The strategic prospects of Russia-India-China (RIC) after BRICS 2026

The 18th BRICS Summit at Bharat Mandapam closed with a 140-page declaration and an unmistakable message: the grouping stays relevant precisely because it refuses to become a bloc. Behind that outcome sits an older idea, the Russia-India-China (RIC) triangle, which has returned to strategic conversation. The question for New Delhi is whether RIC is an opportunity or a trap.

A Declaration Written for Many Capitals

The declaration is best read as a set of messages, each addressed to a capital. To China: no weaponisation of critical minerals. To Russia: support for an end to the war, with expanding trade left as a sovereign decision of each member. To Pakistan: condemnation of the Pahalgam attack. To Iran: no obstruction of smooth transit. To Washington: no de-dollarisation agenda and no anti-West posture, yet a firm objection to unilateral sanctions, economic coercion and punitive tariffs. Unimpeded energy flows and protection of infrastructure and seafarers were reaffirmed.

This is calibrated activism at work. India gave every member something and no member everything.

Why RIC Is Back in the Reckoning

The logic is structural. No single power now manages the order. Washington and Beijing both apply rules selectively, and every other power faces limits. In this Cold War 2.0, the two giants remain interdependent even as they compete; America is losing relevance as a convenor, and middle powers are moving towards self-reliance. Trump’s tariffs have done more to make BRICS relevant than any lobbying by Moscow or Beijing. The Iran war, with its model of resisting a stronger adversary, has made both the SCO and BRICS more popular. India co-signed the SCO’s condemnation of the unilateral US-Israeli attack, and similar language found its way into BRICS.

The summit’s signals reinforce this. The Kremlin says Modi and Xi offered help to Putin in settling the Ukraine war. Xi tabled a five-point initiative covering open-source, inclusive AI; digital, trade and investment facilitation; stable supply chains and a larger integrated market; the Global South as a stabilising force; and non-interference in internal affairs. Putin floated a BRICS-owned insurance mechanism. Energy security binds all three capitals, and the continued role of fossil fuels was acknowledged in a world where no crisis remains merely regional.

The Limits of the Triangle

Enthusiasm needs arithmetic. Trade within BRICS has reached about USD 1.17 trillion, yet BRICS trade with the US and EU still exceeds USD 2 trillion. No member, China included, will sacrifice that access for solidarity. India-China relations, now in a phase of competitive coexistence after the thaw, still carry an unresolved boundary and rival visions of Asia; India’s decision to stay out of RCEP reflects that caution. Iran’s tensions with the UAE and Saudi Arabia show how expansion has imported West Asia’s fault lines into the room. Consensus protects equality, but it also slows decisions. To increase the limit of this triangle and BRICS, intra- BRICS trade must increase.

A Calibrated Agenda for India

First, keep RIC issue-based rather than institutional: energy, Eurasian connectivity, AI governance and facilitation on Ukraine. Second, take from Xi’s initiative what serves India, notably AI that remains human-operated and resilient supply chains, while insisting that border normalisation precedes deeper economic embrace. Third, engage Putin’s insurance idea as an energy, commercial and defence technological hedge. Fourth, keep the Western channel open. India criticised US coercion without breaking with America, and that discipline is among its greatest assets.

Conclusion

RIC’s prospects are real but bounded. It can strengthen India’s bargaining power with Washington, Beijing and Moscow alike, provided New Delhi remains the architect and not the junior partner in someone else’s design. As with BRICS, the principle must hold: non-Western, but not anti-Western. India’s voice, alongside China’s, can carry the concerns of the Global South, but India’s strategic autonomy is not for pooling. Used with discipline, RIC becomes a lever of that autonomy. Used carelessly, it becomes the lens through which the world sees India as part of a Eurasian counter-bloc.