 'illegal immigrants' from Bangladesh, might have carried out the attacks. It also states that some Islamic State-affiliated terror outfits deeper inside southeast Asia have engaged with these videos on social media. Notably, the government raids after the attacks have led the authorities to some similar videos of masked militants with military-grade weapons calling for Jihad against the government forces of Myanmar. The exact nature of this digital evidence, however, remains unclear. Nonetheless, what stands out quite remarkably is the style and tactic employed in the attacks. Although the assailants relied on rudimentary weapons for the assault, they managed to seize 51 medium-to-heavy firearms and more than 10,000 rounds of ammunition from the police. This points to a specific tactic of using a low-level offensive to gather resources for a much larger attack. Most importantly, it reflects the low-grade nature of the offensive entity in marked contrast to well-resourced outfits like HuJI (or HuJI-A). This points to the involvement of a highly localised group, albeit with possible facilitation, funding, and motivation from larger trans-border entities. Despite the revelations by the government of Myanmar after the attacks, the precise contours of 'Rohingya extremism' remain largely inconspicuous. × Thus, despite the revelations by the government of Myanmar after the attacks, the precise contours of 'Rohingya extremism' remain largely inconspicuous. The LeT/HuJI-A link comes under serious scrutiny if one recalls the massive crackdown launched by the Awami League government on domestic extremist groups in Bangladesh, which resulted in the severe degradation of the broader HuJI infrastructure in the region. How, then, was the outfit successful in sustaining its mobilisation efforts, if it did? Did HuJI-A continue to function independently under LeT's tutelage? Were the attacks the sole handiwork of AMM - possibly a derivative of the subcutaneously functional RSO? It is hard to say so at the moment. In light of the above, one could rationally suppose that the Rohingya cause has certainly spilled beyond borders to reach the doorsteps of transnational Jihad. However, one must not forget that an oppressed and disenfranchised community - wherever they might be situated - is often the most fitting resource pool for vested parties willing to hijack an existential cause for political ends. Thus, amidst the deafening clamour of hasty allegations and conclusions being drawn after the heinous attacks, one must try and not forget the perpetual state of fear and subjugation that the Rohingya community continues to live under a country that refuses to recognise them as legitimate citizens.

Branded as 'terrorists' by India, how are Rohingyas connected to Jihadis

"It is very obvious that the army is protecting the jade business and trying to control the land", says the head of Kachin Baptist Organisation

Myanmar, also known as Burma, is a country with many names. Yet, ‘land of jade’ remains the most evocative of all, at least for the distant observer. But, behind this otherwise benign sobriquet, thrives a murky world of exploitation and high-handed subversion. A seminal 12 months-long investigation by the British NGO, Global Witness (GW), reveals the nasty face of Myanmar’s jade mines: slush-filled, begrimed stretches of uneven land dotted with diminishing rocky hills, rumbling heavy machinery, and armed personnel in military fatigues. Very tellingly, Burma’s jade is a gem shackled in the unenviable politics of blood and corruption, not unlike the diamonds of Africa. What, really, is the story of Myanmar’s precious green stone? Burma’s jade is a gem shackled in the unenviable politics of blood and corruption × Stone In The Dark Myanmar holds in its womb the world’s largest deposits of jadeite, a high-value ore that yields jade, a green ornamental gemstone famous world across, and particularly in China where it is popularly known as the “stone of heaven”. While jadeite deposits in Myanmar are spread out across the country in Lone Khin (Kachin State), Hkamti Township (Sagaing Region), and Mogok (Mandalay Region), the largest ores are concentrated in the country’s remote north, in and around Kachin State’s Hpakant Township. The Burmese jade industry is massive in scale and scope: according to GW, jade worth $31 billion - nearly half of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) - was mined in 2014 alone, while annual profits amount to nearly $40 billion. In the first quarter of the current fiscal year, Myanmar earned $23 million from jade exports, mostly to China and India. A mere kilogram of the stone can fetch millions in overseas markets. This lucrative industry operates within the confines of a sprawling black economy controlled by the country’s post-colonial elite, secretive companies owned by the military, and local drug lords. × But, a large fraction of this lucrative industry operates within the confines of a sprawling black economy controlled by the country’s post-colonial elite, secretive companies owned by the military, and local drug lords. In fact, GW has called it the “biggest natural resource heist in modern history." The GW investigation, presented through several multimedia reports including a 7-minutes long documentary called Jade and the Generals, unapologetically unravels the full scope and nature of Burma’s nefarious jade business. The elaborate investigation - called ‘Jade: Myanmar’s Big State Secret’ - reveals an unscrupulous past, an evolving present, and a contested future for the country’s most precious natural resource. Besides cronyism and vested profiteering by domestic stakeholders, the nefarious jade industry has thrived on unyielding demand from China where the gemstone features as a prime luxury product in popular culture. China’s imperial fascination with jade has continued through the ages till this date, with most of the rough jadeite extracts from Kachin ending up in the hands of nondescript Chinese producers. According to GW’s findings, $6.2 billion worth of mine site tax was lost in 2014 alone. But, very few in the region even know what transpires in these rocky, marshy mines. × However, none of this happens legally, as exporters routinely bypass existing customs and export tax regimes. According to GW’s findings, $6.2 billion worth of mine site tax was lost in 2014 alone. But, very few in the region even know what transpires in these rocky, marshy mines. Clearly, what happens in Kachin’s jade mines stays in the mines. Stone in Shackles Burma’s jade mining is a heavily ghettoised affair. Since the Tatmadaw (military) forcefully wrested control of the Hpakant mines from the powerful Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in the early 1990s, inconspicuous companies with links to the army – once the dominant organ of the Burmese state – have remained at the helm of extracting the precious stone. These include conglomerates like the military-owned Myanmar Economic Holdings (MEH) and the defence ministry-owned Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC). A large part of the jade trade is tightly controlled and protected by families of top generals from the erstwhile junta that ruled Myanmar for six decades, including former Prime Minister, Than Shwe. × To be more categorical, a large part of the jade trade is tightly controlled and protected by families of top generals from the erstwhile junta that ruled Myanmar for six decades, including former Prime Minister, Than Shwe, and senior minister in Kachin State, Ohn Myint. Most of these shadow businesses are shielded from public view via front companies and shell entities based in Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. “Most of the jade companies are connected to the army. It is very obvious that the army is protecting the jade business and trying to control the land,” the head of Kachin Baptist Organisation (KBO) is heard saying in Jade and the Generals. The existence of these subcutaneous profit-making entities has created a toxic shadow economy in the region, one that is grossly extractive, corrupt, invasive, and reckless in nature. The gargantuan profits, which seem to flow in only one direction (outward from Kachin), have served little for the region’s upliftment and only deepened the pockets of a select group of powerful elites. The largely non-competitive economy is premised on a well-guarded monopoly wherein the dominant stakeholder – the Tatmadaw – keeps outside entities at bay through both direct and institutional violence. For the powerful men behind the jade trade, “outsiders” is a broad category that includes journalists, recalcitrant politicians, humanitarian workers, and even locals. Army personnel shooting at stray jade-pickers, leading to both injuries and deaths, are not uncommon in the ashen mines of Hpakant. × The GW investigation quotes locals, who have little idea of who runs day-to-day operations in the sites or who the bulldozers and trucks belong to, complaining about how they are arrested if they lay their hands on high-value jadeite. What more, army personnel shooting at stray jade-pickers, leading to both injuries and deaths, are not uncommon in the ashen mines of Hpakant. Further, the shadow operators of this trade have shown little regard for environmental ramifications of rampant mining, gorging through large jadeite deposits for maximum output. The consequences have been drastic: in November 2015, a massive landslide in the Hpakant jade fields killed 116 people and swallowed 100 others. In the GW film, we also see locals ruefully talk about disappearing jadeite hills, indicating high topographical disruption. Thus, a high-value natural resource that could have formed the backbone of the national economy is today seen as a wretched curse, mostly by local Kachins living on the capricious, blackened land. Subdued by the barrel of the gun and the ensuing sense of fear, the local population has been systematically and rather, ruthlessly deprived of the potential benefits of the jade commerce, despite being the traditional owners of the ore-rich lands. At the most, they manage to accrue minuscule profits by occasionally hand-picking leftover stones after big miners have rummaged through the ores using heavy machinery. Beyond the sight of long convoys of trucks rumbling out of the towering jadeite hills and gun-toting military personnel patrolling the mines, the world has seen very little of Burma’s jade mines. But, is discriminatory extraction the only dark side of Myanmar’s imprisoned jade mines? Stone Soaked in Blood Myanmar has been ravaged by a six decades-long violent insurgency, involving the national army and a diverse set of ethnic armed groups, or Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs), fighting for political autonomy. The protracted war has destroyed a significant portion of the country’s domestic economy, displaced millions, pauperised frontier ethnic populations, and diminished the country’s human capital dividends. A pivotal part of the GW investigation is the intersection of the armed conflict and the nefarious jade business. Both sides of the conflict - the army and the various EAOs – happen to be the prime stakeholders in the jade trade. In fact, the whole business forms a core part of the broad conflict economy that has sustained the violent civil war for so long and buttressed the self-serving, rival interests of those directly engaged in the violence. Kachin State happens to be one of the most politically contested and restive regions of the country, sitting next to the porous Chinese border. × What has particularly sharpened the intersection between political violence and the extractive mineral industry is the endemic (and unfortunate) geographical location of the jadeite mines. Kachin State happens to be one of the most politically contested and restive regions of the country, sitting next to the porous Chinese border. The desire for autonomy has always run strong in the northern frontier peoples, translating into strong support for armed struggle. This, in turn, has fostered an ideal environment for a long drawn-out tussle between the army and powerful rebel groups in the region, most prominently the KIA and United Wa State Army (UWSA), for control of the jade mines in Hpakant. The chaotic mix of such one-off endemic factors has ultimately led to unending cycles of violence, massive internal displacement, and a thriving cross-border smuggling racket. Simply put, the gemstone commerce and violence have maintained a symbiotic relationship with one feeding the other. The GW investigation categorically highlights how the KIA maintains its own systems of revenue collection in the mines. Notably, top UWSA operatives to have direct interests in the shadow business. GW points at strong evidence of a longtime drug kingpin and UWSA commander, Wei Hsueh Kang, controlling a certain group of companies that are now dominant players in the jade industry. In fact, private entities owned by Kang – who has a $2 million US bounty on his head – and other UWSA affiliates have been frontal players in the jade industry since the 1990s. Everyone wants a slice of the pie – quite a big pie here – by taking advantage of the secrecy around the whole industry and the overall lawlessness created by the insurgency. × Unsurprisingly, everyone wants a slice of the pie – quite a big pie here – by taking advantage of the secrecy around the whole industry and the overall lawlessness created by the insurgency. Thus, the gun has emerged as an effective instrument for operational control in a situation where the jade mines dole out large sums of profit for its extractors. On the other hand, the precious mines serve as near-limitless treasure chests for both the army and the rebel groups to maintain their ranks, arsenal, and strike capacities, in addition to surplus profits. In a way, whoever controls the mines, enjoys the upper hand in the near-symmetric conflict. Jade and Democracy Myanmar today stands at the crossroads of history, with a popularly-elected government led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi spearheading the country’s landmark transition to democracy. A key component of this transition is an ambitious peace process that intends to engage almost all ethnic groups that operate in the country. The ultimate aim is to reach a permanent negotiated settlement based on a federal structure, much like the one envisaged by Suu Kyi’s father and pioneer of Burmese democracy, General Aung San, in 1947. But, does every political actor in Myanmar want peace? Enter, jade. An end to the conflict would mean greater transparency and fairness in administrative dealings in addition to new institutional safeguards against unilateral actions by private entities. × The highly rewarding jade industry is, unquestionably, one of the key hurdles between the Suu Kyi administration and an effective national peace deal. An end to the conflict would mean greater transparency and fairness in administrative dealings in addition to new institutional safeguards against unilateral actions by private entities. This openness would be highly disadvantageous for the shadow operators of the jade trade, who have traditionally benefited from the opaqueness of the transactional environment, institutional corruption, and absence of legal safeguards. Naturally, the powerful benefactors of this trade would do everything in their capacity to maintain the status quo. GW’s investigation, once again, sheds light on this aspect. It reveals a certain ‘recognisable pattern’ of conflict intensification in light of fresh scrutiny by the new civilian government. In April 2016, just a few weeks after Suu Kyi’s party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), came to power in Nay Pyi Taw, the Minister of Natural Resources and Environment toured Hpakant for an inspection of the mines. The visit was immediately followed by fresh military offensives by the army against KIA. Since then, the fighting has only gotten worse, with thousands displaced and rendered impoverished due to lack of basic resources and no access to humanitarian services. The deliberate flare-up in violence was a clear attempt by the Tatmadaw – the key benefactor of the jade trade – to deflect attention from potential reforms under a democratic state structure. What was perhaps more surprising was the government’s refusal to grant access to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar for her proposed visit to Hpakant, something that she mentioned bluntly in her January 2017 report. Clearly, even the reformed Burmese state is hesitant to open its jade mines up to public scrutiny. Clearly, even the reformed Burmese state is hesitant to open its jade mines up to public scrutiny × But, it would be wrong to say that the Suu Kyi government has blindly protected the shady jade business. In fact, a lot of progressive action has been undertaken by her administration on this front. After all, no ‘ethically upright’ country would want to invest in a country that runs a parallel shadow business. In July 2016, barely three months since it came to power, the NLD government moved to halt fresh licensing of mines in Hpakant till a revised legal framework is not put in place. The new licenses, to be doled out pursuant to a fresh gemstone law, will also follow a certain Environment Management Plan (EMP) that the Department of Mines is currently preparing. However, the moratorium does not cover extensions of previous licenses and those that are yet to lapse. Hence, operators continue to mine jade in Hpakant and are lobbying for favourable laws so as to continue their activities. On 11 July, moreover, the national parliament approved amendments to the Special Commodity Tax Law (2016) that would render revenue collection on items like jade more effective. Despite the progress made, the civilian administration remains apprehensive of taking full-spectrum action against illegal jade mining and trading: bringing past offenders to account and cleansing the mines of nondescript operators. The reason behind this is apparent: the military controls most of the mining business, and the fledgling civilian administration remains hesitant to indict the powerful Generals out of fear of forceful subversion. This skewed dynamic has emerged as a peculiar, and rather reverting, feature of post-2015 Burmese democracy and is continually redefining state-society relations in the country. Without negotiating this impasse, the popular government would find it impossible to effect multi-sectoral reforms. The Way Forward The jade issue is intrinsically tied to political aspirations of the Kachins, who seem to be fast losing faith in the Suu Kyi administration, and forms a core element in the ethnic desire for greater autonomy. × The government of Suu Kyi must tackle the jade business on a priority basis, for it could be the key to managing the violent conflict in the north and achieving a durable ceasefire. The jade issue is intrinsically tied to political aspirations of the Kachins, who seem to be fast losing faith in the Suu Kyi administration, and forms a core element in the ethnic desire for greater autonomy. As GW points out, past experiences of conflict resolution in Kachin have proved that imposing a ceasefire or disarming rebel armies without dealing with the root causes of the violence is an exercise in vain. But, what does tackling the jade issue even entail? The idea is not to completely stop jade mining and the commerce around it but to simply allow the local community to decide how it is to be undertaken. This is because they are the ones who face the direct consequences of the mining. × In the short term, it involves ensuring open access to critical information about day-to-day operations, equitable sharing of profits amongst national and local stakeholders, local ownership of profits, installing an environmental protection regime, instituting legal safeguards against rights abuses, and democratising the decision-making structure around the entire business. The idea is not to completely stop jade mining and the commerce around it but to simply allow the local community to decide how it is to be undertaken. This is because they are the ones who face the direct consequences of the mining. One local Kachin activist puts its aptly, “My dream is a situation where communities are allowed to choose themselves which [mining] company is best.” At the core of democratising the industry, lies throwing open the information matrix to the public. GW highlights how "ordinary people have been unable to access basic data on which companies hold mining licences; who those companies’ real owners are; how licences are allocated; what the terms of their contracts are; what they are paying the government; and how much they are producing.” This information black hole has fueled greater suspicion and lack of trust, triggering in turn, political violence. Furthermore, the introduction of legal safeguards against corruption and human rights abuses must be part of a broader framework of labour rights protection and commercial ethics, wherein the state ensures that industry owners do not exploit locals for their own benefit or to maximise outputs. All stakeholders must have institutional grievance redressal mechanisms to voice their concerns, rather than resorting to violence for resolution. Needless to say, the jade industry must be a central agenda point in the ongoing peace process. Without addressing this, a permanent ceasefire in the north will remain a distant dream. Giving back control over natural resources – a penumbral component of land-oriented local identity – to the local community would automatically pave the way for deeper consensus on other political and economic issues between the union government and the frontier populations. Thus, Myanmar’s emancipatory shift to democracy will remain incomplete if its precious green gemstone remains imprisoned. There is little doubt that the powerful forces, which benefit from the trade, will continue to defend the status quo, largely by force. But, Nay Pyi Taw has to step in and stand tall to establish rule of law and a robust regulatory regime before its too late.

How jade, the precious stone, is funding ethnic conflicts in Myanmar

<p>On 23 June, the Myanmar army released 67 child soldiers from its ranks. A &lsquo;child soldier&rsquo; can be broadly defined as &ldquo;any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity &ndash; including, but not limited to, combatants, cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members.&rdquo;</p>

<p>Myanmar (or Burma) is no stranger to child soldiers. In fact, it was once believed that there are more child soldiers in Burma than any other country in the world. The phenomenon has been all but ubiquitous amongst not just the several Armed Non-State Actors (ANSAs) in the country, but also the state&rsquo;s own armed forces. With little to no scrutiny and accountability of state policy for the longest time, thanks to the erstwhile Burmese military junta&rsquo;s stonewalling diplomatic conduct, children continued to be recruited in large numbers both into regular army ranks and ethnic militias with impunity.</p>

<p>But, a lot has changed over time.</p>

<p>Since the release of a damning report (My Gun Was As Tall As Me) by Human Rights Watch (HRW) in 2002, consistent and unrelenting pressure from the United Nations (UN) and international advocacy groups - most prominently Child Soldiers International (CSI) - has slowly but surely unraveled Myanmar&rsquo;s cancerous problem of child soldiers. This in turn, has made obfuscating the phenomenon much more difficult for the Burmese state. The process has been given a further boost on account of certain historic developments in the country&rsquo;s political system since the beginning of this decade.</p>

<p><strong>Child Soldiers and The State</strong></p>

<p>Recruitment of children into the state&rsquo;s armed forces began at an unspecified time period after the military took over the reins of the country in the 1962 coup. However, the issue began to receive international attention only after the release of the 2002 HRW report. Subsequent monitoring by the UN and other international organisations revealed sinister patterns of child recruitment into the state&rsquo;s armed forces, including but not limited to use of civilian brokers to garner recruits and direct conscription of homeless or orphaned children from public spaces by military personnel. Yet, till date, there exists no credible quantification of underage recruitment by the army.</p>

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<p>It was once believed that there are more child soldiers in Burma than any other country in the world (Representational Image: Left-Flickr Manhhai, Right-Pierre Holtz / UNICEF CAR) (Others)</p>
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<p>As far as engaging the military government on this issue was concerned, the UN took the lead. It successfully pressured the junta into forming the Committee for the Prevention of Military Recruitment of Underage Children (CPMRUC) in 2004. Following this, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict to Myanmar continued to report regularly on this matter, pursuant to a crucial Security Council resolution on children in armed conflict passed in 2005 (Res 1612). This further intensified international pressure on Burma&rsquo;s military government, which had continued to remain complicit in the problem despite self-prohibition. The UN&rsquo;s Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting (CTFMR) on Grave Violations against Children provided the solid empirical backing for it&rsquo;s case.</p>

<p>Ultimately, after years of painstaking negotiations, a concrete protection regime came into being in June 2012 with the signing of the Joint Action Plan (JAP) between the government and the UN. The landmark agreement gave the armed forces 18 months to &ldquo;take measurable steps to release and reintegrate children within their ranks and prevent their recruitment in the future&rdquo;. Since then, the country&rsquo;s 500,000-strong army - Tatmadaw Kyi - has released more than 745 child soldiers from its ranks while the Border Guards Forces (BGF) has decommissioned 1 (as of March 2016). Needless to say, these are not insignificant figures and shows the effectiveness of targeted external intervention on such issues.</p>

<p>Notwithstanding the above, it is crucial to note that through the past decade, the UN has dealt with restricted access and monitoring issues insofar as keeping tab of child recruitment into the state army is concerned. However, as time passed by and the international child protection regime got stronger, the Myanmar government gradually became more responsive and open to scrutiny, perhaps unavoidably so. Without this willingness shown by the junta the JAP would have remained a fantasy for core stakeholders.</p>

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<p><strong>Child Soldiers and Non-State Actors</strong></p>

<p>It has been far more difficult to monitor and prevent underage recruitment by ANSAs, which in Myanmar&rsquo;s case, are the many Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) fighting for federal autonomy. This is because of the disparate and unorganised nature of the non-state domain, or the lack of a centralised authority that can be held accountable. Nonetheless, the UN and other international organisations have recorded multiple instances of ANSAs recruiting child soldiers.</p>

<p>In 2007, the Secretary General released a report outlining the use of child soldiers by ANSAs. Another one in 2014 enlisted seven ANSAs as active recruiters of underage soldiers, while noting that the UN had begun to &ldquo;re-engage with armed groups&rdquo;. This list includes the two largest EAOs in Myanmar - the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and Kachin Independence Army (KIA). Next year, in 2015, CSI released an extensive report titled A Dangerous Refuge, which delineated in great detail, underage recruitment by KIA. It stated that the group&rsquo;s ranks consisted of close to 1000 child soldiers, mostly in the age group of 14-17. The HRW&rsquo;s 2011 World Report too stated that ANSAs were actively involved in child soldier recruitment.</p>

<p>Insofar as bringing the non-state domain to account is concerned, some progress has been made. In November 2007, the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP)/Karenni Army announced that it had signed a &lsquo;Deed of Commitment&rsquo; (DoC) to not recruit child soldiers, after consultation with UNICEF. In 2012, KNPP, along with another EAO, New Mon State Party (NMSP)/Mon National Liberation Army (MNLA), signed another DoC with the Swiss-based organisation Geneva Call.</p>

<p>Beyond these two EAOs, none of the other ANSAs have officially committed to not recruit underage soldiers. This is significant because the set of non-compliant EAOs includes those with disproportionately large armies, high strike capacities, and deep political influence. Without their cooperation, Myanmar will find it impossible to weed out the problem.</p>

<p><strong>The Blessing of Democracy</strong></p>

<p>Myanmar embarked on a landmark project of democratic transition, first in 2011 under the quasi-civilian, reformist administration of Thein Sein, and then in 2016 under the democratically-elected, civilian administration led by the National League for Democracy (NLD). The fact that this gradual opening up of Myanmar&rsquo;s polity has offered new avenues for collective resolution of the child soldiers issue is undeniable.</p>

<p>But, how has democracy changed Burma?</p>

<p>For starters, it has created a favourable environment for peaceful settlement of the six decades-long armed conflict. State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, right after coming to power last year, spelt out her administration&rsquo;s topmost priority very clearly: &lsquo;national reconciliation&rsquo;. To this end, her government created a massive dialogue structure with the intention of addressing the myriad political, economic, social, and security-related issues that await resolution.</p>

<p>Democracy has also ushered in a coterie of hitherto nonexistent stakeholders into Myanmar, including international organisations, advocacy groups, and the free press that were earlier kept at bay by the military junta. More importantly, the peace process itself is being steered by external donor interests that primarily intend to ostensibly stabilise and democratise the politics of Burma for foreign investments to flow in. This naturally translates into much deeper scrutiny of state policy than ever before. In simple words, the Burmese state can no longer get away with arbitrary policymaking and brash unilateral action.</p>

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<p>All of this means that the so-called international community is now better postured to work with Nay Pyi Taw to permanently and sustainably end recruitment of child soldiers. Needless to say, it will be easier to engage with a democratic leadership &ndash; that too one with a Nobel Peace Prize &ndash; than with an authoritarian regime. Furthermore, under the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) of 2015, which is the foundation of the peace process, and the revamped 21st Century Panglong Conference (21CPC), the government has been able to bring almost all armed groups together for talks, notwithstanding the fact that several of them haven&rsquo;t signed the NCA yet.</p>

<p>Thus, the government itself is now better equipped to engage with core stakeholders to find a workable solution.</p>

<p><strong>Roadblocks and the Way Ahead</strong></p>

<p>There are several critical factors that continue to hold Myanmar back from ending underage recruitment into state and non-state armies.</p>

<p>First, Myanmar is yet to ratify the UN&rsquo;s Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. Doing so would render the country far more accountable to the global protection regime than it is now.</p>

<p>Second, the military still commands considerable influence over decision-making in post-2015 Myanmar. Besides the 25 per cent&nbsp;parliamentary seat share that it enjoys, it has absolute say over defence- and security-related agendas. What more, the civilian-military dynamic in Burma is far more volatile than it appears, with the temporally entrenched authority of the Tatmadaw remaining intact despite the coming of a democratically-elected government. Thus, engaging the military over the issue of child soldiers from within continues to be no less difficult than before, especially pressuring it to provide greater access to its rank and file.</p>

<p>Third, the political dialogue and reconciliation process has not, so far, directly featured the &lsquo;child soldiers&rsquo; issue. The administration seems to be far more concerned with top-down reconciliation rather than comprehensively addressing all the lateral phenomena that the 60-years long armed conflict has spurred, like underage recruitment. While the NCA, with its hard-set ceasefire terms, could serve as an effective instrument to establish a solid protection regime for underage conscription of soldiers, the 21CPC could be a legitimate multi-stakeholder forum to routinely discuss developments in this aspect. But, none of it has happened yet.</p>

<p>Fourth, monitoring underage recruitment by ANSAs remains grossly limited, thus preventing holistic action. There is no JAP-like agreement with ANSAs, and the DoC signed by two EAOs is yet to see replication by others. This is even more so in context of the ongoing conflict in non-ceasefire areas in the north - Kachin and Shan states - which has witnessed massive internal displacement due to frequent fighting between the Tatmadaw and EAOs like KIA, TNLA, and MNDAA. Needless to say, a displaced and disenfranchised local population can serve as a great recruitment pool for armed groups under stress, thus enhancing capacities for underage conscription.</p>

<p>Fifth, there is literally no national legislation in Myanmar that comprehensively bars or criminalises underage military recruitment by both the state and non-state armies. What more, the 1993 Child Rights law defines a child as a person under the age of 16, in contravention of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (to which Myanmar is a state party). The issue of underage recruitment into armies is wholly missing from this law. Hopefully, a thorough revision of this crucial piece of legislation to provide greater legal clarity on this issue will be undertaken by the elected parliament in the coming days.</p>

<p>Thus, while there has been considerable progress to end underage recruitment of soldiers in Myanmar, broader and deeper engagement is required to put a total stop to it. With a newly-installed democratic system, both domestic and international stakeholders must act fast to engage transparently on this issue so as to find a permanent and failsafe solution.</p>


Myanmar, which reportedly has the largest number of child soldiers, releases 67 of such soldiers from its army today.

On 23 June, the Myanmar army released 67 child soldiers from its ranks. A ‘child soldier’ can be broadly defined as “any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity – including, but not limited to, combatants, cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members.” Myanmar (or Burma) is no stranger to child soldiers. In fact, it was once believed that there are more child soldiers in Burma than any other country in the world. The phenomenon has been all but ubiquitous amongst not just the several Armed Non-State Actors (ANSAs) in the country, but also the state’s own armed forces. With little to no scrutiny and accountability of state policy for the longest time, thanks to the erstwhile Burmese military junta’s stonewalling diplomatic conduct, children continued to be recruited in large numbers both into regular army ranks and ethnic militias with impunity. But, a lot has changed over time. Since the release of a damning report (My Gun Was As Tall As Me) by Human Rights Watch (HRW) in 2002, consistent and unrelenting pressure from the United Nations (UN) and international advocacy groups - most prominently Child Soldiers International (CSI) - has slowly but surely unraveled Myanmar’s cancerous problem of child soldiers. This in turn, has made obfuscating the phenomenon much more difficult for the Burmese state. The process has been given a further boost on account of certain historic developments in the country’s political system since the beginning of this decade. Child Soldiers and The State Recruitment of children into the state’s armed forces began at an unspecified time period after the military took over the reins of the country in the 1962 coup. However, the issue began to receive international attention only after the release of the 2002 HRW report. Subsequent monitoring by the UN and other international organisations revealed sinister patterns of child recruitment into the state’s armed forces, including but not limited to use of civilian brokers to garner recruits and direct conscription of homeless or orphaned children from public spaces by military personnel. Yet, till date, there exists no credible quantification of underage recruitment by the army. It was once believed that there are more child soldiers in Burma than any other country in the world (Representational Image: Left-Flickr Manhhai, Right-Pierre Holtz / UNICEF CAR) (Others) × As far as engaging the military government on this issue was concerned, the UN took the lead. It successfully pressured the junta into forming the Committee for the Prevention of Military Recruitment of Underage Children (CPMRUC) in 2004. Following this, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict to Myanmar continued to report regularly on this matter, pursuant to a crucial Security Council resolution on children in armed conflict passed in 2005 (Res 1612). This further intensified international pressure on Burma’s military government, which had continued to remain complicit in the problem despite self-prohibition. The UN’s Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting (CTFMR) on Grave Violations against Children provided the solid empirical backing for it’s case. Ultimately, after years of painstaking negotiations, a concrete protection regime came into being in June 2012 with the signing of the Joint Action Plan (JAP) between the government and the UN. The landmark agreement gave the armed forces 18 months to “take measurable steps to release and reintegrate children within their ranks and prevent their recruitment in the future”. Since then, the country’s 500,000-strong army - Tatmadaw Kyi - has released more than 745 child soldiers from its ranks while the Border Guards Forces (BGF) has decommissioned 1 (as of March 2016). Needless to say, these are not insignificant figures and shows the effectiveness of targeted external intervention on such issues. Notwithstanding the above, it is crucial to note that through the past decade, the UN has dealt with restricted access and monitoring issues insofar as keeping tab of child recruitment into the state army is concerned. However, as time passed by and the international child protection regime got stronger, the Myanmar government gradually became more responsive and open to scrutiny, perhaps unavoidably so. Without this willingness shown by the junta the JAP would have remained a fantasy for core stakeholders. There is literally no national legislation in Myanmar that comprehensively bars or criminalises underage military recruitment by both the state and non-state armies × Child Soldiers and Non-State Actors It has been far more difficult to monitor and prevent underage recruitment by ANSAs, which in Myanmar’s case, are the many Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) fighting for federal autonomy. This is because of the disparate and unorganised nature of the non-state domain, or the lack of a centralised authority that can be held accountable. Nonetheless, the UN and other international organisations have recorded multiple instances of ANSAs recruiting child soldiers. In 2007, the Secretary General released a report outlining the use of child soldiers by ANSAs. Another one in 2014 enlisted seven ANSAs as active recruiters of underage soldiers, while noting that the UN had begun to “re-engage with armed groups”. This list includes the two largest EAOs in Myanmar - the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and Kachin Independence Army (KIA). Next year, in 2015, CSI released an extensive report titled A Dangerous Refuge, which delineated in great detail, underage recruitment by KIA. It stated that the group’s ranks consisted of close to 1000 child soldiers, mostly in the age group of 14-17. The HRW’s 2011 World Report too stated that ANSAs were actively involved in child soldier recruitment. Insofar as bringing the non-state domain to account is concerned, some progress has been made. In November 2007, the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP)/Karenni Army announced that it had signed a ‘Deed of Commitment’ (DoC) to not recruit child soldiers, after consultation with UNICEF. In 2012, KNPP, along with another EAO, New Mon State Party (NMSP)/Mon National Liberation Army (MNLA), signed another DoC with the Swiss-based organisation Geneva Call. Beyond these two EAOs, none of the other ANSAs have officially committed to not recruit underage soldiers. This is significant because the set of non-compliant EAOs includes those with disproportionately large armies, high strike capacities, and deep political influence. Without their cooperation, Myanmar will find it impossible to weed out the problem. The Blessing of Democracy Myanmar embarked on a landmark project of democratic transition, first in 2011 under the quasi-civilian, reformist administration of Thein Sein, and then in 2016 under the democratically-elected, civilian administration led by the National League for Democracy (NLD). The fact that this gradual opening up of Myanmar’s polity has offered new avenues for collective resolution of the child soldiers issue is undeniable. But, how has democracy changed Burma? For starters, it has created a favourable environment for peaceful settlement of the six decades-long armed conflict. State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, right after coming to power last year, spelt out her administration’s topmost priority very clearly: ‘national reconciliation’. To this end, her government created a massive dialogue structure with the intention of addressing the myriad political, economic, social, and security-related issues that await resolution. Democracy has also ushered in a coterie of hitherto nonexistent stakeholders into Myanmar, including international organisations, advocacy groups, and the free press that were earlier kept at bay by the military junta. More importantly, the peace process itself is being steered by external donor interests that primarily intend to ostensibly stabilise and democratise the politics of Burma for foreign investments to flow in. This naturally translates into much deeper scrutiny of state policy than ever before. In simple words, the Burmese state can no longer get away with arbitrary policymaking and brash unilateral action. Myanmar is yet to ratify the UN’s Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict × All of this means that the so-called international community is now better postured to work with Nay Pyi Taw to permanently and sustainably end recruitment of child soldiers. Needless to say, it will be easier to engage with a democratic leadership – that too one with a Nobel Peace Prize – than with an authoritarian regime. Furthermore, under the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) of 2015, which is the foundation of the peace process, and the revamped 21st Century Panglong Conference (21CPC), the government has been able to bring almost all armed groups together for talks, notwithstanding the fact that several of them haven’t signed the NCA yet. Thus, the government itself is now better equipped to engage with core stakeholders to find a workable solution. Roadblocks and the Way Ahead There are several critical factors that continue to hold Myanmar back from ending underage recruitment into state and non-state armies. First, Myanmar is yet to ratify the UN’s Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. Doing so would render the country far more accountable to the global protection regime than it is now. Second, the military still commands considerable influence over decision-making in post-2015 Myanmar. Besides the 25 per cent parliamentary seat share that it enjoys, it has absolute say over defence- and security-related agendas. What more, the civilian-military dynamic in Burma is far more volatile than it appears, with the temporally entrenched authority of the Tatmadaw remaining intact despite the coming of a democratically-elected government. Thus, engaging the military over the issue of child soldiers from within continues to be no less difficult than before, especially pressuring it to provide greater access to its rank and file. Third, the political dialogue and reconciliation process has not, so far, directly featured the ‘child soldiers’ issue. The administration seems to be far more concerned with top-down reconciliation rather than comprehensively addressing all the lateral phenomena that the 60-years long armed conflict has spurred, like underage recruitment. While the NCA, with its hard-set ceasefire terms, could serve as an effective instrument to establish a solid protection regime for underage conscription of soldiers, the 21CPC could be a legitimate multi-stakeholder forum to routinely discuss developments in this aspect. But, none of it has happened yet. Fourth, monitoring underage recruitment by ANSAs remains grossly limited, thus preventing holistic action. There is no JAP-like agreement with ANSAs, and the DoC signed by two EAOs is yet to see replication by others. This is even more so in context of the ongoing conflict in non-ceasefire areas in the north - Kachin and Shan states - which has witnessed massive internal displacement due to frequent fighting between the Tatmadaw and EAOs like KIA, TNLA, and MNDAA. Needless to say, a displaced and disenfranchised local population can serve as a great recruitment pool for armed groups under stress, thus enhancing capacities for underage conscription. Fifth, there is literally no national legislation in Myanmar that comprehensively bars or criminalises underage military recruitment by both the state and non-state armies. What more, the 1993 Child Rights law defines a child as a person under the age of 16, in contravention of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (to which Myanmar is a state party). The issue of underage recruitment into armies is wholly missing from this law. Hopefully, a thorough revision of this crucial piece of legislation to provide greater legal clarity on this issue will be undertaken by the elected parliament in the coming days. Thus, while there has been considerable progress to end underage recruitment of soldiers in Myanmar, broader and deeper engagement is required to put a total stop to it. With a newly-installed democratic system, both domestic and international stakeholders must act fast to engage transparently on this issue so as to find a permanent and failsafe solution.

'My gun is taller than me': Child soldiering in Myanmar is far from over

<p>On 31 August 2016, the government of Myanmar inaugurated the much-awaited &#39;21st Century Panglong Peace Conference&#39; (also referred to as the Union Peace Conference) in the capital Naypyidaw. This four-day long mega event saw a wide range of stakeholders gather under a single roof to discuss issues of ethnic discord and armed conflict that have ravaged Myanmar for the last 60 years or so. But how comprehensive is this institutionalised process of reconciliation in reality, and where do Indian interests align with this plan?</p>

<p>&nbsp;With the decolonisation of Myanmar by the British in early 1948 and the subsequent takeover by the military in 1962, the 135 ethnic groups in the country have continuously fought for greater recognition of their respective cultural and political rights. In addition to demanding a larger say in the country&rsquo;s heavily centralised decision-making process, they have also protested against the perceived economic and social impoverishment of their respective regions. After the coming of the military government, particularly, they began to oppose the curtailment of their cultural and religious rights under the government&rsquo;s policy of &lsquo;Burmanisation&rsquo;.&nbsp;</p>

<p>Under severe state repression, the grievances gradually transformed into an armed struggle for greater political autonomy, giving birth to some fifty Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs). The political conflict, in due course, spiralled into a protracted civil war, marked by a profitable war economy and inter-group clashes. From purely ethnopolitical groups, some of the EAOs metamorphosed into narco-insurgent groups involved in illegal contraband trafficking across Myanmar&#39;s porous borders with China, Thailand, and Northeast India.&nbsp;</p>

<p>However, with the coming of the National League for Democracy (NLD) government in 2015, a legitimate opening for democratic reconciliation became visible and viable. Myanmar&#39;s State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi envisaged to reboot the original &#39;Panglong Peace Conference&#39; organised by her father in 1947, and the latest edition comes as a crucial waypoint in the internal peace process of the country. Despite major hold-ups and criticisms, this convention successfully established a cohesive platform for dialogue and peaceful reconciliation between the state and the various independent ethnic organisations.&nbsp;</p>

<p>The high-profile conference, attended by around 1,600 representatives from various EAOs, political parties, parliamentary and military clusters as well as the United Nations secretary-general, was a follow-up to last year&#39;s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) that was signed by eight EAOs. The key focus areas of the conference were: power sharing through federalism, local autonomy, constitutional revision, and separation of powers between the military and civilian state structures.&nbsp;</p>

<p>While the ethnic groups proposed a fully federal union that would proffer complete administrative autonomy to each state, the civilian-military clusters argue for a more decentralised structure of governance through constitutional amendments. Furthermore, the former wish for a complete separation of powers between the civilian government and the military, while the latter group does not deem it as a core issue. As of now, the peace process remains largely staggered owing to differences over these critical agenda points.</p>

<p>Nevertheless, Suu Kyi&#39;s primary motivation in organising such a conference was to bring as many political stakeholders as possible to a common deliberative forum, and in the process create a level-playing field for peaceful settlement of ethnopolitical disputes. It was aimed at expanding the NCA by establishing a platform for sustained and inclusive dialogue between the government, the army, and the various EAOs, including those who did not sign the accord in 2015. However, if one looks closely, the purported inclusiveness of the whole process comes under serious doubt. &nbsp;</p>

<p>First, although some of the NCA non-signatory EAOs did attend the conference, four of them remained uninvited because of their refusal to disarm before the conference, as stipulated by the army. These non-participant groups are the Arakan Army (AA), the Ta&#39;ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Myanmar National Democracy Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland - Khaplang (NSCN-K). Their refusal to disarm is premised on their perception that the Panglong process does not align with their demands for greater autonomy, or in the case of NSCN-K, with the &lsquo;demand for Naga sovereignty&rsquo;.</p>

<p>Second, representatives from the United Wa State Army (UWSA) &ndash; the largest and most powerful EAO in Myanmar &ndash; staged a walkout on the second day of the conference after being identified as &#39;observers&#39; rather than participants. Although this might have been a misunderstanding of protocol, it was enough to incite the aforementioned non-attendees to express solidarity with UWSA and reassert their stance that the Panglong Conference was a &#39;discriminatory&#39; forum.</p>

<p>The crucial point about the above non-attendees, barring the AA and NSCN-K, is that they are based out of Shan State in the north &ndash; a perennial hotbed of violent clashes. On one hand, while TNLA and MNDAA are still engaged in skirmishes with the army, on the other, UWSA continues to survive in the region as one of the largest narco-insurgent groups in the world, and a prime dealer of drugs and illegal arms from Chinese grey markets. The organisation is known to have been the key supplier of weapons to several of the Indian insurgent outfits based in Sagaing division in Myanmar&rsquo;s <a href="http://bit.ly/2cskukd">northwest</a>. Furthermore, a recent <a href="http://bit.ly/2cWa0Hb">analysis</a> points towards the movement of United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA-Paresh Baruah faction) rebels from Sagaing to Shan for safe haven.</p>

<p>Third, the non-participation of NSCN-K, which is currently &lsquo;at war&rsquo; with India, remains a destabilising phenomenon. According to the group&rsquo;s leadership, they chose to not attend because the conference &#39;had nothing to do with the Nagas&rsquo; demand for sovereignty.&#39; Notably, it was only last year that India officially banned the outfit after a brutal assault against an army convoy in Manipur, following which Indian Special Forces pursued the rebels across the India-Myanmar border in a covert operation. NSCN-K is also the &lsquo;leader&rsquo; of the motley set of northeast Indian separatist outfits that currently operate out of Sagaing. Hence, it continues to be a serious threat to India.</p>

<p>Fourth, the political parties from Kayah State who failed to secure seats in November 2015 elections refused to attend the conference, complaining about the meagre five seats granted to them at the table. This reflects a core political dynamic in newly democratic Myanmar where smaller regional parties harbour the perception of political underrepresentation and marginalisation. Fifth, despite the strong statements made by the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon on the deplorable condition of the Rohingya community in Rakhine State, no representative from the religious minority was invited, marking a continuity of the alleged institutionalised marginalisation of the Rohingyas.&nbsp;</p>

<p>In light of the above, Aung San Suu Kyi&rsquo;s remarks and attitudes have been fairly encouraging. In addition to meeting the non-signatory EAOs a month before the conference, she has also succinctly expressed the government&rsquo;s willingness to reach a common ground with the unwilling groups so as to achieve a comprehensive reconciliatory framework. However, the past few days have witnessed the army launch shockingly violent offensives against armed groups in Kachin and Shan <a href="http://bit.ly/2dzmwfW">states </a>- something that threatens to derail the entire peace process.</p>

<p>It is undeniable that the ambitious peace process in Myanmar will remain hobbled without the participation of all ethnic, religious, and political groups. Although the government has charted a specific follow-up action plan - including scheduling similar forums after every six months and widening the scope of the NCA &ndash; it remains to be seen if the recalcitrant EAOs are absorbed in the Panglong framework in the future. As rightly stated by Suu Kyi in her closing remarks, &#39;To achieve peace is very difficult.&#39;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>


The difficult process of achieving peace with Ethnic Armed Organisations has started in Myanmar

On 31 August 2016, the government of Myanmar inaugurated the much-awaited '21st Century Panglong Peace Conference' (also referred to as the Union Peace Conference) in the capital Naypyidaw. This four-day long mega event saw a wide range of stakeholders gather under a single roof to discuss issues of ethnic discord and armed conflict that have ravaged Myanmar for the last 60 years or so. But how comprehensive is this institutionalised process of reconciliation in reality, and where do Indian interests align with this plan? With the decolonisation of Myanmar by the British in early 1948 and the subsequent takeover by the military in 1962, the 135 ethnic groups in the country have continuously fought for greater recognition of their respective cultural and political rights. In addition to demanding a larger say in the country’s heavily centralised decision-making process, they have also protested against the perceived economic and social impoverishment of their respective regions. After the coming of the military government, particularly, they began to oppose the curtailment of their cultural and religious rights under the government’s policy of ‘Burmanisation’. Under severe state repression, the grievances gradually transformed into an armed struggle for greater political autonomy, giving birth to some fifty Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs). The political conflict, in due course, spiralled into a protracted civil war, marked by a profitable war economy and inter-group clashes. From purely ethnopolitical groups, some of the EAOs metamorphosed into narco-insurgent groups involved in illegal contraband trafficking across Myanmar's porous borders with China, Thailand, and Northeast India. However, with the coming of the National League for Democracy (NLD) government in 2015, a legitimate opening for democratic reconciliation became visible and viable. Myanmar's State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi envisaged to reboot the original 'Panglong Peace Conference' organised by her father in 1947, and the latest edition comes as a crucial waypoint in the internal peace process of the country. Despite major hold-ups and criticisms, this convention successfully established a cohesive platform for dialogue and peaceful reconciliation between the state and the various independent ethnic organisations. The high-profile conference, attended by around 1,600 representatives from various EAOs, political parties, parliamentary and military clusters as well as the United Nations secretary-general, was a follow-up to last year's Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) that was signed by eight EAOs. The key focus areas of the conference were: power sharing through federalism, local autonomy, constitutional revision, and separation of powers between the military and civilian state structures. While the ethnic groups proposed a fully federal union that would proffer complete administrative autonomy to each state, the civilian-military clusters argue for a more decentralised structure of governance through constitutional amendments. Furthermore, the former wish for a complete separation of powers between the civilian government and the military, while the latter group does not deem it as a core issue. As of now, the peace process remains largely staggered owing to differences over these critical agenda points. Nevertheless, Suu Kyi's primary motivation in organising such a conference was to bring as many political stakeholders as possible to a common deliberative forum, and in the process create a level-playing field for peaceful settlement of ethnopolitical disputes. It was aimed at expanding the NCA by establishing a platform for sustained and inclusive dialogue between the government, the army, and the various EAOs, including those who did not sign the accord in 2015. However, if one looks closely, the purported inclusiveness of the whole process comes under serious doubt. First, although some of the NCA non-signatory EAOs did attend the conference, four of them remained uninvited because of their refusal to disarm before the conference, as stipulated by the army. These non-participant groups are the Arakan Army (AA), the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Myanmar National Democracy Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland - Khaplang (NSCN-K). Their refusal to disarm is premised on their perception that the Panglong process does not align with their demands for greater autonomy, or in the case of NSCN-K, with the ‘demand for Naga sovereignty’. Second, representatives from the United Wa State Army (UWSA) – the largest and most powerful EAO in Myanmar – staged a walkout on the second day of the conference after being identified as 'observers' rather than participants. Although this might have been a misunderstanding of protocol, it was enough to incite the aforementioned non-attendees to express solidarity with UWSA and reassert their stance that the Panglong Conference was a 'discriminatory' forum. The crucial point about the above non-attendees, barring the AA and NSCN-K, is that they are based out of Shan State in the north – a perennial hotbed of violent clashes. On one hand, while TNLA and MNDAA are still engaged in skirmishes with the army, on the other, UWSA continues to survive in the region as one of the largest narco-insurgent groups in the world, and a prime dealer of drugs and illegal arms from Chinese grey markets. The organisation is known to have been the key supplier of weapons to several of the Indian insurgent outfits based in Sagaing division in Myanmar’s northwest. Furthermore, a recent analysis points towards the movement of United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA-Paresh Baruah faction) rebels from Sagaing to Shan for safe haven. Third, the non-participation of NSCN-K, which is currently ‘at war’ with India, remains a destabilising phenomenon. According to the group’s leadership, they chose to not attend because the conference 'had nothing to do with the Nagas’ demand for sovereignty.' Notably, it was only last year that India officially banned the outfit after a brutal assault against an army convoy in Manipur, following which Indian Special Forces pursued the rebels across the India-Myanmar border in a covert operation. NSCN-K is also the ‘leader’ of the motley set of northeast Indian separatist outfits that currently operate out of Sagaing. Hence, it continues to be a serious threat to India. Fourth, the political parties from Kayah State who failed to secure seats in November 2015 elections refused to attend the conference, complaining about the meagre five seats granted to them at the table. This reflects a core political dynamic in newly democratic Myanmar where smaller regional parties harbour the perception of political underrepresentation and marginalisation. Fifth, despite the strong statements made by the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon on the deplorable condition of the Rohingya community in Rakhine State, no representative from the religious minority was invited, marking a continuity of the alleged institutionalised marginalisation of the Rohingyas. In light of the above, Aung San Suu Kyi’s remarks and attitudes have been fairly encouraging. In addition to meeting the non-signatory EAOs a month before the conference, she has also succinctly expressed the government’s willingness to reach a common ground with the unwilling groups so as to achieve a comprehensive reconciliatory framework. However, the past few days have witnessed the army launch shockingly violent offensives against armed groups in Kachin and Shan states - something that threatens to derail the entire peace process. It is undeniable that the ambitious peace process in Myanmar will remain hobbled without the participation of all ethnic, religious, and political groups. Although the government has charted a specific follow-up action plan - including scheduling similar forums after every six months and widening the scope of the NCA – it remains to be seen if the recalcitrant EAOs are absorbed in the Panglong framework in the future. As rightly stated by Suu Kyi in her closing remarks, 'To achieve peace is very difficult.'

Myanmar Army, Rohingyas and other Ethnic Armed Organisations at Panglong peace conference

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Zee News Rajasthan

Editor

Angshuman Choudhury

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