Article 33 of the Constitution is an exception to the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III. It empowers Parliament to restrict or abrogate the Fundamental Rights of certain categories of government servants so as to ensure the proper discharge of their duties and maintenance of discipline amongst them. Besides the three wings of the armed forces, these rights have been abrogated in respect of the members of the police and paramilitary forces, persons employed in intelligence or counter-intelligence services, and communication systems set up for the above organisations.

In exercising the powers conferred by Article 33, Parliament has authorised the Central government to make rules to restrict certain Fundamental Rights of the members of the armed forces. The Central government, exercising its rule-making power under the Army Act, 1950 (and also the Air Force Act), has restricted the rights relating to freedom of speech and expression, freedom of assembly, and freedom to form associations and unions contained in Article 19 of the Constitution. In the case of the Navy, Parliament has done this under section 12 of the Navy Act itself. The Supreme Court has ruled that these rights can be restricted even for personnel with non-combat roles in the armed forces. This appears logical because the armed forces have to be a disciplined organisation.&nbsp;

The question which emerges is whether the Fundamental Rights of the members of the armed forces, other than the three listed under Article 19, can also be abrogated even if they do not have any impact on discipline or the performance of duty.

There have been a number of incidents where military governance in matters of promotion, posting, pay and allowances, conditions of service and pension have been taken up in the Supreme Court. The arbitrariness in the justice delivery systems has also been questioned in several cases. The Delhi High Court held in a recent case: “A soldier or officer’s honour and dignity is as much a part of his right to life; it is to be respected just as much, if not more, for the reason that it is offered unhesitatingly and fully in defending the borders of the nation. Unlike ‘hired guns’ they stand guard so that the rest exercise our liberties. Denying them the right to a safe workplace with standard equipment constitutes violation of their right to life and dignity.”&nbsp;

The fundamental rights have been liberally construed by the Supreme Court in the last five decades, keeping in view the international covenants to which India is a party. For instance, the right to protection of life and personal liberty has received the widest possible interpretation. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has held that access to justice is a fundamental right guaranteed to citizens by Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution.

While dealing with the case of Ram Sarup in 1964, the Supreme Court relied on the submission made by the Attorney General that each provision of the Army Act is a law made by Parliament and that if any provision tends to affect the fundamental rights, it must be taken that Parliament, under Article 33, has made the requisite modification to affect the respective fundamental right. This was perhaps a wrong interpretation of the constitutional provision, which has to be reviewed in the context of the march of time and the development of law. A constitutional provision must be construed not in a narrow, constricted sense, but in a wide and liberal manner. 
 
The Supreme Court has often taken the path of least resistance by supporting the military in any controversial case. The courts are generally of the opinion that any adverse comment on military higher-ups may erode discipline in the armed forces. The judiciary believes, in good faith, that by supporting the organisation, they are affording an opportunity to the military hierarchy as well as the government to rectify the defects in governance and the justice delivery system. Thus, in cases of alleged bias, denial of rights or injustice at the hands of a commander, the courts are tempted to rule out the possibility of culpability or malice on the part of the superior.&nbsp;

In Maneka Gandhi case (1978), the Supreme Court observed, “The attempt of the court should be to expand the reach and ambit of the fundamental rights, rather than to attenuate their meaning and content by a process of judicial construction.” In the case Ajay Hasia (1981), the Court declared that it has a special responsibility “to enlarge the range and meaning of the fundamental rights and to advance the human rights jurisprudence”. However, when it comes to the fundamental rights of military personnel, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the constitutional provision has been very narrow. 
 
The members of the armed forces must be entitled to the same rights and protections as all other persons, subject to certain limitations imposed to maintain discipline. When the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the members of the armed forces are protected within their institution, they will be more likely to uphold these while carrying out their duties.&nbsp;

(This article was originally published on DNA. Read the <a href="https://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-protecting-basic-rights-of-military-personnel-2667368">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Article 33 of the Constitution is an exception to the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III. It empowers Parliament to restrict or abrogate the Fundamental Rights of certain categories of government servants so as to ensure the proper discharge of their duties and maintenance of discipline amongst them.

Article 33 of the Constitution is an exception to the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III. It empowers Parliament to restrict or abrogate the Fundamental Rights of certain categories of government servants so as to ensure the proper discharge of their duties and maintenance of discipline amongst them. Besides the three wings of the armed forces, these rights have been abrogated in respect of the members of the police and paramilitary forces, persons employed in intelligence or counter-intelligence services, and communication systems set up for the above organisations. In exercising the powers conferred by Article 33, Parliament has authorised the Central government to make rules to restrict certain Fundamental Rights of the members of the armed forces. The Central government, exercising its rule-making power under the Army Act, 1950 (and also the Air Force Act), has restricted the rights relating to freedom of speech and expression, freedom of assembly, and freedom to form associations and unions contained in Article 19 of the Constitution. In the case of the Navy, Parliament has done this under section 12 of the Navy Act itself. The Supreme Court has ruled that these rights can be restricted even for personnel with non-combat roles in the armed forces. This appears logical because the armed forces have to be a disciplined organisation. The question which emerges is whether the Fundamental Rights of the members of the armed forces, other than the three listed under Article 19, can also be abrogated even if they do not have any impact on discipline or the performance of duty. There have been a number of incidents where military governance in matters of promotion, posting, pay and allowances, conditions of service and pension have been taken up in the Supreme Court. The arbitrariness in the justice delivery systems has also been questioned in several cases. The Delhi High Court held in a recent case: “A soldier or officer’s honour and dignity is as much a part of his right to life; it is to be respected just as much, if not more, for the reason that it is offered unhesitatingly and fully in defending the borders of the nation. Unlike ‘hired guns’ they stand guard so that the rest exercise our liberties. Denying them the right to a safe workplace with standard equipment constitutes violation of their right to life and dignity.” The fundamental rights have been liberally construed by the Supreme Court in the last five decades, keeping in view the international covenants to which India is a party. For instance, the right to protection of life and personal liberty has received the widest possible interpretation. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has held that access to justice is a fundamental right guaranteed to citizens by Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution. While dealing with the case of Ram Sarup in 1964, the Supreme Court relied on the submission made by the Attorney General that each provision of the Army Act is a law made by Parliament and that if any provision tends to affect the fundamental rights, it must be taken that Parliament, under Article 33, has made the requisite modification to affect the respective fundamental right. This was perhaps a wrong interpretation of the constitutional provision, which has to be reviewed in the context of the march of time and the development of law. A constitutional provision must be construed not in a narrow, constricted sense, but in a wide and liberal manner. The Supreme Court has often taken the path of least resistance by supporting the military in any controversial case. The courts are generally of the opinion that any adverse comment on military higher-ups may erode discipline in the armed forces. The judiciary believes, in good faith, that by supporting the organisation, they are affording an opportunity to the military hierarchy as well as the government to rectify the defects in governance and the justice delivery system. Thus, in cases of alleged bias, denial of rights or injustice at the hands of a commander, the courts are tempted to rule out the possibility of culpability or malice on the part of the superior. In Maneka Gandhi case (1978), the Supreme Court observed, “The attempt of the court should be to expand the reach and ambit of the fundamental rights, rather than to attenuate their meaning and content by a process of judicial construction.” In the case Ajay Hasia (1981), the Court declared that it has a special responsibility “to enlarge the range and meaning of the fundamental rights and to advance the human rights jurisprudence”. However, when it comes to the fundamental rights of military personnel, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the constitutional provision has been very narrow. The members of the armed forces must be entitled to the same rights and protections as all other persons, subject to certain limitations imposed to maintain discipline. When the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the members of the armed forces are protected within their institution, they will be more likely to uphold these while carrying out their duties. (This article was originally published on DNA. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Important to protect basic rights of military personnel

The Delhi Police has recently inducted an all-woman Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team comprising 36 elite women commandos, trained for anti-terrorist operations. The three wings of the military also have Special Forces which include MARCOS, Para Commandos, the Ghatak, the Garud Commando Force and the National Security Guards. In addition, the CRPF has the specialised COBRA (Commando Battalion for Resolute Action) force and has trained women commandos to deal with difficult situations.

The members of these forces are equipped with body armours, communication systems, devices to enhance vision, and the best possible weapon systems.

The issue that is emerging is whether neuroscience, biotechnology, nanotechnology, robotics and artificial intelligence could be used to enhance the capabilities of the Special Forces to help them complete missions more safely, effectively and economically. In a number of war-like situations, the human brain is faster than a computer in perceiving threats, yet a computer is faster than a human being in calculating countermeasures. Therefore, the forces that are able to combine the two will gain an advantage over those that do not. Enhancing the capability of security personnel with the help of neuroscience is another area that is being explored. For instance, currently one operator is needed to pilot a single drone. If the cognitive capabilities of a drone operator can be enhanced, a single operator may be able to pilot a swarm of drones in future.

The medical enhancement of the capabilities of troops is not new. Throughout history, Armies have used risky enhancements such as addictive drugs to improve soldiers’ performance. For example, caffeine, modanifil, and amphetamines have been shown to be highly effective in temporarily reversing the degradation of the mental performance of sleep-deprived soldiers. The US military and other armies gave amphetamines to soldiers to overcome battle fatigue during World War II.&nbsp;

The German military provided a stimulant called Pervitin to soldiers in combat. During the Vietnam War, the level of psychoactive substances consumption by military personnel was unprecedented in American history. David Grossman in On Killing, writes, “Vietnam was the first war in which the forces of modern pharmacology were directed to empower the battlefield soldier.” Even today, military personnel are prescribed such drugs however, this is treated as classified information.

In a few developed countries, neurological research is directed towards developing military applications for human enhancement—to reduce the need for sleep, to increase the brain’s capacity to retrieve information pertinent to a specific mission, to assist in decision-making under extreme battlefield stress. This may have serious ethical, legal, social, and operational implications.

The ethical issues which emerge are: If an “enhanced soldier” went out of control and violated the laws of war, who would be at fault? Would it be the soldier, the combat leader, or the medical team that created him? Wars are governed by international humanitarian law (IHL), which is a set of legal principles designed to protect those affected by conflict and to regulate the means of warfare. Under the IHL, military action must meet military necessity, use force that is proportional to the objective obtained, treat combatants and prisoners of war humanely, and not target civilians.&nbsp;

Would we have to modify IHL to deal with enhanced soldiers? Could an enhanced soldier who is taken a prisoner of war be subjected to reverse engineering, biological or neural implants? Would it be permissible to overload an implanted chip such that it may cause brain damage through an electrical overload of neural circuits in a soldier? What would be the ethics of fighting an enhanced soldier? Would the Geneva Conventions apply?

The human rights issues relating to enhanced soldiers are more complex. Despite their enhanced status such soldiers would remain fundamentally human. The preamble of all the universal human rights instruments refer to “all members of the human family” and address the rights contained therein to “all human beings”.&nbsp;

Soldiers have the right to life, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war. Enhancement technologies may adversely affect the right to life where the use of a particular technology poses a risk to a soldier and may result in his death. On the other hand, enhanced soldiers may infringe on the right to life by causing the wrongful death of civilians while under the influence of their enhancement. While an enhanced soldier who can withstand pain and operate effectively under stress may benefit a State, the opponent may be forced to develop weapons that cause excruciating pain or suffering to neutralise such a soldier.&nbsp;

While the enhancement of soldiers sounds tempting, genetic engineering has a serious downside. Its unpredictable nature generates questions of safety and the potential side-effects of modifying genetic pathways. We must not forget that athletes are forbidden to use illegal substances to increase their performance. Governments must consider all the pros and cons of genetic engineering before deciding whether its use in the military and other forces would be truly advantageous. 
 
(The author is a Wing Commander Retd) 
 
(This article was first published on The DNA. Read the <a href="https://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-creating-super-soldiers-through-enhancement-technologies-2655612">original article.</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

The members of these forces are equipped with body armours, communication systems, devices to enhance vision, and the best possible weapon systems.

The Delhi Police has recently inducted an all-woman Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team comprising 36 elite women commandos, trained for anti-terrorist operations. The three wings of the military also have Special Forces which include MARCOS, Para Commandos, the Ghatak, the Garud Commando Force and the National Security Guards. In addition, the CRPF has the specialised COBRA (Commando Battalion for Resolute Action) force and has trained women commandos to deal with difficult situations. The members of these forces are equipped with body armours, communication systems, devices to enhance vision, and the best possible weapon systems. The issue that is emerging is whether neuroscience, biotechnology, nanotechnology, robotics and artificial intelligence could be used to enhance the capabilities of the Special Forces to help them complete missions more safely, effectively and economically. In a number of war-like situations, the human brain is faster than a computer in perceiving threats, yet a computer is faster than a human being in calculating countermeasures. Therefore, the forces that are able to combine the two will gain an advantage over those that do not. Enhancing the capability of security personnel with the help of neuroscience is another area that is being explored. For instance, currently one operator is needed to pilot a single drone. If the cognitive capabilities of a drone operator can be enhanced, a single operator may be able to pilot a swarm of drones in future. The medical enhancement of the capabilities of troops is not new. Throughout history, Armies have used risky enhancements such as addictive drugs to improve soldiers’ performance. For example, caffeine, modanifil, and amphetamines have been shown to be highly effective in temporarily reversing the degradation of the mental performance of sleep-deprived soldiers. The US military and other armies gave amphetamines to soldiers to overcome battle fatigue during World War II. The German military provided a stimulant called Pervitin to soldiers in combat. During the Vietnam War, the level of psychoactive substances consumption by military personnel was unprecedented in American history. David Grossman in On Killing, writes, “Vietnam was the first war in which the forces of modern pharmacology were directed to empower the battlefield soldier.” Even today, military personnel are prescribed such drugs however, this is treated as classified information. In a few developed countries, neurological research is directed towards developing military applications for human enhancement—to reduce the need for sleep, to increase the brain’s capacity to retrieve information pertinent to a specific mission, to assist in decision-making under extreme battlefield stress. This may have serious ethical, legal, social, and operational implications. The ethical issues which emerge are: If an “enhanced soldier” went out of control and violated the laws of war, who would be at fault? Would it be the soldier, the combat leader, or the medical team that created him? Wars are governed by international humanitarian law (IHL), which is a set of legal principles designed to protect those affected by conflict and to regulate the means of warfare. Under the IHL, military action must meet military necessity, use force that is proportional to the objective obtained, treat combatants and prisoners of war humanely, and not target civilians. Would we have to modify IHL to deal with enhanced soldiers? Could an enhanced soldier who is taken a prisoner of war be subjected to reverse engineering, biological or neural implants? Would it be permissible to overload an implanted chip such that it may cause brain damage through an electrical overload of neural circuits in a soldier? What would be the ethics of fighting an enhanced soldier? Would the Geneva Conventions apply? The human rights issues relating to enhanced soldiers are more complex. Despite their enhanced status such soldiers would remain fundamentally human. The preamble of all the universal human rights instruments refer to “all members of the human family” and address the rights contained therein to “all human beings”. Soldiers have the right to life, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war. Enhancement technologies may adversely affect the right to life where the use of a particular technology poses a risk to a soldier and may result in his death. On the other hand, enhanced soldiers may infringe on the right to life by causing the wrongful death of civilians while under the influence of their enhancement. While an enhanced soldier who can withstand pain and operate effectively under stress may benefit a State, the opponent may be forced to develop weapons that cause excruciating pain or suffering to neutralise such a soldier. While the enhancement of soldiers sounds tempting, genetic engineering has a serious downside. Its unpredictable nature generates questions of safety and the potential side-effects of modifying genetic pathways. We must not forget that athletes are forbidden to use illegal substances to increase their performance. Governments must consider all the pros and cons of genetic engineering before deciding whether its use in the military and other forces would be truly advantageous. (The author is a Wing Commander Retd) (This article was first published on The DNA. Read the original article.) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Opinion: Creating ‘super soldiers’ through enhancement technologies

On August 4 this year, President Maduro of Venezuela came under an unsuccessful drone attack while delivering a speech in Caracas. He was quickly hustled off stage by the security staff. It came to light later that Maduro was targeted by two small drones one detonated near the venue, while the other crashed, causing a fire. A dissident group called ‘Soldiers in T-shirts’ claimed responsibility for the attack.

Experts are of the view that the M600-model drones used in Venezuela would have cost as little as $8,000 a piece and were strong enough to deliver a powerful payload and fast enough to cover the length of a football field in less than seven seconds. The incident marked the first drone attack by a Non-State Armed Group (NSAGs) on a head of state. Since drones are becoming common it is only a matter of time before it happens again.

The Islamic State (IS) was first terror group to use drones to attack military and civilian targets. It is considered that the IS’s black-market drones are still the most technologically advanced in the world.&nbsp

Most are fixed-wing units with a range of more than 60 miles. These drones can drop grenades on their targets and return to the pilot to be loaded again and re-used. Other NSAGs that have drone capabilities include Houthi Rebels, the Iran-backed rebel group in Yemen Hezbollah, a Lebanese militant group Hamas, the Palestinian group which rules the Gaza strip the Syrian rebel groups the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and Colombian and Mexican drug cartels active in Central Mexico.

In January 2017, the IS released a propaganda video showing nearly a dozen examples of releasing munitions on its enemies from the air with a fair degree of accuracy via quadcopter drones that it had modified. The Islamic State’s drone programme reportedly owes its success to two Bangladeshi brothers who have joined the NSAG. They have acquired dual-use components from their contacts based in the UK, Spain and Bangladesh. The lethal capabilities of drones can be enhanced by putting together cheap, easily acquired add-on components. For instance, quadcopter drones can be developed to carry lethal quantities of explosives. Multiple drones carrying small quantities of explosives can be used to create greater confusion in public gatherings.

The demand for drones has increased rapidly in the last few years and is expected to continue to grow in the coming years. In the last 10-15 years, the production, proliferation and use of drones has seen a major increase. Nearly 90 countries have acquired small and large drones and estimations are that by 2024, every country will have the capacity to use armed drones, thus making proliferation to NSAGs easier. Hobby shops and private firms are selling large and robust drones for a range of civilian and agricultural purposes. The devices are able to carry a wide variety of payloads, such as cameras, sensors and lifting mechanism. These drones could be modified by NSAGs to carry explosive devices such as hand-grenades, IEDs or even chemical or biological weapons. In January this year, Russia responded to an attack by a swarm of drones on its airbase in north-western Syria and a naval station on the Mediterranean Sea. The multi-drone attack, which is suspected to have been launched by militants, is the first of its kind, representing a new threat from terrorist groups.

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which entered into force in December 2014, provides the highest possible common standard for regulating or improving the regulation of international trade in conventional arms and to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade/ diversion of conventional arms.

Article 6.3 of the ATT states, “A State Party shall not authorise any transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, if it has knowledge at the time of authorisation that the arms or items would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians protected as such, or other war crimes as defined by international agreements to which it is a Party.” However, this treaty would be of little help to control the acquisition of commercial drones by NSAGs.

We must not ignore the likely threat of small-scale drones being used by NSAGs, for which the security agencies must be prepared. The police and the armed forces will have to cope with adversaries equipped with different types and sizes of drones, both armed and unarmed. The French Air Force and the Netherlands National Police are using birds to hunt and catch drones that fly near nuclear power plants, airports, and official government buildings. 
 
We could also come up with similar measures and have robust regulations and export controls on the use and acquisition of drones, whether for civilian or military purposes. In April this year, the government announced a 13-member task force for the implementation of drone technology. This task force must make implementable recommendations for the Central and state governments, industry and research institutions. 
 
(The author is a retired Wing Commander)

(This article was first published on The DNA. Read the <a href="http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-have-drones-now-become-the-new-weapon-for-terrorists-2651506">original article</a>.)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

The Islamic State (IS) was first terror group to use drones to attack military and civilian targets. It is considered that the IS’s black-market drones are still the most technologically advanced in the world.

On August 4 this year, President Maduro of Venezuela came under an unsuccessful drone attack while delivering a speech in Caracas. He was quickly hustled off stage by the security staff. It came to light later that Maduro was targeted by two small drones one detonated near the venue, while the other crashed, causing a fire. A dissident group called ‘Soldiers in T-shirts’ claimed responsibility for the attack. Experts are of the view that the M600-model drones used in Venezuela would have cost as little as $8,000 a piece and were strong enough to deliver a powerful payload and fast enough to cover the length of a football field in less than seven seconds. The incident marked the first drone attack by a Non-State Armed Group (NSAGs) on a head of state. Since drones are becoming common it is only a matter of time before it happens again. The Islamic State (IS) was first terror group to use drones to attack military and civilian targets. It is considered that the IS’s black-market drones are still the most technologically advanced in the world. Most are fixed-wing units with a range of more than 60 miles. These drones can drop grenades on their targets and return to the pilot to be loaded again and re-used. Other NSAGs that have drone capabilities include Houthi Rebels, the Iran-backed rebel group in Yemen Hezbollah, a Lebanese militant group Hamas, the Palestinian group which rules the Gaza strip the Syrian rebel groups the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and Colombian and Mexican drug cartels active in Central Mexico. In January 2017, the IS released a propaganda video showing nearly a dozen examples of releasing munitions on its enemies from the air with a fair degree of accuracy via quadcopter drones that it had modified. The Islamic State’s drone programme reportedly owes its success to two Bangladeshi brothers who have joined the NSAG. They have acquired dual-use components from their contacts based in the UK, Spain and Bangladesh. The lethal capabilities of drones can be enhanced by putting together cheap, easily acquired add-on components. For instance, quadcopter drones can be developed to carry lethal quantities of explosives. Multiple drones carrying small quantities of explosives can be used to create greater confusion in public gatherings. The demand for drones has increased rapidly in the last few years and is expected to continue to grow in the coming years. In the last 10-15 years, the production, proliferation and use of drones has seen a major increase. Nearly 90 countries have acquired small and large drones and estimations are that by 2024, every country will have the capacity to use armed drones, thus making proliferation to NSAGs easier. Hobby shops and private firms are selling large and robust drones for a range of civilian and agricultural purposes. The devices are able to carry a wide variety of payloads, such as cameras, sensors and lifting mechanism. These drones could be modified by NSAGs to carry explosive devices such as hand-grenades, IEDs or even chemical or biological weapons. In January this year, Russia responded to an attack by a swarm of drones on its airbase in north-western Syria and a naval station on the Mediterranean Sea. The multi-drone attack, which is suspected to have been launched by militants, is the first of its kind, representing a new threat from terrorist groups. The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which entered into force in December 2014, provides the highest possible common standard for regulating or improving the regulation of international trade in conventional arms and to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade/ diversion of conventional arms. Article 6.3 of the ATT states, “A State Party shall not authorise any transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, if it has knowledge at the time of authorisation that the arms or items would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians protected as such, or other war crimes as defined by international agreements to which it is a Party.” However, this treaty would be of little help to control the acquisition of commercial drones by NSAGs. We must not ignore the likely threat of small-scale drones being used by NSAGs, for which the security agencies must be prepared. The police and the armed forces will have to cope with adversaries equipped with different types and sizes of drones, both armed and unarmed. The French Air Force and the Netherlands National Police are using birds to hunt and catch drones that fly near nuclear power plants, airports, and official government buildings. We could also come up with similar measures and have robust regulations and export controls on the use and acquisition of drones, whether for civilian or military purposes. In April this year, the government announced a 13-member task force for the implementation of drone technology. This task force must make implementable recommendations for the Central and state governments, industry and research institutions. (The author is a retired Wing Commander) (This article was first published on The DNA. Read the original article.) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Opinion: Have drones now become the new weapon for terrorists?

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