<p>On the occasion of 70th years of the establishment of the people’s republic of China, it is crucial to analyze the future direction in the thirteenth national people’s congress this week. The salient feature of this ongoing national congress signifies how the defence spending rate is outpacing economic growth rate despite ongoing tariff war and rising debts in belt and road projects in many parts of the world. In this background, with utmost importance, one needs to analyse the implications of defence spending and economic growth rates for the year 2019 and beyond.   &nbsp;</p>

<p>Recently, Chinese prime minister Li Keqiang announced a projected GDP growth rate between 6 per cent and 6.5 per cent in 2019. He himself, earlier on many counts, mentioned about the manipulation in provided provincial economic data and statistics. For this, perhaps Chinese meritocratic system needs to blamed, where the success of provincial leaders to climb the CCP hierarchy ladder is primarily based on the economic performance of their province. &nbsp;</p>

<p>Thanks to Brookings Institution which, in the latest report, mentions that in 2017, the actual Chinese GDP was $10.77 trillion with the GDP growth rate at 4.9 per cent. For the same period, however, the overstated official figures on Chinese GDP was $12.24 trillion with the GDP growth rate of 6.9 per cent.  &nbsp;</p>

<p>Capital Economics one of the leading independent economic research companies recently reveals that China’s actual growth rate will be around 4.5 per cent for the period of 2018-2022; 2.8 per cent for the period of 2023-2030; and 1.5 per cent in the following decade. Against this backdrop of economic slowdown, China is pursuing a sort of foreign-economic relations to reclaim centre-stage in world politics. In this regard, the two latest incidents are worth mentioning to understand the Chinese foreign policy decision-making process through a realist lens in world politics. &nbsp;</p>

<p>Sino-Indian relations have been always bumpier but, it seems that both countries somehow learned to safeguard their national interests in multilateral forums like the United Nations, World Trade Organisation, BRICS, and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. India is the first country, who refused to join belt and road initiative (BRI) on the ground of sovereignty concern in China-Pakistan economic corridor (CPEC) and non-transparency in dual-use (i.e. civil and military) infrastructure investments. One might argue that China is using terrorism as a foreign policy tool in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to maximise their geopolitical gains at the cost of the brutal killing of innocent civilians for example, China has put a technical hold fourth time on Pakistan-based UN-designated terrorist organisation Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) chief Masood Azhar.&nbsp;</p>

<p>China-Russia strategic partnership is not going through the best phase in their bilateral relationships too. In the latest event Gou Yunhai, a diplomat in the Chinese embassy of Moscow sent an offensive letter to the editorial team of Russian daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta (NG). In an attempt to curb the freedom of the Russian press, the diplomat demanded the immediate deletion of the published article regarding slowdown of the Chinese economy. Moreover, he also threatened the author of the published piece, Anastasia Bashkatova, deputy head of the economics department of the NG to put on the blacklist as a punishment to deny the possibility of any future visit to China. In the published piece, she mentioned about possible forthcoming social instability due to rising unemployment and poor health-care facilities in China. Then after referred the period between 2010 and 2018, where Chinese growth rate slowed down from 10.6 per cent to 6.6 per cent in accordance with the international monetary funds. Furthermore, she highlighted that due to fall in exports, unavailability of cheap labour and low domestic demands, this declining economic trend is going to be continued in the coming years too.  &nbsp;</p>

<p>Another takeaway is regarding the official Chinese narrative of slowing defence spending when indigenous military modernisation programme is in full swing. In 2019, China’s defence spending allocation is $177.5 billion in comparison with $750 billion for the US military budget. However, many believe that the actual Chinese defence spending is three times more than the official statistics for any given year. International Institute for Strategic Studies 2018 report mentions that China has launched more indigenous submarines, warships, amphibious vessels and auxiliaries than the total number of ships currently serving in the navies of Germany, India, Spain, Taiwan and the United Kingdom. An introduction of indigenous twin-engine J-20 stealth fighter has added another feather in the Chinese air power cap.  &nbsp;</p>

<p>Russian daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta (NG) quoted Wang Yongfei, a Chinese defence expert that despite the ongoing tariff war, China will not cut the budget for 04 aircraft carriers scheduled to be deployed by 2022. Many Russian strategic experts believe that with such large-scale financing, almost four times Russian defence spending, China has the potential to overtake Russia in terms of military power in the foreseeable future.  &nbsp;</p>

<p>In the backdrop of growing Chinese military prowess, hence one should ponder about some important questions: To what extent, China has leverage in political interference of the liberal democratic world order? Does China really need a military alliance to reclaim a centre-stage in world politics? Is China destined to fall into Thucydides’ trap? What will be the status of freedom of navigation in south china sea, east china sea, Taiwan Strait and Indo-pacific region in the future? Indeed, interesting times are ahead however, at this critical moment one can conclude the uncertainty in world politics is the only certain thing.&nbsp;<br />
<br />
<em>(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)</em></p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>


On the occasion of 70th years of the establishment of the people’s republic of China, it is crucial to analyze the future direction in the thirteenth national people’s congress this week.

On the occasion of 70th years of the establishment of the people’s republic of China, it is crucial to analyze the future direction in the thirteenth national people’s congress this week. The salient feature of this ongoing national congress signifies how the defence spending rate is outpacing economic growth rate despite ongoing tariff war and rising debts in belt and road projects in many parts of the world. In this background, with utmost importance, one needs to analyse the implications of defence spending and economic growth rates for the year 2019 and beyond.    Recently, Chinese prime minister Li Keqiang announced a projected GDP growth rate between 6 per cent and 6.5 per cent in 2019. He himself, earlier on many counts, mentioned about the manipulation in provided provincial economic data and statistics. For this, perhaps Chinese meritocratic system needs to blamed, where the success of provincial leaders to climb the CCP hierarchy ladder is primarily based on the economic performance of their province.  Thanks to Brookings Institution which, in the latest report, mentions that in 2017, the actual Chinese GDP was $10.77 trillion with the GDP growth rate at 4.9 per cent. For the same period, however, the overstated official figures on Chinese GDP was $12.24 trillion with the GDP growth rate of 6.9 per cent.   Capital Economics one of the leading independent economic research companies recently reveals that China’s actual growth rate will be around 4.5 per cent for the period of 2018-2022; 2.8 per cent for the period of 2023-2030; and 1.5 per cent in the following decade. Against this backdrop of economic slowdown, China is pursuing a sort of foreign-economic relations to reclaim centre-stage in world politics. In this regard, the two latest incidents are worth mentioning to understand the Chinese foreign policy decision-making process through a realist lens in world politics.  Sino-Indian relations have been always bumpier but, it seems that both countries somehow learned to safeguard their national interests in multilateral forums like the United Nations, World Trade Organisation, BRICS, and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. India is the first country, who refused to join belt and road initiative (BRI) on the ground of sovereignty concern in China-Pakistan economic corridor (CPEC) and non-transparency in dual-use (i.e. civil and military) infrastructure investments. One might argue that China is using terrorism as a foreign policy tool in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to maximise their geopolitical gains at the cost of the brutal killing of innocent civilians for example, China has put a technical hold fourth time on Pakistan-based UN-designated terrorist organisation Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) chief Masood Azhar. China-Russia strategic partnership is not going through the best phase in their bilateral relationships too. In the latest event Gou Yunhai, a diplomat in the Chinese embassy of Moscow sent an offensive letter to the editorial team of Russian daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta (NG). In an attempt to curb the freedom of the Russian press, the diplomat demanded the immediate deletion of the published article regarding slowdown of the Chinese economy. Moreover, he also threatened the author of the published piece, Anastasia Bashkatova, deputy head of the economics department of the NG to put on the blacklist as a punishment to deny the possibility of any future visit to China. In the published piece, she mentioned about possible forthcoming social instability due to rising unemployment and poor health-care facilities in China. Then after referred the period between 2010 and 2018, where Chinese growth rate slowed down from 10.6 per cent to 6.6 per cent in accordance with the international monetary funds. Furthermore, she highlighted that due to fall in exports, unavailability of cheap labour and low domestic demands, this declining economic trend is going to be continued in the coming years too.   Another takeaway is regarding the official Chinese narrative of slowing defence spending when indigenous military modernisation programme is in full swing. In 2019, China’s defence spending allocation is $177.5 billion in comparison with $750 billion for the US military budget. However, many believe that the actual Chinese defence spending is three times more than the official statistics for any given year. International Institute for Strategic Studies 2018 report mentions that China has launched more indigenous submarines, warships, amphibious vessels and auxiliaries than the total number of ships currently serving in the navies of Germany, India, Spain, Taiwan and the United Kingdom. An introduction of indigenous twin-engine J-20 stealth fighter has added another feather in the Chinese air power cap.   Russian daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta (NG) quoted Wang Yongfei, a Chinese defence expert that despite the ongoing tariff war, China will not cut the budget for 04 aircraft carriers scheduled to be deployed by 2022. Many Russian strategic experts believe that with such large-scale financing, almost four times Russian defence spending, China has the potential to overtake Russia in terms of military power in the foreseeable future.   In the backdrop of growing Chinese military prowess, hence one should ponder about some important questions: To what extent, China has leverage in political interference of the liberal democratic world order? Does China really need a military alliance to reclaim a centre-stage in world politics? Is China destined to fall into Thucydides’ trap? What will be the status of freedom of navigation in south china sea, east china sea, Taiwan Strait and Indo-pacific region in the future? Indeed, interesting times are ahead however, at this critical moment one can conclude the uncertainty in world politics is the only certain thing. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Decoding China's objection to UN ban on JeM chief Masood Azhar

<p>According to the reports, the US envoy Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban negotiator Maulana Abdul Ghani Baradar negotiated a deal in Doha for the withdrawal of foreign troops from war-ravaged Afghanistan within 18 months.&nbsp;</p>

<p>This week, the US Director of National Intelligence, Dan Coats, warned about the possibility of an increase in the attacks by Taliban, Daesh/IS, TTP, and Al-Qaeda on the Afghan state and foreign forces.</p>

<p>At this moment, nobody is certain about the future of political uncertainty and peace process in Afghanistan. However, it seems that US President Donald Trump is quite right in his analysis of the Af-Pak policy. The US has given more than $33.4 billion to Pakistani army for the war on terror in Afghanistan.&nbsp;</p>

<p>On the contrary, the Pakistani army facilitated the safe passage of Osama bin Laden from Tora Bora mountains, Afghanistan to a residential army colony in Abbottabad, Pakistan.</p>

<p>In order to take leverage of the strategic depth in Afghanistan, the Pakistani army formally established diplomatic relations with the Taliban and helped Saudi Arabia and UAE to tie formal diplomatic relations with the Taliban.&nbsp;</p>

<p>Pakistani army did not hesitate to invite China against the US strategic interests in this region too. &nbsp;</p>

<p>Afghanistan has been always considered geopolitical chessboard, where the US, Afghan state, Taliban, the Pakistani army, and regional powers like Iran, India, China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, UAE are involved. In post-9/11 scenarios, despite several rounds of Afghan general elections, neither the roots of robust democracy took place nor did the Afghan national army and Afghan national police succeeded in taking back Taliban-controlled areas.</p>

<p>With the active support from Pakistani army, the Taliban not just survived over the years but also attacked the foreign forces and Afghan army bases in the last 17 years. According to Afghanistan deputy defence minister Hilaluddin Helal, there are currently 21 terrorist organisation with the strength of around 50200 militants, where Taliban is the biggest with 38000 militants. However, Daesh/IS has more than 2000 militants, which includes 70 per cent Pakistani, 6 per cent Uzbekistani, 4 per cent Chechens and 3 per cent Arabs.&nbsp;</p>

<p>Indeed, the Pakistani army is over joyous in the aftermath of the withdrawal of foreign forces and increased legitimacy of the Taliban in Afghanistan. But it would be highly premature to celebrate their political mileage at this moment because Afghan state, Afghan national army and Afghan police forces are still in place with the support of the US and regional players (Iran, India, Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, UAE) in the peacebuilding efforts and infrastructure development process in Afghanistan. &nbsp;</p>

<p>The history tells us that the Pakistani army relationship with Taliban has been full of ups and down. Some of the major incidents include the Taliban refusal to protect the Bamiyan Buddha and furthermore, it never agreed to recognise the Durand line between Afghanistan and North-West Frontier Pakistan - &nbsp;a colonial legacy indeed. The Taliban opened a political office in Doha, participated in a conference in Moscow, and above all is cultivating relationships with regional powers including Iran, Uzbekistan, Russia, China and the US. &nbsp;</p>

<p>In the long run, the Afghan economy will rely on the foreign aid and official developmental assistance by the regional powers. In order to boost bilateral trade with Afghanistan, many regional countries started air cargo transportation, while the Chabahar port will facilitate alternative trade routes to Afghanistan.</p>

<p>Consequently, the bilateral trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan has reached the lowest level in the last 17 years. Pakistan’s external financing has significantly dropped by over 60 per cent in the shape of loans and grants from July, 2018 to December, 2018, under the leadership of prime minister Imran Khan.&nbsp;</p>

<p>According to the UK-based advisory service Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), the real GDP growth to average 2.9 per cent per year from 2018-19 to 2022-23. The economic success story of Bangladesh proves that the root of Pakistani macroeconomic problems is not economic, but predominantly Pakistani army’s obsession with strategic and military adventurism under which terrorism is an instrument to exploit the so-called strategic depth in the Afghan theatre.&nbsp;</p>

<p>In short, harbouring and sponsoring terrorist groups has always been a policy of the successive selected governments under the diktat of Pakistan army.&nbsp;<br />
&nbsp;<br />
The Pakistani army has been a common source of concern for both Afghanistan and India. In order to understand its dominance in the Pakistani political system, one needs to remember that the Pakistani army has ruled for more than 33 years out of 70 years. Pakistani defence allocation in general budget constitutes over 34 per cent without any audit and scrutiny.&nbsp;</p>

<p>Indeed, the Pakistani army is more a&nbsp;problem rather than the solution. Therefore, Indian interests in Afghanistan are two-fold, directed towards Afghan led-peace process on the one hand, while reducing the abilities of the Pakistani army to operate cross-border terrorism on the other.</p>

<p>Indeed, regional powers have a common concern with regards to Daesh/IS, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Al-Qaeda, East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), and Taliban. In the growing face of any one of these terrorist groups in the Afghan, the theatre would bring a whole new level of action and reactions. On these backdrops, one needs to ask these critical questions: How to build an inclusive, pluralistic Afghan state, whose future hinges on democracy, economic development and human rights? Can Taliban and Afghan state devise a mechanism to work together? In the absence of foreign forces, how effective the Pakistani army would be in Afghan state affairs? &nbsp;</p>

<p>India’s Afghanistan policy is oriented towards Afghan-led, Afghan-controlled, Afghan-owned peace process, which in reality will be a true representative of Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras. Since 2002, India has given over $3 billion foreign aid to Afghanistan.&nbsp;</p>

<p>In order to strengthen the Afghan army, India has promised to give four Mi-25 attack helicopters before July, 2019. India has built roads, schools. Dams (Salma dam and proposed Shahtoot dam), and even Afghan parliament. Indian developmental assistance can be summarised in five categories - infrastructure development, economic development, humanitarian assistance, connectivity and capacity building projects.&nbsp;</p>

<p>In conclusion, perhaps the best possible Indian approach to the Afghan crisis lies in the combination of both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. India-Central Asia-Afghan trilateral meet and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) can be very effective platforms to strengthen the Afghan state. &nbsp;</p>

<p><em>(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)</em></p>


According to the reports, the US envoy Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban negotiator Maulana Abdul Ghani Baradar negotiated a deal in Doha for the withdrawal of foreign troops from war-ravaged Afghanistan within 18 months.

According to the reports, the US envoy Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban negotiator Maulana Abdul Ghani Baradar negotiated a deal in Doha for the withdrawal of foreign troops from war-ravaged Afghanistan within 18 months. This week, the US Director of National Intelligence, Dan Coats, warned about the possibility of an increase in the attacks by Taliban, Daesh/IS, TTP, and Al-Qaeda on the Afghan state and foreign forces. At this moment, nobody is certain about the future of political uncertainty and peace process in Afghanistan. However, it seems that US President Donald Trump is quite right in his analysis of the Af-Pak policy. The US has given more than $33.4 billion to Pakistani army for the war on terror in Afghanistan. On the contrary, the Pakistani army facilitated the safe passage of Osama bin Laden from Tora Bora mountains, Afghanistan to a residential army colony in Abbottabad, Pakistan. In order to take leverage of the strategic depth in Afghanistan, the Pakistani army formally established diplomatic relations with the Taliban and helped Saudi Arabia and UAE to tie formal diplomatic relations with the Taliban. Pakistani army did not hesitate to invite China against the US strategic interests in this region too. Afghanistan has been always considered geopolitical chessboard, where the US, Afghan state, Taliban, the Pakistani army, and regional powers like Iran, India, China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, UAE are involved. In post-9/11 scenarios, despite several rounds of Afghan general elections, neither the roots of robust democracy took place nor did the Afghan national army and Afghan national police succeeded in taking back Taliban-controlled areas. With the active support from Pakistani army, the Taliban not just survived over the years but also attacked the foreign forces and Afghan army bases in the last 17 years. According to Afghanistan deputy defence minister Hilaluddin Helal, there are currently 21 terrorist organisation with the strength of around 50200 militants, where Taliban is the biggest with 38000 militants. However, Daesh/IS has more than 2000 militants, which includes 70 per cent Pakistani, 6 per cent Uzbekistani, 4 per cent Chechens and 3 per cent Arabs. Indeed, the Pakistani army is over joyous in the aftermath of the withdrawal of foreign forces and increased legitimacy of the Taliban in Afghanistan. But it would be highly premature to celebrate their political mileage at this moment because Afghan state, Afghan national army and Afghan police forces are still in place with the support of the US and regional players (Iran, India, Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, UAE) in the peacebuilding efforts and infrastructure development process in Afghanistan. The history tells us that the Pakistani army relationship with Taliban has been full of ups and down. Some of the major incidents include the Taliban refusal to protect the Bamiyan Buddha and furthermore, it never agreed to recognise the Durand line between Afghanistan and North-West Frontier Pakistan - a colonial legacy indeed. The Taliban opened a political office in Doha, participated in a conference in Moscow, and above all is cultivating relationships with regional powers including Iran, Uzbekistan, Russia, China and the US. In the long run, the Afghan economy will rely on the foreign aid and official developmental assistance by the regional powers. In order to boost bilateral trade with Afghanistan, many regional countries started air cargo transportation, while the Chabahar port will facilitate alternative trade routes to Afghanistan. Consequently, the bilateral trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan has reached the lowest level in the last 17 years. Pakistan’s external financing has significantly dropped by over 60 per cent in the shape of loans and grants from July, 2018 to December, 2018, under the leadership of prime minister Imran Khan. According to the UK-based advisory service Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), the real GDP growth to average 2.9 per cent per year from 2018-19 to 2022-23. The economic success story of Bangladesh proves that the root of Pakistani macroeconomic problems is not economic, but predominantly Pakistani army’s obsession with strategic and military adventurism under which terrorism is an instrument to exploit the so-called strategic depth in the Afghan theatre. In short, harbouring and sponsoring terrorist groups has always been a policy of the successive selected governments under the diktat of Pakistan army. The Pakistani army has been a common source of concern for both Afghanistan and India. In order to understand its dominance in the Pakistani political system, one needs to remember that the Pakistani army has ruled for more than 33 years out of 70 years. Pakistani defence allocation in general budget constitutes over 34 per cent without any audit and scrutiny. Indeed, the Pakistani army is more a problem rather than the solution. Therefore, Indian interests in Afghanistan are two-fold, directed towards Afghan led-peace process on the one hand, while reducing the abilities of the Pakistani army to operate cross-border terrorism on the other. Indeed, regional powers have a common concern with regards to Daesh/IS, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Al-Qaeda, East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), and Taliban. In the growing face of any one of these terrorist groups in the Afghan, the theatre would bring a whole new level of action and reactions. On these backdrops, one needs to ask these critical questions: How to build an inclusive, pluralistic Afghan state, whose future hinges on democracy, economic development and human rights? Can Taliban and Afghan state devise a mechanism to work together? In the absence of foreign forces, how effective the Pakistani army would be in Afghan state affairs? India’s Afghanistan policy is oriented towards Afghan-led, Afghan-controlled, Afghan-owned peace process, which in reality will be a true representative of Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras. Since 2002, India has given over $3 billion foreign aid to Afghanistan. In order to strengthen the Afghan army, India has promised to give four Mi-25 attack helicopters before July, 2019. India has built roads, schools. Dams (Salma dam and proposed Shahtoot dam), and even Afghan parliament. Indian developmental assistance can be summarised in five categories - infrastructure development, economic development, humanitarian assistance, connectivity and capacity building projects. In conclusion, perhaps the best possible Indian approach to the Afghan crisis lies in the combination of both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. India-Central Asia-Afghan trilateral meet and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) can be very effective platforms to strengthen the Afghan state. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

India’s Afghanistan policy: What needs to be done

<p>The year 2018 marked a shift in China debate from “Cooperation to Competition” in the media and academia around the world. It all began in March, 2018 when National People’s Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) extended Xi Jinping’s presidential term indefinitely.&nbsp;</p>

<p>Xi’s signature project Belt and Road initiative (BRI), a Chinese grand strategy to reclaim centre stage in world affairs through economic trade and infrastructure investments, has faced criticism because of its 'debt-trap diplomacy'.<br />
<br />
In last five years,&nbsp;China has built seaports which can be used for both civilian and military usage, hence, it is going to increase Chinese strategic influence on many critical choke points and sea lanes of communications along the shipping routes of the world.&nbsp;</p>

<p>According to the Lowy Institute’s Asian Power Index 2018, China is evaluated as an Asian superpower, enjoying the superpower status with the US in Asia. On the account of these major backdrops, Trump administration started a tariff war for middle income trapped Chinese economy, where GDP to debt ratio is now believed to be more than 300 per cent, a dangerous sign indeed.&nbsp;</p>

<p>This tariff war has started to look uglier in the light of geo-technological competition between the US and China as one can see in the case of Chinese telecom giants Huawei and ZTE. Over the years, the Chinese 'one-party system' maintained their political legitimacy based on the Han-nationalism and export-driven economic development. It is interesting to watch how CCP will use Han-nationalism especially when tariff war has started to bite the future prospects of economic growth in general.</p>

<p>Last week, Xi’s speech on the occasion of 70th anniversary of&nbsp;the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC), stirred a fresh round of debate and discussion regarding the future of “one country and two systems” of Taiwan under 1992 consensus. Indeed, Taiwan has always been China’s Achilles Hills. &nbsp;</p>

<p>During her 2019 new year speech, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, leader of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), warned city and county officials to take caution in talks with Chinese authority, after pro-China opposition Kuomintang (KMP) won a local election in November, 2018.&nbsp;</p>

<p>Thanks to the democratic dividend in Taiwan, both popular Taiwanese political leaders, Tsai Ing-wen (DPP) and Ma Ying-jeou (KMT) rejected Chinese President Xi’s proposal of “one country and two systems” under 1992 consensus.&nbsp;</p>

<p>Even former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou disputed the Chinese interpretation of 1992 consensus. Both major political parties, DPP and KMT are willing to enter into discussion with Xi administration, but without any Chinese precondition. In order to have a comprehensive understanding of the political situation, however, one must need to understand the legal nature of Taiwan’s constitutional order too. Any proposed amendment towards the Independence of Taiwan will require constitutional amendments.<br />
<br />
It is a daunting task, therefore, to take the opposition parties on board with the ruling parties, which requires the approval of three-quarters of the members of the Legislative Yuan and endorsement of over half of eligible voters of Taiwan. These political scenarios pose some serious questions, which need to be analysed in the near future: Prior to the 20th party congress of CCP, can Xi administration be able to “reunify” Taiwan forcefully? Why there is a clash of interpretations on “1992 consensus” between China and Taiwan? How fundamentally “1992 Consensus” is different from “One China policy”? What are those historical trajectories, which led to creating complicated political scenarios in Taiwan? How crucial will be the role of local Taiwanese people in deciding the future of Taiwan? Based on the analysis of the above mentioned geopolitical and geo-economic realities in the Indo-pacific region, one cannot ignore the crucial role of the superpowers in deciding the political future of Taiwan. &nbsp;</p>

<p>No doubt, the US has far superior military might than the Chinese military. The US Navy is equivalent to the next thirteen Navies put together, while the US defence budget is equal to the next seven largest national defence budgets in the world. On January 1, 2019, Trump administration signed Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA), signalling the US Congress alignment for reinvigorating the US alliance and cultivating emerging regional partnerships for the Indo-Pacific region. Earlier in March, 2018, Trump administration passed the Taiwan Travel Act (TTA) for high-level diplomatic exchanges between the US and Taiwan. Though the US supports 'One China policy', the catch here is the very definition of the term “One China” for both countries. Later in June, 2018, the US established a de facto embassy along with 400 staffs in Taipei. The US has already normalised the arms sales to Taiwan.&nbsp;</p>

<p>The US Navy has run freedom of navigation three times in the international water of Taiwan Strait. By all account, Sino-US bilateral relation certainly cannot be described as one of the best phases. &nbsp;</p>

<p>In conclusion, the need of the hour is the use&nbsp;of political wisdom by all three parties involved in the Taiwan crisis namely China, Taiwan and the US. One must need to avoid any sort of armed conflict to resolve this crisis. It is only through dialogue, discussion and proper consultation by keeping consideration of local people’s opinion in Taiwan, peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region can be restored. &nbsp;<br />
<br />
<em>(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)</em></p>


The year 2018 marked a shift in China debate from “Cooperation to Competition” in the media and academia around the world. It all began in March, 2018 when National People’s Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) extended Xi Jinping’s presidential term indefinitely.

The year 2018 marked a shift in China debate from “Cooperation to Competition” in the media and academia around the world. It all began in March, 2018 when National People’s Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) extended Xi Jinping’s presidential term indefinitely. Xi’s signature project Belt and Road initiative (BRI), a Chinese grand strategy to reclaim centre stage in world affairs through economic trade and infrastructure investments, has faced criticism because of its 'debt-trap diplomacy'. In last five years, China has built seaports which can be used for both civilian and military usage, hence, it is going to increase Chinese strategic influence on many critical choke points and sea lanes of communications along the shipping routes of the world. According to the Lowy Institute’s Asian Power Index 2018, China is evaluated as an Asian superpower, enjoying the superpower status with the US in Asia. On the account of these major backdrops, Trump administration started a tariff war for middle income trapped Chinese economy, where GDP to debt ratio is now believed to be more than 300 per cent, a dangerous sign indeed. This tariff war has started to look uglier in the light of geo-technological competition between the US and China as one can see in the case of Chinese telecom giants Huawei and ZTE. Over the years, the Chinese 'one-party system' maintained their political legitimacy based on the Han-nationalism and export-driven economic development. It is interesting to watch how CCP will use Han-nationalism especially when tariff war has started to bite the future prospects of economic growth in general. Last week, Xi’s speech on the occasion of 70th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC), stirred a fresh round of debate and discussion regarding the future of “one country and two systems” of Taiwan under 1992 consensus. Indeed, Taiwan has always been China’s Achilles Hills. During her 2019 new year speech, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, leader of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), warned city and county officials to take caution in talks with Chinese authority, after pro-China opposition Kuomintang (KMP) won a local election in November, 2018. Thanks to the democratic dividend in Taiwan, both popular Taiwanese political leaders, Tsai Ing-wen (DPP) and Ma Ying-jeou (KMT) rejected Chinese President Xi’s proposal of “one country and two systems” under 1992 consensus. Even former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou disputed the Chinese interpretation of 1992 consensus. Both major political parties, DPP and KMT are willing to enter into discussion with Xi administration, but without any Chinese precondition. In order to have a comprehensive understanding of the political situation, however, one must need to understand the legal nature of Taiwan’s constitutional order too. Any proposed amendment towards the Independence of Taiwan will require constitutional amendments. It is a daunting task, therefore, to take the opposition parties on board with the ruling parties, which requires the approval of three-quarters of the members of the Legislative Yuan and endorsement of over half of eligible voters of Taiwan. These political scenarios pose some serious questions, which need to be analysed in the near future: Prior to the 20th party congress of CCP, can Xi administration be able to “reunify” Taiwan forcefully? Why there is a clash of interpretations on “1992 consensus” between China and Taiwan? How fundamentally “1992 Consensus” is different from “One China policy”? What are those historical trajectories, which led to creating complicated political scenarios in Taiwan? How crucial will be the role of local Taiwanese people in deciding the future of Taiwan? Based on the analysis of the above mentioned geopolitical and geo-economic realities in the Indo-pacific region, one cannot ignore the crucial role of the superpowers in deciding the political future of Taiwan. No doubt, the US has far superior military might than the Chinese military. The US Navy is equivalent to the next thirteen Navies put together, while the US defence budget is equal to the next seven largest national defence budgets in the world. On January 1, 2019, Trump administration signed Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA), signalling the US Congress alignment for reinvigorating the US alliance and cultivating emerging regional partnerships for the Indo-Pacific region. Earlier in March, 2018, Trump administration passed the Taiwan Travel Act (TTA) for high-level diplomatic exchanges between the US and Taiwan. Though the US supports 'One China policy', the catch here is the very definition of the term “One China” for both countries. Later in June, 2018, the US established a de facto embassy along with 400 staffs in Taipei. The US has already normalised the arms sales to Taiwan. The US Navy has run freedom of navigation three times in the international water of Taiwan Strait. By all account, Sino-US bilateral relation certainly cannot be described as one of the best phases. In conclusion, the need of the hour is the use of political wisdom by all three parties involved in the Taiwan crisis namely China, Taiwan and the US. One must need to avoid any sort of armed conflict to resolve this crisis. It is only through dialogue, discussion and proper consultation by keeping consideration of local people’s opinion in Taiwan, peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region can be restored. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

China’s Taiwan conundrum: New year, old challenges

<p>With the increasing great power competition in the Indo-pacific region, the Indo-US ties have become a necessity more than ever. In the last two decades, US has become a ‘strategic partner’ from the ‘partner of choice’ due to increasing strategic Chinese influence in South Asia and South-East Asia.&nbsp;</p>

<p>Indo-US ties, however, have a different set of priorities for both countries.&nbsp;</p>

<p>For India, this deepening tie is about building a generational partnership to achieve the strategic milestone. India wants to put ASEAN countries at the center for Indo-Pacific Strategy and the QUAD alliance because India does not want to become a frontal state in a Sino-US ongoing trade war and geopolitical competition, to lose strategic autonomy in their foreign policy decision-making process.</p>

<p>In fact, China is not leaving any stone unturned to make strategic inroads in South Asia and Indian Ocean region by both building defence infrastructure on the Indian side of the border, attempting to alter the territorial status quo, not just selling nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan, but arms and weapons to other South Asian and South-East Asian neighbors too, which is a cause of concern for Indian strategic interests.</p>

<p>In this context, what are the choices India actually have? In order to get a clear understanding, let’s revisit Indo-US strategic partnership in last two decades and how the multi-aligned Indian foreign policy is doing every bit possible to make both an inclusive Indo-Pacific region and multipolar world order. Indo-US Strategic partnership revolves around four foundational defence agreements namely General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCAST), and Basic Exchange Agreement (BECA). India, however, already signed three out of four agreements, along with the ongoing negotiation on BECA because it involves sharing of critical geographical intelligence which includes satellite imagery and topographical data.&nbsp;</p>

<p>With the 9/11 attack in 2001 and ‘War on Terror’ operations, the US started to realise the strategic importance of India in the Asia-Pacific region.&nbsp;</p>

<p>India has been a long victim of cross-border terrorism and raised consistently voices against terrorism at several multilateral and regional forums for last many decades. It was the year 2002 when India signed the first foundational defence agreement - GSOMIA, which cleared the path of Indo-US strategic partnership for the coming decades. After a lot of public debate and deliberations, ‘Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal 2005’ was concluded, despite the non-signatory status of India in Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).<br />
<br />
In 2009, India signed End User Monitoring Agreement (EUMA) which cleared the way to the procurement of US&nbsp;defence equipment after extended negotiations to ensure that will kept intrusive and monitoring American inspectors away from Indian military bases. After this, India started to engage in bilateral trade discussions with the US in 2012, which is commonly known as the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI). Since then the projectile of the Indo-US bilateral relationship is in an upward trajectory. &nbsp;</p>

<p>After a long wait of fourteen years, it was the year 2016 when India signed the second defence foundational agreement - LEMOA, to facilitate port calls, joint military exercises, training, disaster relief operations and bilateral access to logistical facilities on the case to case basis. The US immediately recognized India as a major defence partner under the ‘National Defense Authorization Act, 2019’. On October 24, 2017, India signed Helicopter Support Other than Aircraft Carriers (HOSTAC) agreement with the US at the sideline of ASEAN Defense Ministers Meet in Manila. &nbsp;</p>

<p>Within a year, India was granted ‘Strategic Trade Authorization-1’ status on July 30, 2018, which will be facilitating in the export of both defence and high technology products without the requirement of the individual license. This will be led to increased interoperability, reduce time-management and required resources within the US system to get more streamlined licensing approved at earliest. For the US, India is now at par with three allies namely Japan, South Korea, and Australia plus North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies for the sale of hi-tech critical arms and weapons including combat and communications platforms.&nbsp;</p>

<p>Within the time span of three months, India signed third foundational defence agreement - COMCASA during 2+2 Indo-US meet, which will allow secure peacetime and wartime communication with its proprietary encrypted communications equipment and systems between Indian and US military assets including aircraft and ships. It's just a matter of time when after signing of fourth foundational defence agreement – BECA, US would be able to set a framework through which both countries can share sensitive data to aid targeting and navigation with India.&nbsp;</p>

<p>All these developments can be understood effectively in the light of this question that why India’s major dependence on Russian arms import needs to be changed? In the current geopolitical context, confident India is equally giving importance to diversify their arms basket from US, Russia, France, Israel, and others. In addition, US agreed to establish a Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) in Bengaluru to design the arms and weapons under the Make-in-India Initiative, which highlight this fact that Indo-US strategic partnership is futuristic in nature.<br />
<br />
US supported India in getting membership in three out of four non-proliferation regimes namely the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), Australia Group (AG). It is just a matter of time when India will be a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which actually shows the level of strategic convergence in an Indo-US bilateral relationship. In a nutshell, deepening Indo-US ties highlights that India wants to keep their strategic option open and multi-aligned in this multipolar world order.&nbsp;</p>

<p><em>(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)</em></p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>


In the current geopolitical context, confident India is equally giving importance to diversify their arms basket from US, Russia, France, Israel, and others

With the increasing great power competition in the Indo-pacific region, the Indo-US ties have become a necessity more than ever. In the last two decades, US has become a ‘strategic partner’ from the ‘partner of choice’ due to increasing strategic Chinese influence in South Asia and South-East Asia. Indo-US ties, however, have a different set of priorities for both countries. For India, this deepening tie is about building a generational partnership to achieve the strategic milestone. India wants to put ASEAN countries at the center for Indo-Pacific Strategy and the QUAD alliance because India does not want to become a frontal state in a Sino-US ongoing trade war and geopolitical competition, to lose strategic autonomy in their foreign policy decision-making process. In fact, China is not leaving any stone unturned to make strategic inroads in South Asia and Indian Ocean region by both building defence infrastructure on the Indian side of the border, attempting to alter the territorial status quo, not just selling nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan, but arms and weapons to other South Asian and South-East Asian neighbors too, which is a cause of concern for Indian strategic interests. In this context, what are the choices India actually have? In order to get a clear understanding, let’s revisit Indo-US strategic partnership in last two decades and how the multi-aligned Indian foreign policy is doing every bit possible to make both an inclusive Indo-Pacific region and multipolar world order. Indo-US Strategic partnership revolves around four foundational defence agreements namely General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCAST), and Basic Exchange Agreement (BECA). India, however, already signed three out of four agreements, along with the ongoing negotiation on BECA because it involves sharing of critical geographical intelligence which includes satellite imagery and topographical data. With the 9/11 attack in 2001 and ‘War on Terror’ operations, the US started to realise the strategic importance of India in the Asia-Pacific region. India has been a long victim of cross-border terrorism and raised consistently voices against terrorism at several multilateral and regional forums for last many decades. It was the year 2002 when India signed the first foundational defence agreement - GSOMIA, which cleared the path of Indo-US strategic partnership for the coming decades. After a lot of public debate and deliberations, ‘Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal 2005’ was concluded, despite the non-signatory status of India in Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In 2009, India signed End User Monitoring Agreement (EUMA) which cleared the way to the procurement of US defence equipment after extended negotiations to ensure that will kept intrusive and monitoring American inspectors away from Indian military bases. After this, India started to engage in bilateral trade discussions with the US in 2012, which is commonly known as the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI). Since then the projectile of the Indo-US bilateral relationship is in an upward trajectory. After a long wait of fourteen years, it was the year 2016 when India signed the second defence foundational agreement - LEMOA, to facilitate port calls, joint military exercises, training, disaster relief operations and bilateral access to logistical facilities on the case to case basis. The US immediately recognized India as a major defence partner under the ‘National Defense Authorization Act, 2019’. On October 24, 2017, India signed Helicopter Support Other than Aircraft Carriers (HOSTAC) agreement with the US at the sideline of ASEAN Defense Ministers Meet in Manila. Within a year, India was granted ‘Strategic Trade Authorization-1’ status on July 30, 2018, which will be facilitating in the export of both defence and high technology products without the requirement of the individual license. This will be led to increased interoperability, reduce time-management and required resources within the US system to get more streamlined licensing approved at earliest. For the US, India is now at par with three allies namely Japan, South Korea, and Australia plus North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies for the sale of hi-tech critical arms and weapons including combat and communications platforms. Within the time span of three months, India signed third foundational defence agreement - COMCASA during 2+2 Indo-US meet, which will allow secure peacetime and wartime communication with its proprietary encrypted communications equipment and systems between Indian and US military assets including aircraft and ships. It's just a matter of time when after signing of fourth foundational defence agreement – BECA, US would be able to set a framework through which both countries can share sensitive data to aid targeting and navigation with India. All these developments can be understood effectively in the light of this question that why India’s major dependence on Russian arms import needs to be changed? In the current geopolitical context, confident India is equally giving importance to diversify their arms basket from US, Russia, France, Israel, and others. In addition, US agreed to establish a Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) in Bengaluru to design the arms and weapons under the Make-in-India Initiative, which highlight this fact that Indo-US strategic partnership is futuristic in nature. US supported India in getting membership in three out of four non-proliferation regimes namely the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), Australia Group (AG). It is just a matter of time when India will be a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which actually shows the level of strategic convergence in an Indo-US bilateral relationship. In a nutshell, deepening Indo-US ties highlights that India wants to keep their strategic option open and multi-aligned in this multipolar world order. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Opinion: Indo-US deepening ties is about keeping strategic options open

<p>International trade is not just about economic development but, it has direct linkages with foreign and security policy because foreign-economic relations are inextricably linked and cannot be separated from each other. In these contexts, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is meant to safeguard the national interests of China.</p>

<p>The Made-in-China 2025 and Going-Out Strategy are two policies to attain ‘rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The Made-in-China 2025 plan is to lead cutting-edge technologies in the field from robotics and agricultural machinery to next-generation Information technology (IT) and new energy vehicles. And, China Inc’s ‘Going-Out Strategy’ is meant to promote, help and develop BRI projects successfully all around the world.&nbsp;</p>

<p>But, it would be interesting to see, how far these small neighbouring countries can afford to bargain Chinese investments in Indo-Pacific region? Last week, the Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad cancelled two Chinese BRI projects to build a gas pipeline and to construct a high-speed railway across the Malay Peninsula. &nbsp;</p>

<p>He also denied the selling of ‘Johor State’s apartments’ to Chinese nationals. So far, he has already suspended about $24 billion BRI projects including the East Coast Rail Link and three oil and gas pipelines in Malaysia. &nbsp;</p>

<p>Mahathir Mohamad has been an ardent critic of former Najib Razak’s government, who sealed many BRI projects in Malaysia. Under the Najib government, the ‘Forest City’s apartments’ were completed in 2017, where the current price starts at $170000, raises economic viability of these BRI projects. Furthermore, there is a high influx of Chinese buyers, environmental concerns, the impact of land reclamation on the local fishing industry and real estate oversupply. &nbsp;</p>

<p>In this backdrop, he specifically mentioned: "One thing is certain, that city that is going to be built cannot be sold to foreigners. We are not going to give visas for people to come and live here". During his visit to Beijing, Mahathir blamed ousted prime minister, Najib’s government for this situation and referred all these deals “stupid” multiple times.&nbsp;</p>

<p>He said: “We are not against Chinese companies, but we are against borrowing money from outside and having projects which are unnecessary, and which are very costly”. One can see clearly these BRI projects are manifestations of neo-colonialism and based on unequal treaties. &nbsp;</p>

<p>Small nation-states must differentiate between the BRI rhetoric and the political strings attached with Chinese BRI investments. The foreign direct investments (FDI) from India, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Australia can check and balance the Chinese strategic influence in the Indo-Pacific region.</p>

<p>In Myanmar, eighty nine firms from seventeen countries invested in the last couple of years specifically, hence Myanmar scaled back Chinese project in Kyauk Pyu deep water port (from $7.3 billion to around $1.3 billion) after the careful study of Chinese debt trap diplomacy in Sri Lanka and Pakistan.&nbsp;</p>

<p>Thailand is making more Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in border areas with Myanmar and expecting its trade with Myanmar and India in the backdrop of India’s Act East policy. Moreover, the increasing tariff barriers in midst of the US-China trade war forced many foreign MNCs from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, the USA to Cambodia, Vietnam and India, to relocate assembly plant out of China.&nbsp;</p>

<p>In conclusion, other political leaders must learn from the Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad’s political wisdom and have the courage to act against Chinese debt-trap diplomacy before it’s too late. Chinese BRI is a geo-political master stroke, which final aim is to establish the Chinese supremacy by building a world-class military in 2049.</p>

<p>In short, the Chinese debt-trap diplomacy is a carefully designed CCP’s magical tool to increase strategic influence for the Chinese supremacy in the Indo-Pacific region. &nbsp;</p>

<p><em>(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)</em></p>


Chinese BRI is a geo-political master stroke, which final aim is to establish the Chinese supremacy by building a world-class military in 2049.

International trade is not just about economic development but, it has direct linkages with foreign and security policy because foreign-economic relations are inextricably linked and cannot be separated from each other. In these contexts, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is meant to safeguard the national interests of China. The Made-in-China 2025 and Going-Out Strategy are two policies to attain ‘rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The Made-in-China 2025 plan is to lead cutting-edge technologies in the field from robotics and agricultural machinery to next-generation Information technology (IT) and new energy vehicles. And, China Inc’s ‘Going-Out Strategy’ is meant to promote, help and develop BRI projects successfully all around the world. But, it would be interesting to see, how far these small neighbouring countries can afford to bargain Chinese investments in Indo-Pacific region? Last week, the Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad cancelled two Chinese BRI projects to build a gas pipeline and to construct a high-speed railway across the Malay Peninsula. He also denied the selling of ‘Johor State’s apartments’ to Chinese nationals. So far, he has already suspended about $24 billion BRI projects including the East Coast Rail Link and three oil and gas pipelines in Malaysia. Mahathir Mohamad has been an ardent critic of former Najib Razak’s government, who sealed many BRI projects in Malaysia. Under the Najib government, the ‘Forest City’s apartments’ were completed in 2017, where the current price starts at $170000, raises economic viability of these BRI projects. Furthermore, there is a high influx of Chinese buyers, environmental concerns, the impact of land reclamation on the local fishing industry and real estate oversupply. In this backdrop, he specifically mentioned: "One thing is certain, that city that is going to be built cannot be sold to foreigners. We are not going to give visas for people to come and live here". During his visit to Beijing, Mahathir blamed ousted prime minister, Najib’s government for this situation and referred all these deals “stupid” multiple times. He said: “We are not against Chinese companies, but we are against borrowing money from outside and having projects which are unnecessary, and which are very costly”. One can see clearly these BRI projects are manifestations of neo-colonialism and based on unequal treaties. Small nation-states must differentiate between the BRI rhetoric and the political strings attached with Chinese BRI investments. The foreign direct investments (FDI) from India, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Australia can check and balance the Chinese strategic influence in the Indo-Pacific region. In Myanmar, eighty nine firms from seventeen countries invested in the last couple of years specifically, hence Myanmar scaled back Chinese project in Kyauk Pyu deep water port (from $7.3 billion to around $1.3 billion) after the careful study of Chinese debt trap diplomacy in Sri Lanka and Pakistan. Thailand is making more Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in border areas with Myanmar and expecting its trade with Myanmar and India in the backdrop of India’s Act East policy. Moreover, the increasing tariff barriers in midst of the US-China trade war forced many foreign MNCs from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, the USA to Cambodia, Vietnam and India, to relocate assembly plant out of China. In conclusion, other political leaders must learn from the Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad’s political wisdom and have the courage to act against Chinese debt-trap diplomacy before it’s too late. Chinese BRI is a geo-political master stroke, which final aim is to establish the Chinese supremacy by building a world-class military in 2049. In short, the Chinese debt-trap diplomacy is a carefully designed CCP’s magical tool to increase strategic influence for the Chinese supremacy in the Indo-Pacific region. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

BRI designed to strengthen China's strategic influence in Indo-Pacific region

<p>The US-Pakistan bilateral relations are witnessing a historic low and, the main reasons include the US-China trade war, Pakistan's proximity to China, Pakistani official policy of safe haven to terror groups in Pakistan, the US’s direct engagement with Taliban in Afghanistan, and reopening of talks with Uzbekistan for providing land access to Afghanistan.&nbsp;<br />
&nbsp;<br />
Washington has given more than $33 billion aid to Pakistan, while International Monetary Funds (IMF) financed as many as 14 programmes since 1980. But the recent reduction in US defence aid from $1 billion to $150 million annually and suspension of a decades-old military training programme for Pakistani officials at US institutions signals this fact that Pakistan is already into Chinese orbit.&nbsp; &nbsp;</p>

<p>Any further infusion of IMF loans to Pakistani economy would be actually the bailout of Chinese investments under China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). As a matter of facts, IMF has bailed out five times in the past and the largest bailout i.e. $6.7 billion was in 2013. Furthermore, Pakistan has been put on the grey list by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and currently facing heat to avoid black-listing in next FATF meeting &nbsp;scheduled in October, 2018, if fails to act against anti-terror financing.&nbsp; &nbsp;</p>

<p>In these contexts, the newly elected coalition government looks weak, where Imran Khan as a puppet of army does not exercise any significant control over the foreign ministry, and has been given the task to fix already sinking Pakistani economy.&nbsp; &nbsp;</p>

<p>Certainly, the Pakistani army is the real winner in this election, when European Union observers criticised the ground of lack of equality and mentioned conditions for fair elections in Pakistan worsened since the last vote in 2013. In fact, the new cabinet ministers in the Imran Khan led government proves this point quite significantly, when nine out of fifteen ministers, and three out of five advisers were senior officials in the General Pervez Musharraf led-army regime (1999-2007). Imran Khan-led coalition government has been given the task to fix the economy in order to avoid any sorts of international criticism and secure more international aid soon.&nbsp; &nbsp;</p>

<p>However, this civilian government, like earlier ones, does highlights that the three crucial moments usually start with ‘hope and watershed moment’, then move to ‘benefit of doubt moment’ for using pro-army narratives and slogans as a strategic tool to buy more time from International financial institutions, till the time they realise it’s a bit ‘unusual moment’.&nbsp;</p>

<p>India waited long for this moment in the US-Pakistan bilateral relations. Perhaps, this is one of the best times in modern history, when New Delhi can pull the best bargain out of the US-China trade war on the one side, and Russia-China strategic rivalry in Central Asia on the other. However, India should be careful to not loose its strategic autonomy by taking the side of any one state.&nbsp;</p>

<p>After all, national interests are paramount and New Delhi needs to maintain this pace for economic development and military modernisation for a decade at least. &nbsp;<br />
<br />
<em>&nbsp;(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)</em></p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>


The recent reduction in US defence aid from $1 billion to $150 million annually and suspension of a decades-old military training program for Pakistani officials at US institutions signals this fact that Pakistan is already into Chinese orbit.

The US-Pakistan bilateral relations are witnessing a historic low and, the main reasons include the US-China trade war, Pakistan's proximity to China, Pakistani official policy of safe haven to terror groups in Pakistan, the US’s direct engagement with Taliban in Afghanistan, and reopening of talks with Uzbekistan for providing land access to Afghanistan. Washington has given more than $33 billion aid to Pakistan, while International Monetary Funds (IMF) financed as many as 14 programmes since 1980. But the recent reduction in US defence aid from $1 billion to $150 million annually and suspension of a decades-old military training programme for Pakistani officials at US institutions signals this fact that Pakistan is already into Chinese orbit. Any further infusion of IMF loans to Pakistani economy would be actually the bailout of Chinese investments under China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). As a matter of facts, IMF has bailed out five times in the past and the largest bailout i.e. $6.7 billion was in 2013. Furthermore, Pakistan has been put on the grey list by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and currently facing heat to avoid black-listing in next FATF meeting scheduled in October, 2018, if fails to act against anti-terror financing. In these contexts, the newly elected coalition government looks weak, where Imran Khan as a puppet of army does not exercise any significant control over the foreign ministry, and has been given the task to fix already sinking Pakistani economy. Certainly, the Pakistani army is the real winner in this election, when European Union observers criticised the ground of lack of equality and mentioned conditions for fair elections in Pakistan worsened since the last vote in 2013. In fact, the new cabinet ministers in the Imran Khan led government proves this point quite significantly, when nine out of fifteen ministers, and three out of five advisers were senior officials in the General Pervez Musharraf led-army regime (1999-2007). Imran Khan-led coalition government has been given the task to fix the economy in order to avoid any sorts of international criticism and secure more international aid soon. However, this civilian government, like earlier ones, does highlights that the three crucial moments usually start with ‘hope and watershed moment’, then move to ‘benefit of doubt moment’ for using pro-army narratives and slogans as a strategic tool to buy more time from International financial institutions, till the time they realise it’s a bit ‘unusual moment’. India waited long for this moment in the US-Pakistan bilateral relations. Perhaps, this is one of the best times in modern history, when New Delhi can pull the best bargain out of the US-China trade war on the one side, and Russia-China strategic rivalry in Central Asia on the other. However, India should be careful to not loose its strategic autonomy by taking the side of any one state. After all, national interests are paramount and New Delhi needs to maintain this pace for economic development and military modernisation for a decade at least. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Opinion: US-Pakistan relations at a historic low

<p>Recently, concluded first plenum of 19th Congress of Communist Party of China (CPC) helped in consolidating Chinese President Xi Jinping position as a core leader, included his thought in the constitution of the party as Xi Jinping thought of Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era along with his ambitious Belt and Road Initiative(BRI); and finally his emphasis on Chinese military modernisation, where army must be controlled by the communist party of China.</p>

<p>Now, one needs to carefully analyse the implications of these developments for Indian strategic and security interests in particular and foreign policy in general. Indeed, Chinese President Xi Jinping is the third most influential political leader after Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping in Chinese political history. China has world&rsquo;s second largest GDP in nominal terms $11,199,145 and hence, no short of money for Chinese military modernisation.</p>

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<h5>As a chairman of Central Military Commission, Xi Jinping has reiterated &lsquo;basic mechanisation&rsquo; by 2020, &lsquo;complete modernisation&rsquo; by 2035; and finally having &lsquo;world-class military&rsquo; by 2050.</h5>
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<p>China has increased their military spending 118 per cent between 2007 and 2016 along with biggest military spender in Asia and Oceania. As the chairman of Central Military Commission (CMC), Chinese President Xi Jinping has reiterated &lsquo;basic mechanisation&rsquo; by 2020, &lsquo;complete modernisation&rsquo; by 2035&nbsp;and finally having &lsquo;world-class military&rsquo; by 2050. He also asked the people&rsquo;s liberation army (PLA) to be prepared for not just fight but win a war at any time.</p>

<p>In this background, it would be important to observe profiles of some important diplomats and military leaders. To begin with, one of the top diplomats, Yang Jiechi who is a state councillor; and special representative of India-China Border Dispute Talk Mechanism has been retained as a politburo and central committee (CC) member of the CPC.</p>

<p>The Central Committee (204 members) is the third largest decision-making body after Politburo Standing Committee (7-members PBSC) and Politburo (25 members including PBSC) of the CPC. It is also presumed that current foreign minister; Wang Yi will replace Yang Jiechi as a new state councillor and special representative in upcoming next plenum of 19th Congress of CPC in March-2018.</p>

<p>The head of Western Command of PLA in Sichuan, General Zhao Zongqi has been promoted as a central committee member. He is in-charge of India-China boundary disputes on the ground and played a very crucial role during 73-days long Doklam faceoff recently. General Xu Qiliang has been retained as a vice-chairman CMC of the CPC. The names of newly elected vice-chairman Zhang Youxia, and members of CMC are Wei Fenghe, Li Zuocheng, Miao Hua, Zhang Shengmini. It is to be noted that Chinese infrastructure development and logistics are in much better condition than Indian side of the border. China is also working on hi-speed train projects to these border areas with central parts of China.</p>

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<h5>Xi Jinping tries to build his legacy in next 30 years with the help of his ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a grand strategy of China.</h5>
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<p>One can say that Chinese President Xi Jinping tries to build his legacy in next 30 years with the help of his ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a grand strategy of China. The Chinese official argument behind BRI is that to build a world community of shared destiny based on the sovereignty and national interests of every country in the world.</p>

<p>But what we notice in the case of their sensitivities towards &lsquo;Indian sovereignty and national interests&rsquo; that despite Indian government repetitive protests, China is already involved in infrastructure development projects like construction of motorways, railways, bridges, tunnel and dams in the disputed Gilgit-Baltistan region of Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK), Pakistan. In fact, China started building Karakoram highways in 1957 to increase their strategic influence in this disputed PoK region. No doubt, China-Pakistan Military Nexus is a strategic reality, which has been done against India. Today, both Chinese and Pakistani armies do joint patrolling in the disputed PoK region.</p>

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<h5>With the help of BRI, China wants to increase their strategic influence in South Asia and Indian Ocean region.</h5>
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<p>With the help of BRI, China wants to increase their strategic influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. China is giving loans to India&rsquo;s neighbouring countries, such as Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Pakistan. China&rsquo;s new assertiveness towards South Asia and the Indian Ocean region is a manifestation of asymmetric military and economic capabilities between China and India.</p>

<p>One can witness this assertiveness and strategic signalling in the tone and tenor of psychological warfare and threatening and immature words used against India during the recent 73-days long Doklam faceoff. In fact, Doklam faceoff was an ad-hoc diplomatic victory because even Chinese PLA Major General Qiao Liang justified withdrawal of troops in order to secure strategic position and to host BRICS Xiament Summit 2017 between 3rd and 5th Sep-2017; and 19th congress of Chinese communist party between 18th and 25th Oct-2017.</p>

<p>These South Asian countries like Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Pakistan are already raising the concerns about repayment of Chinese loans and debts. There are some questions which need to be answered in this context. What if these south small Asian countries default on their repayment of Chinese loan and its high-interest rates?</p>

<p>If China is serious about building a world community of shared destiny based on the sovereignty and national interests then, why it did not consult all the participating countries before unilaterally setting the agendas for BRI forum at Beijing on 14-15 May 2017?</p>

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<h5>BRI is a Chinese initiative launched for safeguarding the Chinese strategic and national interests.</h5>
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<p>No doubt, BRI is a Chinese initiative launched for safeguarding the Chinese strategic and national interests. In the foreseeable future, one cannot discount the possibilities of another India-China boundary disputes because, in Chinese power calculus, India is considered as a junior power merely due to asymmetry in economic and military capabilities of both countries.</p>


Chinese initiative for safeguarding the Chinese strategic and national interests seem alarming for India

Recently, concluded first plenum of 19th Congress of Communist Party of China (CPC) helped in consolidating Chinese President Xi Jinping position as a core leader, included his thought in the constitution of the party as Xi Jinping thought of Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era along with his ambitious Belt and Road Initiative(BRI); and finally his emphasis on Chinese military modernisation, where army must be controlled by the communist party of China. Now, one needs to carefully analyse the implications of these developments for Indian strategic and security interests in particular and foreign policy in general. Indeed, Chinese President Xi Jinping is the third most influential political leader after Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping in Chinese political history. China has world’s second largest GDP in nominal terms $11,199,145 and hence, no short of money for Chinese military modernisation. As a chairman of Central Military Commission, Xi Jinping has reiterated ‘basic mechanisation’ by 2020, ‘complete modernisation’ by 2035; and finally having ‘world-class military’ by 2050. × China has increased their military spending 118 per cent between 2007 and 2016 along with biggest military spender in Asia and Oceania. As the chairman of Central Military Commission (CMC), Chinese President Xi Jinping has reiterated ‘basic mechanisation’ by 2020, ‘complete modernisation’ by 2035 and finally having ‘world-class military’ by 2050. He also asked the people’s liberation army (PLA) to be prepared for not just fight but win a war at any time. In this background, it would be important to observe profiles of some important diplomats and military leaders. To begin with, one of the top diplomats, Yang Jiechi who is a state councillor; and special representative of India-China Border Dispute Talk Mechanism has been retained as a politburo and central committee (CC) member of the CPC. The Central Committee (204 members) is the third largest decision-making body after Politburo Standing Committee (7-members PBSC) and Politburo (25 members including PBSC) of the CPC. It is also presumed that current foreign minister; Wang Yi will replace Yang Jiechi as a new state councillor and special representative in upcoming next plenum of 19th Congress of CPC in March-2018. The head of Western Command of PLA in Sichuan, General Zhao Zongqi has been promoted as a central committee member. He is in-charge of India-China boundary disputes on the ground and played a very crucial role during 73-days long Doklam faceoff recently. General Xu Qiliang has been retained as a vice-chairman CMC of the CPC. The names of newly elected vice-chairman Zhang Youxia, and members of CMC are Wei Fenghe, Li Zuocheng, Miao Hua, Zhang Shengmini. It is to be noted that Chinese infrastructure development and logistics are in much better condition than Indian side of the border. China is also working on hi-speed train projects to these border areas with central parts of China. Xi Jinping tries to build his legacy in next 30 years with the help of his ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a grand strategy of China. × One can say that Chinese President Xi Jinping tries to build his legacy in next 30 years with the help of his ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a grand strategy of China. The Chinese official argument behind BRI is that to build a world community of shared destiny based on the sovereignty and national interests of every country in the world. But what we notice in the case of their sensitivities towards ‘Indian sovereignty and national interests’ that despite Indian government repetitive protests, China is already involved in infrastructure development projects like construction of motorways, railways, bridges, tunnel and dams in the disputed Gilgit-Baltistan region of Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK), Pakistan. In fact, China started building Karakoram highways in 1957 to increase their strategic influence in this disputed PoK region. No doubt, China-Pakistan Military Nexus is a strategic reality, which has been done against India. Today, both Chinese and Pakistani armies do joint patrolling in the disputed PoK region. With the help of BRI, China wants to increase their strategic influence in South Asia and Indian Ocean region. × With the help of BRI, China wants to increase their strategic influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. China is giving loans to India’s neighbouring countries, such as Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Pakistan. China’s new assertiveness towards South Asia and the Indian Ocean region is a manifestation of asymmetric military and economic capabilities between China and India. One can witness this assertiveness and strategic signalling in the tone and tenor of psychological warfare and threatening and immature words used against India during the recent 73-days long Doklam faceoff. In fact, Doklam faceoff was an ad-hoc diplomatic victory because even Chinese PLA Major General Qiao Liang justified withdrawal of troops in order to secure strategic position and to host BRICS Xiament Summit 2017 between 3rd and 5th Sep-2017; and 19th congress of Chinese communist party between 18th and 25th Oct-2017. These South Asian countries like Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Pakistan are already raising the concerns about repayment of Chinese loans and debts. There are some questions which need to be answered in this context. What if these south small Asian countries default on their repayment of Chinese loan and its high-interest rates? If China is serious about building a world community of shared destiny based on the sovereignty and national interests then, why it did not consult all the participating countries before unilaterally setting the agendas for BRI forum at Beijing on 14-15 May 2017? BRI is a Chinese initiative launched for safeguarding the Chinese strategic and national interests. × No doubt, BRI is a Chinese initiative launched for safeguarding the Chinese strategic and national interests. In the foreseeable future, one cannot discount the possibilities of another India-China boundary disputes because, in Chinese power calculus, India is considered as a junior power merely due to asymmetry in economic and military capabilities of both countries.

China's growing strategic influence in Asia is a threat to India

Author

Zee News Rajasthan

Editor

Sudeep Kumar

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