China has extended its Belt & Road initiative to Afghanistan. What's in it for China? Meanwhile Chinese, Pakistani and Afghanistani foreign ministers met in Islamabad and agreed to combat terrorism. Molly Gambhir reports.

Gravitas: China's Belt & Road project in Afghanistan

China held the second conference on the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) in Beijing on April 25-26, 2019, wherein 40 heads of states, delegates from 150 countries and 90 international organisations from different parts of the world participated.

These included the likes of Russian President Vladimir Putin, President Ueli Maurer of Switzerland, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad, UN General Secretary Antonio Guterres, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, Nepali President Bindiya Bhandari and state Counselor Aung San Su-Kyi of Myanmar.

With the presence of about 5,000 delegates, the second Belt Road Forum provided an opportunity for China to take stock of the BRI and plan the next course of action for the success of this global project.

Ever since the One Belt One Road (OBOR) Initiative (now known as the BRI) was launched in 2013, it has become the most ambitious project of the Chinese government to reshape the regional and global order.&nbsp;

While the BRI is generally viewed in terms of a plan to build infrastructure projects, its other elements include strengthening regional political cooperation, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people exchanges.&nbsp;

The BRI, covering 76 countries from Asia, Africa, and Europe, accounts for half the world’s population and a quarter of global GDP.&nbsp;

In fact, the Xi Jinping government has focussed on mobilising the country’s political, diplomatic, intellectual, economic, and financial resources to establish China as the unquestionable regional and global power.&nbsp;

While the BRI is expected to cost more than $11 trillion, President Xi Jinping has said that the total trade volume between China and Belt and Road participating countries exceeded $6 trillion from 2013 to 2018, while China has so far chalked up $80 billion in direct foreign investment in these countries. Xi also announced that projects worth $64 billion and 283 deliverables were signed at the forum.&nbsp;

But, it is equally true that apprehensions about the BRI as trap diplomacy by China have also increased, symbolised by cases of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the Hambantota Port and others.&nbsp;

In fact, Malaysia had put on hold the Chinese rail project until the original cost was cut by 30 per cent. &nbsp;

Realising this negative image, President Xi focussed on engaging with other countries, saying that the “Belt and Road Initiative is not only for China, but open to other nations’ participation.”&nbsp;

India, a major emerging economic and military power in Asia, has refused to join BRI on the ground that the CPEC violates its sovereignty because it passes through the part of the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir that belongs to India.&nbsp;

Unlike in the past, this time, the US also did not send its representative for this summit. In fact, New Delhi and Washington have a shared understanding of the possible strategic and security threats emerging from the BRI.&nbsp;

New Delhi and Washington have taken several measures to effectively challenge Xi Jinping’s pet project. In doing so, while India has focused on enhancing its engagement with Southeast Asian countries under the Act East Policy, it also sees a point in Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy to maintain and promote peace and security in the region.&nbsp;

US secretary of state Mike Pompeo has announced that “Indo-Pacific Economic Vision” will increase the financial support that the US government provides to countries in the region through a proposed agency, the US International Development Finance Corporation (USIDFC).&nbsp;

The rival Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between the US, Japan, Australia and India last year is also attributed to the intention of these countries to check China’s rise.&nbsp;

At the same time, India is focused on working with Japan in developing an Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), which will help create a “free and open Indo-Pacific region” by rediscovering ancient sea-routes and creating new sea corridors that will link the African continent with India and countries in South-Asia and South-East Asia.&nbsp;

It has to be seen whether the BRI 2.0 really promotes multilateralism in Asia and beyond or it further amplifies the concerns about China’s perceived efforts to dominate the regional global power structure.&nbsp; 
 
&nbsp;(This article was originally published on The DNA. Read the <a href="https://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-india-keeps-off-bri-has-us-and-japan-in-the-loop-2751354">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)&nbsp; 
&nbsp;

China held the second conference on the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) in Beijing on April 25-26, 2019, wherein 40 heads of states, delegates from 150 countries and 90 international organisations from different parts of the world participated.

China held the second conference on the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) in Beijing on April 25-26, 2019, wherein 40 heads of states, delegates from 150 countries and 90 international organisations from different parts of the world participated. These included the likes of Russian President Vladimir Putin, President Ueli Maurer of Switzerland, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad, UN General Secretary Antonio Guterres, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, Nepali President Bindiya Bhandari and state Counselor Aung San Su-Kyi of Myanmar. With the presence of about 5,000 delegates, the second Belt Road Forum provided an opportunity for China to take stock of the BRI and plan the next course of action for the success of this global project. Ever since the One Belt One Road (OBOR) Initiative (now known as the BRI) was launched in 2013, it has become the most ambitious project of the Chinese government to reshape the regional and global order. While the BRI is generally viewed in terms of a plan to build infrastructure projects, its other elements include strengthening regional political cooperation, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people exchanges. The BRI, covering 76 countries from Asia, Africa, and Europe, accounts for half the world’s population and a quarter of global GDP. In fact, the Xi Jinping government has focussed on mobilising the country’s political, diplomatic, intellectual, economic, and financial resources to establish China as the unquestionable regional and global power. While the BRI is expected to cost more than $11 trillion, President Xi Jinping has said that the total trade volume between China and Belt and Road participating countries exceeded $6 trillion from 2013 to 2018, while China has so far chalked up $80 billion in direct foreign investment in these countries. Xi also announced that projects worth $64 billion and 283 deliverables were signed at the forum. But, it is equally true that apprehensions about the BRI as trap diplomacy by China have also increased, symbolised by cases of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the Hambantota Port and others. In fact, Malaysia had put on hold the Chinese rail project until the original cost was cut by 30 per cent. Realising this negative image, President Xi focussed on engaging with other countries, saying that the “Belt and Road Initiative is not only for China, but open to other nations’ participation.” India, a major emerging economic and military power in Asia, has refused to join BRI on the ground that the CPEC violates its sovereignty because it passes through the part of the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir that belongs to India. Unlike in the past, this time, the US also did not send its representative for this summit. In fact, New Delhi and Washington have a shared understanding of the possible strategic and security threats emerging from the BRI. New Delhi and Washington have taken several measures to effectively challenge Xi Jinping’s pet project. In doing so, while India has focused on enhancing its engagement with Southeast Asian countries under the Act East Policy, it also sees a point in Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy to maintain and promote peace and security in the region. US secretary of state Mike Pompeo has announced that “Indo-Pacific Economic Vision” will increase the financial support that the US government provides to countries in the region through a proposed agency, the US International Development Finance Corporation (USIDFC). The rival Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between the US, Japan, Australia and India last year is also attributed to the intention of these countries to check China’s rise. At the same time, India is focused on working with Japan in developing an Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), which will help create a “free and open Indo-Pacific region” by rediscovering ancient sea-routes and creating new sea corridors that will link the African continent with India and countries in South-Asia and South-East Asia. It has to be seen whether the BRI 2.0 really promotes multilateralism in Asia and beyond or it further amplifies the concerns about China’s perceived efforts to dominate the regional global power structure. (This article was originally published on The DNA. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

India keeps off BRI, has US and Japan in the loop

The Indian politico-diplomatic policy contour, in relation to two major events slated for end April in the Chinese calendar, is indicative of a carefully nuanced posture that Delhi is adopting towards Beijing, even as the world’s largest democracy is in the middle of a major national election.

The Modi led NDA government is in caretaker mode and a new Prime Minister will assume office after May 23 but some import-laden Indian policies that are unfolding this week warrant scrutiny.

On April 23 (Tuesday), two Indian naval ships – the INS Kolkata, a guided-missile destroyer and INS Shakti the fleet tanker will be part of the International Fleet Review (IFR) that China is conducting off Qingdao as part of the 70th-anniversary celebrations of the PLA Navy. Chinese President Xi Jinping will review the 50 naval ships assembled from 13 nations (excluding the host) on Tuesday. Major foreign navies represented at the PLA(N) IFR &nbsp;include Russia, Japan and India and some ASEAN nations. It may be recalled that India had conducted an IFR in February 2016 that saw 100 ships from 50 navies anchored off Visakhapatnam and the assemblage included two PLA(N) frigates.

International fleet reviews are a demonstration of a nation’s politico-diplomatic and military credibility as also acceptability and China is engaged in a similar pursuit against the backdrop of regional anxiety and unease over the kind of military assertiveness that Beijing has demonstrated in recent years in relation to its territorial claims in the East Asia-western Pacific continuum.

But in contrast to this friendly overture apropos the Qingdao IFR, Delhi has decided that India will not be part of the second OBOR (one belt-one road) summit being held in Beijing later in the week (April 26). This summit meeting has been billed as the biggest diplomatic event for China in 2019 and is acknowledged as a hugely ambitious personal project of President Xi Jinping that has complex strategic implications linked to the ‘rise of China’.

Delhi had stayed away from the inaugural summit in 2017 due to the manner in which India’s sovereignty claims over POK (Pakistan occupied Kashmir) were ignored among other concerns. Yet given the manner in which the post-Doklam tension was sought to be assuaged at the informal Xi-Modi summit Wuhan, it was expected that India would review its non-participation at the second OBOR (aka Belt and Road Initiative) &nbsp;summit. &nbsp;&nbsp;

However, in what was seen as a major disappointment for Beijing, earlier in March, the Indian ambassador to China Vikram Misri explained the rationale for the Indian refusal to be part of the 2019 summit. Misri noted: &nbsp;"Above all, connectivity initiatives must be pursued in a manner that respects the sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity of nations".

He further added: "No country can participate in an initiative that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity. To be honest, we have made no secret of our views and our position on the BRI is clear and consistent and one that we have conveyed to the authorities concerned.”&nbsp; 
 
It is understood that most of the global community would be present at the second BRI &nbsp;summit, including nations with whom China currently has an uneasy or tense relationship including the USA and Japan and India’s determined ‘absence’ would be visible.

The inference that could be made is that by adopting two very different policy &nbsp;options in relation to the PLA (Navy) IFR on April 23 and the BRI summit on April 26, Delhi &nbsp;is signalling both malleability and resolve in what may be described as an ‘issue-based’ and carefully calibrated approach in its overall China policy.

In yet another development, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has set up a new division designated the Indo-Pacific and it is understood that this division will integrate policies pertaining to the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and deliberations related to the Quad. The latter refers to maritime/naval consultations between the USA, Japan, India and Australia.

The Indo-Pacific is both a geographic entity that links the two oceans – the Indian and the Pacific; and a nascent strategic construct mooted by the USA in some detail in October 2017. The Indian formulation in relation to the Indo-Pacific was outlined by PM Modi at the Shangri-La dialogue in mid-2018 which dwelt on the centrality of ASEAN in this maritime framework. China has its own reservations about this yoking of the two oceans and the strategic sub-text advanced by the USA and the Indian decision to formally create a new division dedicated to the Indo-Pacific will not go unnoticed.

Managing the bilateral with China will be a major challenge for the next Indian government and the policy contours of end April, as manifest in the IFR and the BRI summit, will remain important punctuation in this uneasy relationship between the two Asian giants.

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)&nbsp; 
&nbsp;

The Indian politico-diplomatic policy contour, in relation to two major events slated for end April in the Chinese calendar, is indicative of a carefully nuanced posture that Delhi is adopting towards Beijing, even as the world’s largest democracy is in the middle of a major national election.

The Indian politico-diplomatic policy contour, in relation to two major events slated for end April in the Chinese calendar, is indicative of a carefully nuanced posture that Delhi is adopting towards Beijing, even as the world’s largest democracy is in the middle of a major national election. The Modi led NDA government is in caretaker mode and a new Prime Minister will assume office after May 23 but some import-laden Indian policies that are unfolding this week warrant scrutiny. On April 23 (Tuesday), two Indian naval ships – the INS Kolkata, a guided-missile destroyer and INS Shakti the fleet tanker will be part of the International Fleet Review (IFR) that China is conducting off Qingdao as part of the 70th-anniversary celebrations of the PLA Navy. Chinese President Xi Jinping will review the 50 naval ships assembled from 13 nations (excluding the host) on Tuesday. Major foreign navies represented at the PLA(N) IFR include Russia, Japan and India and some ASEAN nations. It may be recalled that India had conducted an IFR in February 2016 that saw 100 ships from 50 navies anchored off Visakhapatnam and the assemblage included two PLA(N) frigates. International fleet reviews are a demonstration of a nation’s politico-diplomatic and military credibility as also acceptability and China is engaged in a similar pursuit against the backdrop of regional anxiety and unease over the kind of military assertiveness that Beijing has demonstrated in recent years in relation to its territorial claims in the East Asia-western Pacific continuum. But in contrast to this friendly overture apropos the Qingdao IFR, Delhi has decided that India will not be part of the second OBOR (one belt-one road) summit being held in Beijing later in the week (April 26). This summit meeting has been billed as the biggest diplomatic event for China in 2019 and is acknowledged as a hugely ambitious personal project of President Xi Jinping that has complex strategic implications linked to the ‘rise of China’. Delhi had stayed away from the inaugural summit in 2017 due to the manner in which India’s sovereignty claims over POK (Pakistan occupied Kashmir) were ignored among other concerns. Yet given the manner in which the post-Doklam tension was sought to be assuaged at the informal Xi-Modi summit Wuhan, it was expected that India would review its non-participation at the second OBOR (aka Belt and Road Initiative) summit. However, in what was seen as a major disappointment for Beijing, earlier in March, the Indian ambassador to China Vikram Misri explained the rationale for the Indian refusal to be part of the 2019 summit. Misri noted: "Above all, connectivity initiatives must be pursued in a manner that respects the sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity of nations". He further added: "No country can participate in an initiative that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity. To be honest, we have made no secret of our views and our position on the BRI is clear and consistent and one that we have conveyed to the authorities concerned.” It is understood that most of the global community would be present at the second BRI summit, including nations with whom China currently has an uneasy or tense relationship including the USA and Japan and India’s determined ‘absence’ would be visible. The inference that could be made is that by adopting two very different policy options in relation to the PLA (Navy) IFR on April 23 and the BRI summit on April 26, Delhi is signalling both malleability and resolve in what may be described as an ‘issue-based’ and carefully calibrated approach in its overall China policy. In yet another development, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has set up a new division designated the Indo-Pacific and it is understood that this division will integrate policies pertaining to the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and deliberations related to the Quad. The latter refers to maritime/naval consultations between the USA, Japan, India and Australia. The Indo-Pacific is both a geographic entity that links the two oceans – the Indian and the Pacific; and a nascent strategic construct mooted by the USA in some detail in October 2017. The Indian formulation in relation to the Indo-Pacific was outlined by PM Modi at the Shangri-La dialogue in mid-2018 which dwelt on the centrality of ASEAN in this maritime framework. China has its own reservations about this yoking of the two oceans and the strategic sub-text advanced by the USA and the Indian decision to formally create a new division dedicated to the Indo-Pacific will not go unnoticed. Managing the bilateral with China will be a major challenge for the next Indian government and the policy contours of end April, as manifest in the IFR and the BRI summit, will remain important punctuation in this uneasy relationship between the two Asian giants. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Managing bilateral relations with China will be a major challenge for the next Indian government

India to China: Will not accept projects that hurt our sovereignty

In a statement on Saturday Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Kong Xuanyou said that China won't force India to accept its Belt and Road project.&nbsp;

Kong further noted that China does not think that India's acceptance of the project is important.

Kong addressed media at Wuhan after the ongoing informal summit between the PM Modi and President Xi Jinping concluded. He also said that the Xi-regime does not think the Indian government has changed its official position that Tibet is a part of China.

The two-day informal summit between PM Modi and Xi was described as a "forward-looking dialogue"&nbsp;between the two countries by the Ministry of External Affairs earlier today.

"PM Modi and President Xi recognised the common threat posed by terrorism and both reiterated their strong condemnation of a resolute opposition to terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Both committed to cooperate further in counter-terrorism," Gokhale added.

India and China also agreed to undertake a joint India-China economic project in Afghanistan at the summit, a move that could upset Pakistan.

(With inputs from agencies)&nbsp;

Kong further noted that China does not think that India's acceptance of the project is

In a statement on Saturday Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Kong Xuanyou said that China won't force India to accept its Belt and Road project. Kong further noted that China does not think that India's acceptance of the project is important. Kong addressed media at Wuhan after the ongoing informal summit between the PM Modi and President Xi Jinping concluded. He also said that the Xi-regime does not think the Indian government has changed its official position that Tibet is a part of China. The two-day informal summit between PM Modi and Xi was described as a "forward-looking dialogue" between the two countries by the Ministry of External Affairs earlier today. "PM Modi and President Xi recognised the common threat posed by terrorism and both reiterated their strong condemnation of a resolute opposition to terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Both committed to cooperate further in counter-terrorism," Gokhale added. India and China also agreed to undertake a joint India-China economic project in Afghanistan at the summit, a move that could upset Pakistan. (With inputs from agencies)

Won't force India to accept Belt and Road project: China