Yet another tragic terror incident in Kashmir! It’s so serious that it has shaken the soul of the nation once again.&nbsp;

There is no change in Pakistan-sponsored terrorists’ strategy. But the methodology adopted this time is new. A bus carrying CRPF personnel was attacked by a suicide bomber driving an explosive-laden car alongside the running convoy in Pulwama. More than 40 CRPF personnel were killed and many others were critically injured. Pakistan based Jaish-e-Mohammed, ready with a video of the local suicide bomber Adil Ahmad Dar, has promptly claimed credit for organising this terror attack. Its new tactics, and likely repetition in J&amp;K, will definitely cause more challenges for the security forces and the government.

How did they manage to organise such a planned attack? This and related investigations are in progress by the J&amp;K Police and the National Investigation Agency. These are being reported every minute in the media. My comments are on more fundamental issues.

Terrorism in J&amp;K has two dimensions: Internal and external. The latter is related to Pakistan with which India has a running territorial dispute and a violence-prone boundary or Line of Control. Both dimensions, though linked, require integrated and well-coordinated policies and a comprehensive grand strategy. Unfortunately, there has been a lack of focus on our policies/grand strategy, if there were any.

Internal dimension

In J&amp;K, we have had several political failures. The last one was the PDP-BJP coalition, formed on March 1, 2015. We forgot that PDP rose to power with solid support of Jamaat-e-Islami elements in South Kashmir. Its ideology would not gel with that of BJP. The resultant coalition failure, rise of radicalisation, and further deterioration of law-and-order situation was no surprise. It also gave large space to the separatists; so much that even mainstream politicians felt compelled to tow their line and often coerce security forces to dilute safety and security measures.&nbsp;

These failures and the deteriorating situation have led to an approach that has put the security forces on the forefront. A hard military strategy without a proper political strategy does not succeed. They now have to take the flak from the local population and from those in the government if there is any mistake or collateral damage. The political and social aspects — contact with local communities and local development initiatives — have been lost.

Terrorism is not just a military problem. It is primarily a major socio-political-economic problem. A pure military approach, given the lack or fragility of the institutional framework in operational areas, can worsen the situation.

Security forces are meant to handle terrorists and violence, not the rise of radicalisation, or the separatists’ calls for hartals and marshalling of stone-pelters.&nbsp;

Worldwide, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations have not succeeded unless the ideologues have been neutralised. In India, we not only give them more outreach space but also state security, communication and other facilities. We claim that they are being funded by the ISI and yet do not block their bank accounts. We also allow them to take telephone calls from Pakistani ministers.&nbsp;

Now that we have Governor’s rule in J&amp;K, here are a few suggestions:

The Governor should reactivate the United Headquarter (UHQ) and meet regularly to ensure better civil-military coordination and its effectiveness.

Take immediate steps to isolate and neutralise Hurriyat leaders and other separatists and withdraw all their government-funded facilities.

The Governor should hold separate regular meetings with political leaders, civil society leaders, educational networks, youth organisations, NGOs, business leaders and local professionals. Local development initiatives should play a role with government as a supportive partner.

Arrest radicalisation attempts in schools, colleges and religious institutes.

Security grid in South Kashmir, lifeline to Srinagar, should be further strengthened to deal with the current terrorist situation.

External dimension

Causing terrorism in India is a decades-old Pakistani state policy, sponsored and controlled by Pakistani Army. Terror outfits like Lashkar and Jaish are only cheap tools. For justice, it is necessary to book or neutralise their leaders like Hafiz Saeed and Maulana Masood Azhar. However, that is unlikely to deter Pakistani Army from changing its policy. Pakistan can find many more such already trained terror leaders. In fact, even if J&amp;K issue is somehow resolved, its anti-India policy is unlikely to change. In its present polity, Pakistan does not believe in sub-continental geo-political stability and co-existence.

Pakistan’s quest to destabilise India and keep the pot boiling in J&amp;K will not change. Another surgical strike on terrorists’ camps will not lead to deterrence or dissuasion. In any case, it has already lost its surprise element and political or strategic impact. The government could consider taking covert action in Pakistan. A major military option requires not only capacity assessment but also its build-up, if necessary. More importantly, it cannot be left to the armed forces alone as has been stated in public by some of our political leaders. A major strike or a limited war option is a national issue. It requires political will, diplomatic push, economic sustenance, and advanced preparations. We should prepare our grounds well. A half-hearted or a divided national power should never be employed in a conflict, without adequate escalation control politico-military ability.&nbsp;

I am happy that despite forthcoming elections, all opposition parties have extended full support to the government at this juncture. It is now up to the government to keep them adequately briefed and take their views and suggestions. We had an almost similar political climate during the Kargil war. India’s national security should always take precedence over our political ideologies and interests.

(This article was originally published on The DNA. Read the <a href="https://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-pakistan-s-thirst-for-violence-2720901">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Yet another tragic terror incident in Kashmir! It’s so serious that it has shaken the soul of the nation once again. There is no change in Pakistan-sponsored terrorists’ strategy.

Yet another tragic terror incident in Kashmir! It’s so serious that it has shaken the soul of the nation once again. There is no change in Pakistan-sponsored terrorists’ strategy. But the methodology adopted this time is new. A bus carrying CRPF personnel was attacked by a suicide bomber driving an explosive-laden car alongside the running convoy in Pulwama. More than 40 CRPF personnel were killed and many others were critically injured. Pakistan based Jaish-e-Mohammed, ready with a video of the local suicide bomber Adil Ahmad Dar, has promptly claimed credit for organising this terror attack. Its new tactics, and likely repetition in J&K, will definitely cause more challenges for the security forces and the government. How did they manage to organise such a planned attack? This and related investigations are in progress by the J&K Police and the National Investigation Agency. These are being reported every minute in the media. My comments are on more fundamental issues. Terrorism in J&K has two dimensions: Internal and external. The latter is related to Pakistan with which India has a running territorial dispute and a violence-prone boundary or Line of Control. Both dimensions, though linked, require integrated and well-coordinated policies and a comprehensive grand strategy. Unfortunately, there has been a lack of focus on our policies/grand strategy, if there were any. Internal dimension In J&K, we have had several political failures. The last one was the PDP-BJP coalition, formed on March 1, 2015. We forgot that PDP rose to power with solid support of Jamaat-e-Islami elements in South Kashmir. Its ideology would not gel with that of BJP. The resultant coalition failure, rise of radicalisation, and further deterioration of law-and-order situation was no surprise. It also gave large space to the separatists; so much that even mainstream politicians felt compelled to tow their line and often coerce security forces to dilute safety and security measures. These failures and the deteriorating situation have led to an approach that has put the security forces on the forefront. A hard military strategy without a proper political strategy does not succeed. They now have to take the flak from the local population and from those in the government if there is any mistake or collateral damage. The political and social aspects — contact with local communities and local development initiatives — have been lost. Terrorism is not just a military problem. It is primarily a major socio-political-economic problem. A pure military approach, given the lack or fragility of the institutional framework in operational areas, can worsen the situation. Security forces are meant to handle terrorists and violence, not the rise of radicalisation, or the separatists’ calls for hartals and marshalling of stone-pelters. Worldwide, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations have not succeeded unless the ideologues have been neutralised. In India, we not only give them more outreach space but also state security, communication and other facilities. We claim that they are being funded by the ISI and yet do not block their bank accounts. We also allow them to take telephone calls from Pakistani ministers. Now that we have Governor’s rule in J&K, here are a few suggestions: The Governor should reactivate the United Headquarter (UHQ) and meet regularly to ensure better civil-military coordination and its effectiveness. Take immediate steps to isolate and neutralise Hurriyat leaders and other separatists and withdraw all their government-funded facilities. The Governor should hold separate regular meetings with political leaders, civil society leaders, educational networks, youth organisations, NGOs, business leaders and local professionals. Local development initiatives should play a role with government as a supportive partner. Arrest radicalisation attempts in schools, colleges and religious institutes. Security grid in South Kashmir, lifeline to Srinagar, should be further strengthened to deal with the current terrorist situation. External dimension Causing terrorism in India is a decades-old Pakistani state policy, sponsored and controlled by Pakistani Army. Terror outfits like Lashkar and Jaish are only cheap tools. For justice, it is necessary to book or neutralise their leaders like Hafiz Saeed and Maulana Masood Azhar. However, that is unlikely to deter Pakistani Army from changing its policy. Pakistan can find many more such already trained terror leaders. In fact, even if J&K issue is somehow resolved, its anti-India policy is unlikely to change. In its present polity, Pakistan does not believe in sub-continental geo-political stability and co-existence. Pakistan’s quest to destabilise India and keep the pot boiling in J&K will not change. Another surgical strike on terrorists’ camps will not lead to deterrence or dissuasion. In any case, it has already lost its surprise element and political or strategic impact. The government could consider taking covert action in Pakistan. A major military option requires not only capacity assessment but also its build-up, if necessary. More importantly, it cannot be left to the armed forces alone as has been stated in public by some of our political leaders. A major strike or a limited war option is a national issue. It requires political will, diplomatic push, economic sustenance, and advanced preparations. We should prepare our grounds well. A half-hearted or a divided national power should never be employed in a conflict, without adequate escalation control politico-military ability. I am happy that despite forthcoming elections, all opposition parties have extended full support to the government at this juncture. It is now up to the government to keep them adequately briefed and take their views and suggestions. We had an almost similar political climate during the Kargil war. India’s national security should always take precedence over our political ideologies and interests. (This article was originally published on The DNA. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Pakistan’s quest to keep the pot boiling in J&K will not change

Last week, the government announced its Interim Budget for 2019-20. Defence allocation was again a disappointment, particularly for those looking forward to covering up important deficiencies and introducing a degree of modernisation.

With a 3 per cent hike from the last Defence Budget, the current allocation will cover inflation, but very little beyond that.

In all civilisations, wise generations and statesmen have been keenly aware of the values of peace and war. Peace connotes development, progress and lives led in comfort and tranquillity. War denotes death, destruction and poor development.

Greek historian Herodotus noted in 484 BC: “No one is so foolish as to choose war over peace. In peace, sons bury their fathers. In war, fathers bury their sons.” War and peace have been part of all civilisations; two sides of the same coin.

Most of us believe that in the mythological Sat Yug, our people lived a great life, peaceful, free from toil and grief. But they forget that even Sat Yug was not entirely peaceful. There was violence between Devalok and Asurlok. In fact, none of our mythological Yugs was peaceful. In Treta Yug, there was war between Ram and Ravan. In Dwapar Yug, the Pandavs fought with Kauravs.

On war and peace, there is another classical quote, ‘Si vis pacem, para bellum’ (Latin writer Flavious Vegetius). It means “If you want peace, prepare for war”.

This phrase is used to affirm that the effective means for ensuring peace for a people is always to be armed and ready to defend oneself. Chinese words Shi ji convey the same idea.

The historical truth is that peace cannot be had free. It accrues only to those nations which are strong and prepared for war. Strong nations seldom listen to weak nations when their own national interests are at stake. They indulge in coercive diplomacy backed by threats of war.

Hoping for peace can only be wishful thinking if a nation is not strong to deter/dissuade its foes.

Vegetius’ quote is also interpreted to mean that the time to prepare for war is not when the war is imminent, but when times are peaceful. A strong peacetime army would signal to would-be attackers that the battle may not be worth it.

To set the foundations on which to erect the outline of a general theory of war, Vice-Admiral JC Wylie (US Navy) had worked on several basic assumptions. One such assumption described by Wylie in his papers ‘Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power’ is “Despite whatever effort there may be to prevent it, there may be a war.”

Military history tells us that nations who neglect this historical determinism make themselves vulnerable to military surprise, defeat, and ignominy.

This assumption is a reminder to strategists to visualise security threats and to remain prepared for any eventuality. To those who may find this assumption irritable or doubtful, I would remind them of the Kargil War which broke out within two months of the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan signing the Lahore Declaration.

Another basic assumption for war planning, as mentioned by Wylie, was “We cannot predict with certainty the pattern of war for which we prepare ourselves.” It has seldom been possible to forecast the time, place, scope, intensity and the general tenor of a war.

India, since Independence, has never prepared itself adequately for wars. Only in 1971, did we manage to get time and prepare ourselves because Sam Manekshaw insisted on delaying the conflict and the circumstances were favourable.

In all other wars, our adversaries took the initiative because they considered us to be politically and militarily inadequately prepared.

Erosion of credible conventional deterrence often makes them audacious and challenge us. Before the Kargil war, Pakistan had perceived that due to prolonged involvement in anti-terrorist and anti-insurgency operations in Punjab, J&amp;K and North East India, our army was not in any shape to fight. Its weapons and equipment were obsolete, as no modernisation had taken place for more than a decade.

While addressing troops of the Pakistan Army on October 29, 1998, Musharraf had said, “Don’t be carried away by the rhetoric of the Indians, whose armed forces are totally exhausted and whose morale is at its lowest.” In March 1999, the intelligence adviser to Nawaz Sharif, Lt Gen Javed Nasir, wrote that “Indian Army was incapable of undertaking any conventional operation.”

Some of us want peace desperately. We refuse to learn from history and happenings on the ground. We get thrilled whenever a friendly statement is made by a Pakistani or a Chinese leader. That may be soothing. But to be intoxicated by over-optimism and neglect our defence preparedness would be naïve and dangerous.

To deter or dissuade potential challengers, our armed forces require strengthening of capabilities with a certain amount of specialisation.

There is an acute shortage of fighter aircraft in the Indian Air Force and submarines in the Indian Navy. The Indian Army needs to replace its basic weapons for infantry.

Keeping in view the nature of conflicts in the foreseeable future, we need to raise more special forces, upgrade command, control, communications, computers, information, surveillance and reconnaissance, cyber and space war capabilities.

We also require better defence infrastructure along our northern borders. The next war, if we are forced to fight, will be quite different from any war that we have fought so far.

For peaceful development, security awareness, sagacity and rationality are needed in our political discourse to allow required build-up of military capability. India must aim for the cheaper, preparedness option. The other, more expensive option, is unthinkable.

(This article was originally published on The DNA. Read the&nbsp;<a href="https://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-defence-allocation-too-small-2716953">original article)</a>

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Last week, the government announced its Interim Budget for 2019-20. Defence allocation was again a disappointment, particularly for those looking forward to covering up important deficiencies and introducing a degree of modernisation.

Last week, the government announced its Interim Budget for 2019-20. Defence allocation was again a disappointment, particularly for those looking forward to covering up important deficiencies and introducing a degree of modernisation. With a 3 per cent hike from the last Defence Budget, the current allocation will cover inflation, but very little beyond that. In all civilisations, wise generations and statesmen have been keenly aware of the values of peace and war. Peace connotes development, progress and lives led in comfort and tranquillity. War denotes death, destruction and poor development. Greek historian Herodotus noted in 484 BC: “No one is so foolish as to choose war over peace. In peace, sons bury their fathers. In war, fathers bury their sons.” War and peace have been part of all civilisations; two sides of the same coin. Most of us believe that in the mythological Sat Yug, our people lived a great life, peaceful, free from toil and grief. But they forget that even Sat Yug was not entirely peaceful. There was violence between Devalok and Asurlok. In fact, none of our mythological Yugs was peaceful. In Treta Yug, there was war between Ram and Ravan. In Dwapar Yug, the Pandavs fought with Kauravs. On war and peace, there is another classical quote, ‘Si vis pacem, para bellum’ (Latin writer Flavious Vegetius). It means “If you want peace, prepare for war”. This phrase is used to affirm that the effective means for ensuring peace for a people is always to be armed and ready to defend oneself. Chinese words Shi ji convey the same idea. The historical truth is that peace cannot be had free. It accrues only to those nations which are strong and prepared for war. Strong nations seldom listen to weak nations when their own national interests are at stake. They indulge in coercive diplomacy backed by threats of war. Hoping for peace can only be wishful thinking if a nation is not strong to deter/dissuade its foes. Vegetius’ quote is also interpreted to mean that the time to prepare for war is not when the war is imminent, but when times are peaceful. A strong peacetime army would signal to would-be attackers that the battle may not be worth it. To set the foundations on which to erect the outline of a general theory of war, Vice-Admiral JC Wylie (US Navy) had worked on several basic assumptions. One such assumption described by Wylie in his papers ‘Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power’ is “Despite whatever effort there may be to prevent it, there may be a war.” Military history tells us that nations who neglect this historical determinism make themselves vulnerable to military surprise, defeat, and ignominy. This assumption is a reminder to strategists to visualise security threats and to remain prepared for any eventuality. To those who may find this assumption irritable or doubtful, I would remind them of the Kargil War which broke out within two months of the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan signing the Lahore Declaration. Another basic assumption for war planning, as mentioned by Wylie, was “We cannot predict with certainty the pattern of war for which we prepare ourselves.” It has seldom been possible to forecast the time, place, scope, intensity and the general tenor of a war. India, since Independence, has never prepared itself adequately for wars. Only in 1971, did we manage to get time and prepare ourselves because Sam Manekshaw insisted on delaying the conflict and the circumstances were favourable. In all other wars, our adversaries took the initiative because they considered us to be politically and militarily inadequately prepared. Erosion of credible conventional deterrence often makes them audacious and challenge us. Before the Kargil war, Pakistan had perceived that due to prolonged involvement in anti-terrorist and anti-insurgency operations in Punjab, J&K and North East India, our army was not in any shape to fight. Its weapons and equipment were obsolete, as no modernisation had taken place for more than a decade. While addressing troops of the Pakistan Army on October 29, 1998, Musharraf had said, “Don’t be carried away by the rhetoric of the Indians, whose armed forces are totally exhausted and whose morale is at its lowest.” In March 1999, the intelligence adviser to Nawaz Sharif, Lt Gen Javed Nasir, wrote that “Indian Army was incapable of undertaking any conventional operation.” Some of us want peace desperately. We refuse to learn from history and happenings on the ground. We get thrilled whenever a friendly statement is made by a Pakistani or a Chinese leader. That may be soothing. But to be intoxicated by over-optimism and neglect our defence preparedness would be naïve and dangerous. To deter or dissuade potential challengers, our armed forces require strengthening of capabilities with a certain amount of specialisation. There is an acute shortage of fighter aircraft in the Indian Air Force and submarines in the Indian Navy. The Indian Army needs to replace its basic weapons for infantry. Keeping in view the nature of conflicts in the foreseeable future, we need to raise more special forces, upgrade command, control, communications, computers, information, surveillance and reconnaissance, cyber and space war capabilities. We also require better defence infrastructure along our northern borders. The next war, if we are forced to fight, will be quite different from any war that we have fought so far. For peaceful development, security awareness, sagacity and rationality are needed in our political discourse to allow required build-up of military capability. India must aim for the cheaper, preparedness option. The other, more expensive option, is unthinkable. (This article was originally published on The DNA. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Budget 2019: Defence allocation too small

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